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Summary 
 
From learning to earning: 
the transition from manufacturing catch-up to competitiveness at the global 
business frontier, as pursued in China’s energy equipment sector 
RF Joe Studwell 
 
Most studies of industrial policy in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China have been 
concerned with the state’s role in framing industrial policy, and have taken a cross-
sectional approach, limited in time. This thesis explores industrial policy 
longitudinally, as a dynamic, evolving relationship between the state and firms, one 
in which the positive contribution of the state tends to diminish as capabilities in the 
wider economy increase. It does so through an examination of the development of 
firms in China’s electricity-generating equipment industry since 1978, based on more 
than 70 case study interviews. Three sub-sectors – thermal power equipment, wind 
turbines, and photovoltaics – are examined in order to track state industrial policy 
development and the evolution of firm-level capabilities and strategies over four 
decades. A multi-disciplinary theoretical foundation is constructed from 
development economics studies and economic and strategic management theory. 
The findings point to inevitable tension between the early-stage, centralising support 
for technological learning by a strong developmental state and the more fluid, 
dynamic and disruptive capabilities that define successful firms’ strategies once basic 
manufacturing skills are acquired. While the developmental state’s strengths are 
reflected in the steady, conservative nurturing of manufacturing capabilities, 
successful firm strategy increasingly requires dynamic capabilities reflected in 
systems integration, and strategic risk taking in the choice of activities in the 
business chain and technology sourcing, in turn favouring private ownership. The 
thesis findings recommend policies that explicitly recognise the need for transitions 
from state-led development to decentralised, entrepreneurial and market-led 
growth. It is concluded that strategic management research could contribute 
significantly to our understanding of economic development if researchers focused 
attention on political economy transitions in developmental-state-led economies.   
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Introduction 
 
It could be argued that no industrial sector has been more central to the 
Chinese government’s ambitions for economic development than power 
generation. One year after Deng Xiaoping established leadership over 
China’s ‘reform and opening’ strategy at the Third Plenum of the 11th 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 
1978, China’s State Council approved the allocation of US$250m of 
scarce foreign exchange for licences and training required for the 
importation of technology for the manufacture of 300 and 600 
megawatt steam turbines and boilers for coal-fired power stations.1 
Contracts with the American firms Westinghouse and Combustion 
Engineering were signed in September and November 1980, and 
formally approved by the Chinese and US governments in early 1981.2 
 
The technology transfer process did not begin well. In the early 1980s, 
Westinghouse hosted more than 500 Chinese engineers for technical 
training courses in Florida. It was planned that the technicians would 
return to China and train other technicians. When Westinghouse 
supervisors re-located to China to oversee turbine construction at three 
newly-built factories in Shanghai, Wuhan and Harbin, however, they 
discovered that the content of their training modules had not been 
imparted to other workers. Westinghouse managers began to have 
																																																								
1 In response to the January 1979 ‘Report on Speeding Up the Development of the [Power] Machinery 
Industry By Learning From Foreign Experience’ ($!EFJ,M´.^|RQ!?), 
submitted to the State Council. The report was the result of two 1978 inspection missions, to Europe 
and Japan. 
2 Source: Shi Yan4, ‘Development of large-scale, complete power equipment sets’ (&(
9)), Equipment Manufacturing magazine (1D), 15 August 2013. 
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doubts that China would absorb the technology its Ministry of Machine 
Building Industry had contracted to receive.3 
 
Progress in technical absorption in the early 1980s was painfully slow. 
Yet with the benefit of 35 years’ hindsight, China not only absorbed the 
original steam turbine technology, but also went on to digest that for 
subsequent ‘super-critical’ and ‘ultra-supercritical’ generations of 
turbine design. Through a combination of licensing arrangements and 
joint ventures with multinational technology providers, and steady 
improvement in product quality under supply contracts to domestic 
power generation facilities, Chinese state companies mastered 
increasingly complex technologies and eventually progressed to export 
markets. 
 
In recent years, there has been evidence of Chinese firms developing 
technological capacity independent of multinational providers, with 
companies controlling their own global networks of research and 
development, design and production facilities. In the renewable energy 
sector, the largest crowd at the China Wind Power trade show in Beijing 
in October 2014 was drawn by Envision, a private equity-backed wind 
turbine firm started by a Chinese former energy analyst for Total, and 
investment banker. Envision operates ‘lean’ wind turbine production 
facilities in China run by a combination of former managers from GE 
Wind with operations specialists from multinational automotive firms, 
recruited to bring new process skills to wind turbine manufacturing. 
Envision has turbine design and testing facilities located in Denmark, a 																																																								
3 Th1, 9 June 2014. 
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blade development centre in Boulder, Colorado, software development 
centres in California in the United States and an energy management 
services division based in Houston, Texas. At the Beijing show, the firm 
launched Greenwich, a software application for design and optimisation 
of wind and solar farms that marries Chinese state supercomputing 
capacity in Jinan and Guangzhou with a low-cost software platform 
based on Google Maps and Amazon cloud hosting services. In seven 
years, Envision became a renewable energy systems integrator that 
ranked as the third biggest wind turbine supplier in China in 2015, and 
the eighth biggest in the world.4 
 
This thesis explores China’s transition from being a learning laggard to a 
global challenger – though not yet a global leader – in the power 
equipment sector. The thesis considers, on the one hand, the extent to 
which the transition should be understood in terms of top-down 
management by a successful developmental state and, on the other, it 
examines the extent to which China’s entrepreneurs should be given 
credit for the bottom-up development of capabilities. In view of doubts 
about the global competitiveness of Chinese firms (Nolan 2002, 2014, 
Nolan and Zhang, 2002, Nolan et al., 2008, Abrami et al., 2014)5, the 
thesis also contextualises China’s four-decade experience of trying to 
																																																								
4 Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) and FTI Consulting data for 2015, accessed 4 July 2016 at 
http://nawindpower.com/top-10-wind-turbine-makers-for-2015-the-year-of-china 
5 Nolan’s long-running doubts about the competitiveness of large-scale Chinese industry are repeated 
in Nolan (2014:xvii): ‘China is unique among large latecomer developing countries in... lacking a 
substantial group of globally competitive firms.’ However, China has no obvious comparators in terms 
of ‘large latecomer developing countries’. Only South Korea and Taiwan, both much smaller 
economies, are in any way comparable in terms of the structure and pace of their economic 
development. Of these two, South Korea is defined by branded multinational businesses, Taiwan is 
not. Moreover, South Korean corporates like Hyundai and Samsung were only recognized as globally 
competitive players in the 1990s, after more than three decades of development and at a level of 
GNI-per-capita, controlled for inflation, that China is only now approaching. 
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create globally competitive firms in terms of the historic industrialisation 
performance of Asian peers Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  
 
The three central research questions of this thesis are: 1. What have 
been the common success strategies of firms transitioning from learning 
laggards to being globally competitive? 2. What have been the most 
successful developmental state policies that have facilitated this 
transition? 3. How have the most successful firm strategies and most 
successful developmental state policies evolved over time? The central 
research questions are deliberately broad because the research 
construct is inductive, with no a priori assumptions (Zott and Huy, 2007, 
Hargadon and Sutton, 1997).  
 
This thesis seeks to shift the debate about the developmental state away 
from its traditional focus on cross-sectional analysis of different 
countries (for instance: Wade, 1990, Evans, 1995, Amsden, 1989) 
towards a longitudinal focus on how the relationship between the state, 
the entrepreneurial firm, and decentralised arm’s length markets 
evolved, or might optimally evolve, under the sort of successful 
industrial policy associated with the ‘north-east Asian’ economies of 
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China. I call such economies Fast 
Developing Countries (FDCs); they are characterised by average GDP 
growth of 8-10 percent per annum over more than 25 years (Spence, 
2008, Studwell, 2013). Rather than add to a voluminous literature on 
east Asia that demonstrates that industrial policy contributes to 
accelerated economic transformation and accumulation (Amsden 1989, 
2001, Chang, 1994, Johnson, 1982, Lall, 1996, Naughton, 1995, 2007, 
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Woo, 1991), this thesis seeks to tease out more detail about how 
industrial policy contributes, what its limitations are, and what are the 
evolving, longitudinal contributions of private sector entrepreneurs and 
markets that the developmental state must cede economic space to.  
 
Empirically, the thesis deals with the power equipment manufacturing 
industry in China since 1978. Making cheap electricity is fundamental to 
accelerated economic development, because accelerated development 
involves heavy dependence on manufacturing (Kaldor, 1966, 1967, 1968, 
Studwell, 2013). China’s attention to the power generation sector has 
been acute. This thesis looks at China’s original, post-1978 programme 
to master technology for coal-fired thermal power generating 
equipment, the same fundamental technology that has been pursued by 
emerging countries and their leading engineering firms for more than 
one hundred years. The thesis then moves on to consider the acquisition 
of capabilities in two newer, renewable power generating technologies: 
wind turbines and crystalline photovoltaics.  
 
The logic of this three sub-sector comparison is to allow for three 
different perspectives on the evolving state-firm relationship over time, 
and to track ‘resets’ as the developmental state and its firms tackle new 
technological challenges with constantly rising capabilities. In this thesis I 
use the term resets to refer to the launch of a new product category 
within the broad industrial sector that manufactures equipment used to 
generate electricity. Resets occur both within existing firms as they 
evolve longitudinally, and in new firms that are formed in the context of 
rising, economy-wide capabilities that encourage entrepreneurs to 
	 21	
launch start-ups. In technological terms, there are three resets that are 
considered: when the original ‘big three’ state-owned power equipment 
firms set out to make large gas turbines (LGTs) (a within-firm reset); 
when old state-owned firms, new state-owned firms, new hybrid state-
private firms, and new private firms set out to make wind turbines (a 
within-firm and new-firm reset); and when mostly private firms set out 
to make solar photovoltaic power generating equipment (a within-firm 
and new-firm reset overwhelmingly skewed to new firms).  
 
It is important to note that in developmental states resets may be 
heavily influenced by, or even determined by, government industrial 
policy, which aims to set priorities for technological catch-up at the firm 
level (Amsden, 1989, Johnson, 1982, Wade, 1990). This is particularly so 
in the early stages of catch-up because, at the outset, the developmental 
state has, almost by definition, greater capabilities in the planning, 
execution and coordination of technology acquisition than firms, which 
are characterised by low capabilities (Chang, 1994). The three sub-
industry structure of the thesis attempts to capture the dynamic nature 
of the economic catch-up (Abramovitz, 1986, Gerschenkron, 1962) 
experience, at both government and firm levels, over four decades. 
 
In the case of China, a thesis structure that also highlights intra-firm, 
technology-based resets in terms of state-firm relations is necessary 
because as Kroeber (2016) notes, China since 1978 engaged in not one 
but two reform processes. The first was the introduction of 
developmental state policies based around international trade and flows 
of technology similar to those familiar from Japan, South Korea and 
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Taiwan (Studwell, 2013). The second reform process, not seen in the 
other economies, was a transition away from a centrally-planned, non-
market economy in which almost all activity, as of 1978, was undertaken 
by state work units not subject to price signals. The manner in which this 
wrenching second transition occurred can only be fully accounted for by 
investigating businesses that began operations at different points during 
the transition process, reflecting changing government industrial 
management- and firm-ownership regimes that obtained in different 
periods.  
 
It is also helpful in answering the research questions of this thesis that 
the longitudinal structure allows us to compare the performance of 
state-owned firms with hybrid state-private firms and private firms, as 
they were successively permitted to participate in different power 
equipment businesses. In addition, the structure allows us to compare 
the thermal power equipment and wind turbine industries which were 
given full state industrial policy support from an early stage, and the 
photovoltaics sector where firms were left for many years to operate 
without an industrial policy commitment to a subsidised domestic 
market. These multiple perspectives are essential to the conclusions set 
out in Chapter 6.6 
 
When we look chronologically at the resets examined in this thesis, we 
see the state-firm relationship in thermal power equipment as it was 
originally configured in 1978; the manner in which it evolved in the 
1980s and 1990s as state control over state firms gradually loosened; 																																																								
6 To be clear, a transition from more central control to less, or more planning to less, is a stylised fact 
of all Asian FDCs: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China. China is the most extreme case. 
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how the relationship was reset when the wind and photovoltaics 
businesses scaled up in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and private firms 
were allowed into the sectors to compete on a more or less equal 
footing with state firms; and what happened when state industrial policy 
focused the big three state-owned thermal firms on LGTs, initially in 
2003, but more aggressively beginning with China’s 12th Five Year Plan 
(2011-15).  
 
As noted, throughout this longitudinal evolution, government industrial 
policymakers adjusted their strategies for technology acquisition and 
were confronted with new policy choices. At the firm level, managers 
and entrepreneurs addressed a rapidly evolving competitive landscape, 
one that made possible previously impossible entry strategies. Within 
firms, adaptability to technological resets was critical to commercial 
success. In this respect, an important contribution of this is thesis is to 
highlight the changing role of firm strategy in catch-up. In the electricity-
generating equipment industry, thermal firms set out in the 1980s to 
acquire basic manufacturing capabilities and a gradual, step-by-step 
approach to this process led to success. However, in both the thermal 
sub-sector and subsequent renewables sub-sectors, manufacturing 
capabilities alone did not provide a route to global competitiveness. Firm 
strategy in terms of different activities in a given business chain and 
technology sourcing became the keys to better margins and hence 
superior competitive performance. These were capabilities generated 
within firms, not capabilities that the developmental state could plan 
and direct. 
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In addressing the evolution of the state-firm relationship, this thesis 
concentrates considerable attention on questions of vertical scope of 
firm activity and on firms’ unfolding value chain strategies. The approach 
reflects a substantial theoretical literature in economics and strategic 
management studies, set out in Chapter 1, that points to a tension 
between vertical integration as a means to acquiring capabilities at the 
firm level, and vertical disintegration as a route to greater profitability, 
most directly via reduced capital intensity. While the theoretical 
literature is substantial, it has not usually been applied to case studies of 
accelerated firm-level development under state industrial policy. In the 
development economics and economic history literature, examinations 
of the role of vertical integration as a tool of learning, and subsequent 
vertical disintegration, are to be found mostly in empirical studies (for 
instance: Thun, 2006, Cusumano, 1985, Gregory, 1985, Chandler, 1988 
(1959), 1990 (1962), 1977). This thesis therefore seeks to connect 
theoretical insights from economics and strategic management 
scholarship focused primarily on developed countries with the 
experiences of firms in developing countries under developmental state 
leadership. 
 
Chapter 1 sets out the theoretical and empirical context in which the 
thesis is written. It brings together different strands of literature in 
economic and strategic management theory, development economics 
studies, and economic and business history. The chapter also sets out 
the ‘north-east Asian’ developmental context into which China fits. A 
critical aim of Chapter 1 is to establish that there is a theoretical gap in 
the extant literature that justifies the theory building undertaken in this 
	 25	
thesis (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Chapter 2 presents the 
methodology and research design, as well as a brief discussion of the 
interplay of national and local governance in China that poses a 
particular challenge to a research construct concerned, in part, with 
‘government’ industrial policy. Chapter 3 examines the development of 
the thermal power equipment sector after 1978 and the efforts of 
incumbent state-owned firms to react to the rise of renewables from the 
late 1990s. A discussion at the end of Chapter 3 reflects on the apparent 
successes and limitations of the original state firm development model.  
Chapter 4 considers the wind turbine business, where the central 
government decided in the early 2000s to use supply- and demand-side 
industrial policy to back the development of an industry in which firms 
of all domestic ownership types were encouraged to participate. Chapter 
5 examines the solar photovoltaics sector, where the central 
government determined not to provide demand-side industrial policy 
support in the early 2000s. Emergent firms relied instead on limited, 
supply-side science and technology (S&T) policy support and on local 
government support, until a period of crisis in the industry saw the 
central government step in to create a subsidised domestic market 
similar to that in the wind sector. Chapter 6 presents integrated findings, 
discussion and scope for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
Theoretical and empirical context 
 
1.1. Motivation 
Broadly, China has followed the industrialisation trajectory pioneered in 
east Asia by Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (Studwell, 2013). The classic 
texts of accelerated industrial development in those economies were 
written in the 1980s and described industrialisation overwhelmingly 
from the perspective of government policy. According to the key country 
studies, it was the provision of support, subsidy and protection to 
nurture the development of ‘infant industries’ that defined the most 
rapid industrialisation processes the world had yet seen. 
 
Amsden (1989) was the most strident in designating government 
planning as the decisive force in successful industrialisation, in a study of 
South Korea’s development. In her analysis, the state’s dominant role 
meant that: ‘the protagonist of industrialization is not so much the 
entrepreneur today as the salaried engineer’ (1989:9). According to 
Amsden’s paradigm, the state planned, and the engineer rather than the 
entrepreneur delivered on a plan that was driven by the state’s 
application of an extensive range of direct and indirect subsidies: ‘The 
allocation of subsidies has rendered the government not merely a 
banker, as Gerschenkron (1962) conceived it, but an entrepreneur, using 
the subsidy to decide what, when and how much to produce’ 
(1989:144).7  																																																								
7 Amsden (1989) did not consider how the relationship between the state and the entrepreneur was 
adjusting, and would in future adjust, as the state began to reduce its involvement in industrial policy-
making, even though this started to happen under the presidency of Chun Doo Hwan from 1980, in 
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Johnson (1982), author of the earliest of the seminal single-country 
studies, about Japan, identified a more mutually inter-dependent 
relationship between state and firm. He placed Japan’s post-Second 
World War planning agency, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Investment (MITI), at the centre of industrial development, describing 
the defining characteristic of accelerated development as its ‘plan-
rational’ nature (1982:chapter 1). The plan, however, had to 
complement rather than replace the contribution of the entrepreneur: 
‘the fundamental political problem of the state-guided high-growth 
system,’ wrote Johnson, ‘is that of the relationship between the state 
and privately owned business... If this relationship is overbalanced in 
favour of one side or the other, it will result in either the loss of the 
benefits of competition or the dilution of the state’s priorities.’ 
(1982:195). 
 
Nonetheless, despite Johnson’s assertion of this central tension, he 
included almost no firm-level examination of the state-firm relationship 
in his study. Equally, while Johnson recognised the emergence of key 
Japanese firms outside MITI’s plans -- including Sony, Matsushita and 
Honda -- he did not provide an explanation as to why such successful 
firms should turn out to be ‘unplanned’.8 
 
																																																																																																																																																															
the period when she was conducting her research. Amsden’s later work on the relationship between 
state and entrepreneur is discussed below. 
8 In a similar vein Johnson (1982:chapter 3) notes that it was the sale of publicly-owned ‘pilot’ 
factories to private entrepreneurs in Meiji Japan in the 1880s that coincided with the development of 
the first really successful Japanese firms. But there is no detailed analysis of what entrepreneurs were 
able to do that the state had not delivered. 
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Wade (1990), in dealing with the development of Taiwan, was largely 
consistent with Johnson. His ‘governed markets’ theory centred on three 
elements of effective state infant industry policy: very high investment 
to accelerate transfer of technology; more investment in certain 
industries than would occur otherwise; and exposure of many industries 
to international competition (1990:26pp). Firms and entrepreneurs were 
acknowledged, but existed in the background of Wade’s state policy-
driven development analysis. There was little direct consideration given 
to a firm-level or entrepreneurial perspective. 
 
The emphasis on the contribution of state industrial policy in these 
country studies provided an important riposte to neo-liberal claims in 
the 1970s and 1980s about the redundancy or counter-productiveness 
of infant industry policies (Krueger, 1974, Lal, 2000 (1983)). The 
approach was consistent with other pro-industrial policy, multi-country 
studies of the period, such as Evans (Evans et al., 1985).  However the 
adoration of state capacity displaced valid questions about the limits and 
durability of state industrial policies (as highlighted, for instance, by 
Little, 1982, 1993, Little et al.,1970).  
 
The limits of dirigiste industrial policy became apparent, I suggest, in the 
1990s when Japanese, and to a lesser extent Taiwanese, growth 
collapsed, and South Korea became embroiled in the Asian Financial 
Crisis, necessitating a request for International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
assistance. If the classic texts of the 1980s shed light on the potential for 
state policy to guide rapid economic accumulation, actual experience in 
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the 1990s pointed to a more complex, dynamic development experience 
than those texts allowed for. 
 
The north-east Asian country studies of the 1980s had three major 
weaknesses. First, state industrial policy was treated in monolithic 
terms. Its costs and benefits were not analysed relative to the evolving 
capabilities of the firms, or the aggregate economies, which state policy 
sought to build up. Infant industry programmes were presented 
somewhat simplistically as necessary and positive, rather than as time-
specific responses to transitory problems. Second, and equally and 
oppositely, the contribution of the entrepreneur was treated 
monolithically, rather than as something that co-evolved and changed as 
infant industry policies impacted firms and economies. And third, the 
phenomenon of successful ‘off-plan’ firms highlighted by Johnson in 
Japan was not explored, even though it pointed to a more nuanced 
relationship between state industrial policy and entrepreneurial success 
than, in particular, Amsden’s (1989) blunt early dismissal of the 
entrepreneurial role allowed. The seminal country studies from east Asia 
did not offer dynamic explanations, and left large empirical and 
theoretical holes in our understanding of latecomer industrialisation. 
The holes were longitudinal in nature – to do with how industrial policies 
need to be adjusted and scaled up and down over time, how the 
relationship between the state and the entrepreneur evolves, and what 
the entrepreneur delivers, and why, at different points in this process.  
 
The one major study of the era to focus explicitly on firm-level learning 
in South Korea and Taiwan, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore, was 
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Hobday (1995). This study provided a thorough taxonomy of firm-level 
learning channels: foreign direct investment (FDI), joint ventures, 
licensing, original equipment manufacture (OEM), original design 
manufacture (ODM), other sub-contracting, learning through buyers, 
learning through hiring of foreign specialists and returnees, overseas 
acquisitions, and strategic partnerships. However, the study was limited 
to the electronics industry up to the early 1990s. It concentrated on 
learning in terms of products and production processes. There was some 
discussion of the learning of marketing and organisational skills, such as 
the transition from OEM to ODM. But the research period was too early 
to take in systems integration and servitisation capabilities that are 
important competitive dimensions in this thesis. After four decades of 
development in China, the capabilities of the best firms analysed in this 
thesis are greater and more complex than those of firms considered by 
Hobday in South Korea and Taiwan after three decades of catch-up 
learning.  
 
In the early 2000s, Amsden and Chu (2003) completed a longitudinal 
study of Taiwan, which also focused on the electronics sector. They 
argued that developmental success in the late 1980s and 1990s in 
Taiwan was characterised by a new type of ‘second mover’ firm that 
combined three things: scale, technological and management 
capabilities, and distribution capacity. The observations that state firm 
leadership in Taiwan gave way in some cases to private firm leadership, 
that ‘big man’ entrepreneurs played important roles9, that returnee 
																																																								
9 ‘Behind almost every big electronics company in Taiwan was a “big man” – the owner-entrepreneur 
who could make decisions quickly with respect to ramping up... With a big man at the top and salaried 
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technical specialists became important, and that government R&D 
support of enterprises became ever more critical, all pointed to a 
dynamic state-firm relationship. However there was no theorisation of 
the overall process and no clear connection made to Amsden’s earlier 
(1989) theoretical assertions with respect to South Korean development. 
Moreover, the Taiwan electronics sector’s technology acquisition model 
was anomalous in north-east Asia in that it depended heavily on 
capability building conducted within state research agencies and then 
gifted to existing private firms or spun out to new private start-ups.10  
 
It was China scholarship of the 2000s and 2010s that produced a much 
richer literature of longitudinal studies, including the sectors of 
automotive (Anderson, 2012, Thun, 2006), electronics (Fu, 2015b, 
Jakobson, 2007), computing (Lu, 2000, Fuller, 2016), 
telecommunications (Harwit, 2008) and renewable energy (Fu and 
Zhang, 2011, Lewis, 2012). These studies began to provide greater 
empirical depth in their treatment of the unfolding challenges facing 
both developmental state policymakers and firm-level strategists. 
Several China studies referred explicitly to multiple ‘stages’ of innovation 
capability building against a background of changing economy-wide 
capabilities (Fu, 2015b, Rein, 2014, Yip and McKern, 2016). 
 
In an important early study of the automotive sector, Thun (2006) 
showed how much the requirement for state policy intervention to 																																																																																																																																																															
managers in the middle and bottom, leading enterprises became hierarchically managed but fast to 
respond’ (2003:41). 
10 The main agencies involved were the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), ITRI’s 
subsidiary the Electronics Research and Service Organisation (ERSO), and the National Science Council 
(NSC). 
	 32	
support firm-level development changed over time. He described how, 
initially, laissez-faire approaches to building firm-level capabilities in 
Beijing and Guangzhou failed on the one hand, while directly nationally-
controlled carmakers under fragmented bureaucratic control, in Wuhan 
and Changchun, came up short on the other.11 It was a local 
developmental state (Oi, 1995) in Shanghai that delivered effective 
coordination in the auto sector, co-financing and organising production 
networks for components, and thereby creating the first genuinely 
capable car firm, Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC).12  
 
Thun highlighted, however, that the Shanghai developmental state-SAIC 
relationship needed to change if the latter was to move towards global 
competitiveness, brand development and export capacity (2006:chapter 
8). At its simplest, he identified a two-stage challenge under which the 
component production structure that made SAIC the market-leading 
assembler needed to become more entrepreneurially managed, more 
flexible and more disintegrated in order to nurture technical and design 
skills, reduce costs, and raise profits (Figure 1, below). The challenge that 
confronted developmental-state policy therefore changed, from 
coordination of component production to enhancement of efficiency 
and profitability. 
 
																																																								
11 ‘There was nothing virtuous about the development process for firms in localities with laissez-faire 
local states. The fragmented local bureaucracies were unable to concentrate resources in key firms, 
and thus did little to ameliorate the collective action problem within the network of local suppliers... 
local supply firms quickly withered on the vine... The outcome was not much better for the firm-
dominated localities of Changchun and Wuhan during this early stage. Although the fragmentation 
had a different source in these cases – the split between centrally controlled business groups and the 
locality – the result was the same. Domestic [component] firms at the local level did not have the 
financial resources that development required’ (2006:32). 
12 In the 1990s, SAIC controlled over 50 percent of the Chinese market for sedans (Thun, 2006:32). 
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Figure 1. Stages of Development in the Chinese Auto Sector 
 
 
Source: Thun (2006:39) 
 
Thun recognised that change was difficult and that path dependency 
was the easiest course of action, posing a threat to the continued 
success of the developmental state-firm relationship: ‘The very success 
of a development effort will result in an economic environment that is 
different from the one in which the initial policy was formulated. The 
question is not whether change will occur, but whether states will have 
adequate capacity to respond’ (2006:38). Thun suspected that, given 
institutional path dependency, the Shanghai government and SAIC 
would find it difficult to cut costs as fast as subsequent market entrants, 
destroying SAIC’s early monopolistic pricing power. He was correct. In 
the 2000s, off-plan private firms in China, typified by Geely, Chery and 
Great Wall, accessed supply networks created by groups like SAIC, 
Stage 2: The race for competitiveness 
 
 
Broader range of pre-existing customers 
and suppliers leads to decreasing need for 
investment coordination for the sector as 
a whole. 
 
An urgent need for cutting costs is created 
by rapidly increasing levels of competition. 
Effective governance of firms becomes 
critical. 
 
For firms that aspire to belong to the 
upper tiers of the supply chain and 
compete with global suppliers, the 
development of technical and design skills 
is of paramount importance and the key to 
future competitiveness. 
Stage 1: Development as a coordination 
problem 
 
Need for coordinated development of a 
supply network creates high level of 
capital intensity for sector as a whole. 
 
The small number of potential customers 
(due to low levels of development and 
local protectionism) leads to high levels of 
asset specificity for many key supply firms. 
 
Urgent need to master manufacturing and 
project execution skills makes learning and 
feedback critical, particularly in forms 
conducive to the dissemination of tacit 
knowledge. 
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established lower cost structures, more resourceful approaches to 
marketing, and began to take market share, principally in the lowest-
cost sedan segments (Anderson, 2012).  
 
Subsequent longitudinal sectoral studies across the automotive, 
motorcycle and construction machinery sectors in China highlighted a 
tendency for early-stage state industrial policy to become counter-
productive as sectors and firms approached the technological frontier 
(Brandt and Thun 2010, 2016). Policy flexibility was a pre-requisite for 
continued competitive progress. In a study of China’s 
telecommunications equipment sector, Harwit similarly found that it 
was relatively greater government industrial policy flexibility compared 
with other sectors that accounted for the rise of a larger number of 
globally competitive firms (Harwit, 2008).  
 
Longitudinal firm and sectoral studies in China also questioned whether 
the heavy presence of state-owned enterprises in the country’s 
industrial planning was crowding out private sector entrepreneurs and 
making relatively less efficient use of investment capital than the private 
sector (Huang, 2008, Steinfeld, 1998, Fuller, 2016). Fuller (2016), in an 
investigation of China’s IT sector, including software and 
semiconductors, concluded that in recent years state sector firms failed 
to deliver technological progress. The finding was borne out by 
quantitative studies showing that China’s state enterprises are 
characterised by both lower levels of profitability and less efficient R&D 
activity than private firms (Johansson and Feng, 2016, Xia and Walker, 
2015, Zhou et al., 2017, Zhang et al., 2003).  
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The suggestion that state ownership of firms was a growing impediment 
to technological and competitive progress echoed earlier concerns in 
Taiwan, which for common historical reasons (Kirby, 1990) also had a 
large public sector. While long-term state ownership was associated 
with positive outcomes in Taiwan’s semiconductor foundry operations 
(Tsai and Cheng, 2006), it was less successful elsewhere. After Taiwan 
began its heavy industrialisation drive in 1969, referred to locally as its 
‘second stage’ development programme, state firms dominated three of 
four target sectors, with lacklustre results (Gold, 1986, Fei et al., 1999, Li, 
1988).13 At the same time, private sector Taiwanese firms were often 
denied the scale and scope of industrial policy support afforded to peers 
to in South Korea, with negative implications for them, as a comparison 
of firms like Acer and Samsung Electronics highlights (Chang, 2008, Tsai 
and Cheng, 2006). 
 
A second group of longitudinal studies with potentially significant 
implications for China was ones that reviewed industrial policy outcomes 
in north-east Asia’s most mature developmental-state economy. Japan’s 
post-1989 economic crisis gave rise to a number of studies that were 
important in highlighting that manufacturing capabilities alone, on which 
developmental-state literature concentrated, had not been sufficient to 
deliver true global competitiveness to emergent firms. Manufacturing 
capability was a necessary, but not a sufficient, requirement for 
international competitiveness. 
 																																																								
13 Petrochemicals, machinery, shipbuilding, iron and steel. 
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Case studies conducted in the post-crash Japanese economy highlighted 
that while Japanese industrial policy had been highly effective in 
upgrading the variety and quality of manufacturing products, Japanese 
firms often failed to achieve profit margins on par with US and European 
multinationals (Emmott, 1989, Wood, 1992, Pempel, 1998, Motonishi 
and Yoshikawa, 1999, Pafomansu, 1997). The reasons for this included a 
failure to disintegrate production chains in favour of less capital-
intensive operating structures and a shortfall of marketing capabilities, 
especially in export markets (Sakiya and Porter, 1982:chapter 5, 
Cusumano, 1985, Pafomansu, 1997, Morita et al., 1994:83pp).14   
 
The outstanding case study of entrepreneurial success in Japan was the 
country’s automakers, led by Toyota, that in the 1950s and 1960s 
created an asset-light ‘systems integration’ model (Prencipe et al., 2003) 
– a strategic management rather than a manufacturing breakthrough. 
Branded automakers exercised control of supplier firms with either 
minority or zero equity positions, cutting their investment and operating 
costs while passing risks of overcapacity on to suppliers, thereby 
maximising leverage in the value chain with the smallest possible asset 
base (Fine, 1999, Cusumano, 1985).15 The system integrators then 
focused more investment on sales and marketing activities.16  
																																																								
14 Chapter 2 of Nihon Indasutoriaru Pafomansu (1997), on the Home Electric Appliance Industry, 
included a close analysis of how that sector lagged far behind global multinational peers in 
disintegrating productions chains, and often in profitability; Chapter 4, Metallic Materials, makes 
similar points about heavy industry; Chapter 8, Common Problems, highlights ‘low manufacturing 
profits’ as a systemic problem. Akio Morita wrote a number of publicly influential essays (in Japanese) 
in the 1990s on Japan’s still-poor profitability record; a small taste of points he made can be found in 
English at http://www.akiomorita.net/en/contents/philosophy/007.html Accessed 23 October 2017. 
15 Cusumano described the asset-light approach as supply networks with ‘minimum direct investment, 
established long-term programmes to increase productivity and quality, subcontracted components 
and final assembly at unusually high levels to firms with lower wage scales’ (1985:2). Cusumano 
estimated that between 1965 and 1980, Toyota and Nissan increased production 600 percent while 
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Consistent with Johnson’s (1982) observation in his seminal country 
study, the most profitable and successful Japanese firms continued to be 
ones outside the developmental state’s core industrial planning regime. 
These more ‘off-plan’ firms included Sony (Morita et al., 1994:note, 
particularly, 200pp with respect to Japan's best firms, Nathan, 1999), 
Honda (Sakiya and Porter, 1982), Toyota (Cusumano, 1985, Toyoda, 
1987), and Softbank (Lynskey and Yonekura, 2001), which combined 
narrow product capabilities with strategic capabilities that made them 
flexible, leaner, and more able to adjust strategy to fit with rising 
economy-wide capabilities and new opportunities (Fine, 1999, Toyoda, 
1987, Sakiya and Porter, 1982). The experience suggested that what the 
developmental state delivered in orchestrating manufacturing upgrading 
was ultimately superseded by strategic capabilities honed within firms.  
 
Notably, the finding that in north-east Asian developmental states 
manufacturing capability was a necessary but not sufficient requirement 
for competitive dominance echoed Chandler’s conclusion in his historical 
studies of the emergence of leading US firms in the late 19th century. 
Chandler observed that during the formative 1880-1900 period of 
industrialisation there was a consistent pattern whereby competition 																																																																																																																																																															
increasing fixed investment at their factories by one-third as much (1985:215). It should be noted that 
this strategy was consistent with, and combined with, innovative forward integration, particularly at 
Toyota and Honda, which invested in national dealership networks where dealers were employed to 
sell individual model lines so that not only existing best-selling models were sold, maximising 
throughput in the Chandlerian (Chandler, 1977) tradition (1985:123pp). 
16 For an indication of how important marketing capability was to the success of Toyota and Honda, 
the two outstanding Japanese car firms, see Cusumano (1985:135) Table 37: ‘Dealer Network 
Comparison [of 11 major Japanese car firms], December 1983’. Honda was a pioneer in not 
distributing through Japan’s general trading companies. In the United States, Honda also took direct 
control of its sales and marketing operations for motorcycles, setting up dealerships not through 
existing American motorcycle dealers, but through sporting goods stores and hobby shops in such a 
way that the firm could control the entire marketing process (Sakiya and Porter 1982:chapter 5). 
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through manufacturing scale alone was insufficient because barriers to 
entry in most types of manufacturing were too low. He found that a 
struggle to control sales and marketing channels, including logistics, 
became the early US economy’s defining strategic battleground 
(Chandler, 1959, 1967, 1982, 1990 (1962)).17 
 
Longitudinal studies established a number of dynamic empirical 
regularities in the developmental state-firm relationship. Three of these 
are of particular consequence for this thesis: the first is the basic fact of 
discrete stages in the developmental state-firm relationship that depend 
on the broader context of evolving economy-wide capabilities; the 
second, which is particularly important in China in the light of the 
country’s transition from a socialist economy, is that the benefit of state 
ownership of firms under the developmental state is increasingly 
questionable as economy-wide capabilities increase; and the third is that 
manufacturing capabilities, which are those are most easily nurtured by 
the developmental state, are not, on their own, sufficient to deliver true 
global competitiveness to firms – strategic capabilities are required. In 
order to understand why the developmental state-firm relationship 
must be a dynamic one, it is necessary to look to theories of economic 
growth. 
 
 
 																																																								
17 In Chandler (1990 (1962)), the key sections of the role of forward integration are Chapter 1 and 
pp386. Chandler’s work on the 1880-1900 period of US firm-level development was mostly 
undertaken in the early part of his career in the later 1950s and early 1960s. It built on his earliest 
research on the creation of the US railway network (Chandler, 1956), which made possible the 
markets in which he argued that organisational strategy became more important than scale in 
determining winners and losers. 
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1.2. Developments in theories of economic growth   
The approach to the theoretical discussion in this thesis was to search 
for relevant theory without a priori assumptions (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997:5).18 The quest looked principally at theoretical developments in 
three areas: macro- and microeconomics; development economics; and 
strategic management theory. This first section deals with economic 
theory and three new theoretical schema that, since the 1980s, claimed 
to offer fresh tools with which to analyse the process of economic 
growth and development. 
 
1.2.1. Transaction costs 
The first was transaction cost economics (TCE) (Williamson, 1975, 1987 
(1985), an attempt to create a comprehensive micro-economic 
framework consistent with the tenets of orthodox, marginalist19 
economics. TCE built on and systemised the post-Second World War 
literature on market failure (for instance, Akerlof, 1970, Arrow, 1962, 
1969). Market failures resulting from the absence of large numbers of 
market participants, complexity and uncertainty, the exploitation of 
imperfect information by opportunists, and the ‘bounded rationality’ 
(Simon, 1957:198) of human beings when analysing the world about 
them were directly confronted, rather than assumed away by 
spontaneous, costless coordination. The institution that resolved these 
failures was the firm, which (building on Coase, 1937) existed in order to 
coordinate transactions that could not be more efficiently handled by 																																																								
18 This much-cited paper is of itself a case study in why, in theory building, it is often important not to 
have a priori assumptions. 
19 In line with A.K. Dasgupta (1985), the adjective ‘marginalist’ is preferred to ‘neo-classical’ as being 
more descriptively accurate. Recently, the creators of endogenous growth models might make a 
stronger claim to the description neo-classical, but their work has not become central to 
contemporary orthodoxy, which remains best described as marginalist. 
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markets. Firms dealt with failures in the market by internalising 
transactions through vertical integration, which allowed fiat within the 
firm to replace problematic transactions in the marketplace.  
 
At first blush, TCE had little to say on the subject of long-run 
technological progress, a central subject of this thesis. Its objective was 
to explain which current-period transactions were handled by the 
market and which were internalised within firms (Shin, 2013).20 As 
Perrow (Perrow et al., 1986:236) put it in his critique of TCE: 
‘Transaction-costs economics is an efficiency argument for the present 
state of affairs.’  
 
Despite this, TCE’s acute focus on problems of information and 
coordination made its empirical application well suited to questions of 
technology acquisition. For example, TCE offered an explanation of why 
high levels of vertical integration were observed in firms in their 
formative stages of technology acquisition, as was the case in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan (with respect to Japan, for instance, see Gregory, 
1985, OECD, 1979). In the TCE paradigm, an integrated production 
structure improved information sharing and coordination, overcame 
weak public systems of dispute resolution and legal enforcement, and 
circumvented under-developed markets for intermediate goods. Equally 
and oppositely, TCE pointed to distortions resulting from internal 
procurement, tendencies to undisciplined expansion and strategic path 
dependency, and problems rewarding entrepreneurship, that made 																																																								
20 Shin (2013:44) notes that TCE is ‘an attempt to rectify the deficiencies of the concept of production 
cost in standard neo-classical economic theories’. Total costs of economic activity are therefore 
defined as production cost (specified in the production function) plus transaction cost – although 
Williamson never directly discusses production cost. 
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vertical integration a potentially inefficient structure in the longer term 
(Williamson, 1975:117pp, 129pp). TCE might therefore help to explain 
dynamic hierarchical change in firms acquiring technology over time.21 
 
The problem was that a profound contradiction was inherent in TCE. On 
the one hand, TCE sought to complement a marginalist framework that 
had no explicit place for ongoing technical change. On the other, 
Williamson’s undoubted analytical advances pointed to change in 
vertical scope as a natural firm-level response to issues of technological 
learning and progress, dragging technology into view. Williamson’s 
inability to resolve this contradiction was clear in the one chapter of his 
key theoretical work devoted to technology (Williamson, 1975:chapter 
10, 'Market Structure in Relation to Technical and Organisational 
Innovation'). Here, Williamson avoided the more specific term 
‘technological progress’, preferring the ambiguous catch-all -- 
‘progressiveness’ -- and claiming, without evidence, that this was a 
variant of efficiency: 
 
‘Earlier chapters are mainly cost oriented; progressiveness is featured 
here... although efficiency and progressiveness are by no means 
independent, there is a difference in the emphasis of each...’ (1975:176). 
 
There was no elucidation of what the difference of ‘emphasis’ might be 
and the claim was uncharacteristically obtuse in what was otherwise a 
highly cogent theoretical explication. The problem for Williamson was 																																																								
21 This in turn explains why the TCE framework has continued to be an important point of reference 
for scholars of technological change, whether in the value chain literature (for instance Gereffi, 
Humphrey, Sturgeon, 2005) or in strategic management studies (for instance Teece, 1986). 
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that by analysing internal firm organisation so rigorously he pointed to 
the fact that firms do not only economise on current transaction costs, 
they also economise on longer-run learning costs associated with 
technological change. Indeed, TCE’s focus on hierarchy was sometimes 
more convincing in explaining firm structures as a response to long-run 
knowledge acquisition and technological challenges than as a short-run 
response to efficiency demands and profit pressures.22  
 
TCE made an important, if unwitting and theoretically confused, 
contribution to our understanding of internal firm-level responses to 
problems of technological progress. The theoretical confusion arose 
because of the determination to stick with the static efficiency analysis 
at the core of marginalist economics, rather than an explicitly dynamic 
approach that technical change demands. It subsequently fell to 
strategic management theorists, influenced by TCE, to consider changes 
in vertical scope dynamically (see below). It is the work of those 
management theorists that is particularly relevant to this thesis. To be 
fair to Williamson (1975, 1987 (1985):18), he did repeatedly state that 
TCE should be used in tandem with other analytical methodologies. 
 
1.2.2. TCE extended to the state  
The explanatory power of transaction cost economising was sufficiently 
alluring for heterodox development economists that Chang (1994) 
extended it to the institution of the state. Consistent with the FDC 
experience in north-east Asia, Chang argued that not only firms, but 																																																								
22 In turn, early, influential empirical applications of TCE dealt with technology absorption and 
development at the firm level (see, for instance, Ogden and Teece 1980, Monteverde and Teece 
1982). 
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governments, played a role in coordinating economic activity and 
thereby economising on transaction costs. A valid view of the economic 
process – particularly the FDC development process -- therefore 
compared the cost of the state resolving market coordination problems 
with the cost of other solutions:23 
 
‘In the real world, both state intervention and market transactions are 
costly. Therefore the comparison must be between the costs of 
allocating resources through market transactions (or the transaction 
costs of market allocation) and the costs of allocating resources through 
state intervention (or the transaction costs of state allocation). Thus 
seen, the real question is whether the state can achieve the same 
allocative efficiency at a lower cost than the market can do, and not 
whether state intervention is costly per se. Introducing transaction costs 
into our scheme allows us to introduce a role of the state which has 
hitherto been neglected in conventional economic theory, that is, the 
role of lowering transaction costs in the economy’ (Chang, 1994:48). 
 
The costs with which Chang dealt were primarily those relating to 
‘strategic uncertainty’. The state was presented as a potential agent of 
efficiency – a least-cost solution – when it came to investment 
coordination at the early, and least certain, stages of economic 
development. Equally, the state was shown empirically to be a cost-
efficient manager of recession cartels to smooth external economic 
shocks, and the most efficient arbiter of negotiated exits and capacity 
scrapping in the middle stages of latecomer industrialisation. Various 																																																								
23 Chang is South Korean and has written, most extensively, about the development of South Korea, 
an FDC. 
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types of transaction cost economising associated with state industrial 
policy are set out in Figure 2.  
 
However Chang’s concern to bring the state into the transaction cost 
paradigm saw him push the firm out. His construct was state versus 
market, not state versus firm versus market, as a true extension of 
Williamson would be. Where this dissertation deals with vertical scope 
and transaction cost economising in pursuit of technological learning, it 
envisages a comprehensive, three-way trade-off between all the 
potential economisers on transaction costs – state (state choosing what 
to do), firm (firm choosing what to do), and market (decentralised, arm’s 
length exchanges between firms and firms or firms and state). The 
relationship between the three institutional possibilities is fully dynamic, 
constantly adjusting as the technological capabilities of firms and the 
broader economy increase. Consequently, what the state might do cost-
efficiently at one moment, the entrepreneur-led firm is better placed to 
do at another, and the market at another.  
 
It is argued that the key point to register with respect to hierarchy -- 
whether in the form of state fiat from without the firm or managerial 
fiat within -- is that it solves transient problems to do with information 
and coordination (the latter normally being subsidiary to the former 
because failures of coordination result from incomplete information 
about the right course of action (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976, Stiglitz, 
2000). By its very nature, when a transient informational problem – or 
‘learning problem’ – is resolved, the result is to call into question the 
 
 
 
 
Create and coordinate 
production hierarchies, 
overcome investment 
risk aversion 
Early stage 
transaction cost 
economies 
Reduce technology 
acquisition costs 
through centralised 
bargaining 
Discourage short-term 
profit-chasing where it 
occurs at the expense of 
technological learning 
Compel mergers, 
negotiate exits, limit 
‘irrational 
competition’ 
Organise recession 
cartels 
Figure 2. The developmental state economising on transaction costs 
Mid stage transaction 
cost economies 
Source: expanded by the author from Chang (1994) 
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continued hierarchical arrangements that solved the problem because 
the costs of hierarchy may no longer be justified.   
 
There are two main mechanisms that dynamically undermine the case 
for an existing hierarchy. One is that productive knowledge garnered 
through hierarchy may disperse to many firms (via ‘externalities’ in the 
parlance of Endogenous Growth Theory, see below), in which case the 
value of the knowledge is competed away and a firm’s costs, most 
immediately operating costs, need to fall in order to maintain profit 
levels. The second is that information may be retained within a firm (or 
group of firms), allowing for Schumpterian temporary monopoly profits 
(Schumpeter, 1955 (1934)). However, the monopoly profit scenario 
encourages firms to manage their proprietary information such that they 
can provide less critical parts of it to other firms, employ them as 
‘captive’, low-margin suppliers that risk their own capital, and thereby 
also disintegrate the hierarchical production chain. This latter possibility, 
today commonplace under the direction of global systems integrators 
(Prencipe et al., 2003), was not clearly foreseen in the era when 
Williamson formulated his original TCE framework. 
 
Under a developmental state, as the economy matures and transaction 
costs are reduced, there is a general, long-run trend in manufacturing 
from state-orchestrated hierarchies to firm-orchestrated hierarchies to 
arm’s-length markets and systems integration. (This point is made by 
Stigler (1983 (1968)) although, in the US, he was not confronted in his 
work by so many state-orchestrated hierarchies as existed in the north-
east Asian FDCs, and nor was systems integration yet a recognised 
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concept.) However, as management theorists have shown (again, see 
below), this is not permanently or consistently the case because new 
learning challenges associated with new technologies, or radically new 
combinations of existing technologies, are constantly emerging in all 
economies and may recommend new, again transient, vertical structures 
for learning. At all times, therefore, the state, firms and markets have 
their different, dynamic roles to play in vertical integration, where the 
trade-off is frequently between learning and earning. 
 
1.2.3. Evolutionary economics 
A second theory of economic growth to emerge in the 1980s was 
evolutionary economics. In contrast to TCE, evolutionary economics set 
out to build a fundamentally different analytical paradigm to that of 
marginalist economics. Instead of making the role of technological 
change secondary and concentrating on static analysis based on fixed 
production functions, evolutionary economics made the process of 
change its central concern. The authors of the original schema hailed 
Schumpeter as having had the correct perspective: ‘Schumpeter pointed 
out the right problem – how to understand economic change.’ (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982:ix). 
 
In confronting change, evolutionary economics dispensed with two 
pillars of the marginalist framework: the notion that economic 
relationships tended towards natural equilibrium positions, and the idea 
that economic actors made maximising decisions based on clear, 
informed choices. The rejection of these assumptions reflected a 
position that both information and objectives were far from clear in the 
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process of economic change.24  Instead of accumulating physical capital 
on a static production function as happened in the marginalist 
framework, in evolutionary economics firms built up ‘capabilities, 
procedures, and decision rules that determine what [firms] do given 
external conditions. They also engage in various “search” operations 
whereby they consider, discover, and evaluate possible changes in their 
ways of doing things’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982:207). In other words, in 
a world of incomplete information, firms groped their way between 
different technological and organisational possibilities – different 
production functions -- only gradually coming to understand the 
implications of those possibilities. 
 
The one constant, therefore, was the generation, or destruction, of 
broadly-defined ‘technological’ capabilities within firms. One part of 
those capabilities was embedded in a firm’s machines, the other in its 
people. The latter set of skills was harder to copy, transfer and change 
because people often could not articulate and codify the skills they had; 
their knowledge was, in a strict sense, tacit, or silent. The importance of 
tacit knowledge (Polanyi, 1962, 1967) made it difficult for firms to 
quickly adjust their strategies and contributed to an economic 
adjustment process that was ‘jumpy’ and typified by a lack of 
equilibrium (Nelson and Winter, 1982:9). Per Schumpeter, firms that 
that did manage to adjust their competitive positions and create ‘new 
combinations’ (Schumpeter, 1955 (1934):66-67) had the opportunity – 																																																								
24 Or, as Schumpeter put it: ‘While in the accustomed circular flow every individual can act promptly 
and rationally because he is sure of his ground and is supported by the conduct, as adjusted to the 
circular flow, of all other individuals, who in turn expect the accustomed activity from him, he cannot 
simply do this when he is confronted by a new task... Carrying out a new plan and acting according to 
a customary one are things as different as making a road and walking along it’ (1955:79).  
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not least because of the difficulty of what they achieved -- to reap 
temporary monopoly profits. 
 
The focus of evolutionary economics on technical change, on the quest 
for temporary monopoly profits as part of technical and organisational 
progress, as well as the paradigm’s embrace of imperfect information, 
were all considerable strengths. The discussion of firms’ differing 
capabilities (prefigured in Richardson (1972) and extending the insights 
of Penrose (1959)) provided a new conceptual framework with which to 
analyse economic change within the firm -- one that proved highly 
attractive to management theorists (see below) because they could 
relate it more easily than the orthodox paradigm to real-world, firm-
level experience. Capabilities made the firm a heterogeneous, fallible, 
potentially infinitely capable, people-driven actor in the economic 
universe and spawned a vast strategic management literature in the 
period after Nelson and Winter first published. 
 
Nonetheless, evolutionary economics had its own set of limitations – 
some of specific consequence for the study of economic development, 
and some general. To take the specific issues for a country like China, 
evolutionary economics left the state and other institutions outside the 
firm largely outside its analysis. In this respect, evolutionary economics 
was a symmetric counter-paradigm to TCE -- one that focused on the 
process of economic change rather than on static efficiency, but with the 
firm still in place as the locus of analysis. Nelson and Winter (1982:235) 
showed how a catch-up economy that invested in more productive 
technologies advanced by upgrading its human and organisational 
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capital rather than simply by increasing its stock of physical capital. 
However, they did not explore the critical role of the state and of other 
non-market institutions in enabling this process. Evolutionary economics 
was not, as Blankenburg observed (2007:176), tailored to the conditions 
and needs of what Marx termed ‘primitive accumulation’.25  
 
At a general level, Nelson and Winter’s attempts to formalise the 
evolutionary model bumped up against the logical impossibility of 
perfectly, or perhaps even closely, modelling the world of imperfect 
information. The original text (Nelson and Winter, 1982:Part IV, Part V) 
employed simulations of firms choosing between different technological 
production possibilities. In some models (1982:chapter 12), consistent 
with Schumpeter’s schema (1955 (1934)), firms were able to choose 
between attempting to innovate themselves, or copying other firms that 
had already successfully innovated (thereby operating as ‘fast 
followers’). However, despite the fact that the theory of evolutionary 
economics rejected clear ‘choice sets’ for technical and organisational 
progress, simulation was only possible where a finite number of choices 
was specified, albeit with selection between those choices randomised.26  
 
The unlimited potential ‘combinations’ of product, technology and 
organisation that the individual entrepreneur might deploy were beyond 
the realm of any manageable simulation. Indeed, it remained the 
defining characteristic of the literature on entrepreneurship (see 																																																								
25 This is an ‘historical stage view’ (Glassman, 2006:611), defined by Marx as the (initial) ‘historical 
process of divorcing the producer from the means of production’, transforming ‘the social means of 
subsistence and of production into capital’ and ‘the immediate producers into wage labourers’ (Marx, 
1967 (1867):714). 
26 As the authors state when specifying their most complex simulation: ‘there is a given set of 
techniques to be found’, (1982:211). 
	 50	
discussion below) that scholars failed to produce any strong insights into 
requisites that consistently predicted the success of entrepreneurs. As 
one example, no manageable simulation could allow for the 
entrepreneur who jumped between different lines of unconnected 
business, as is often the case, particularly in developing countries, until 
he happened on something that ‘worked’ (a phenomenon sometimes 
referred to under the rubric of the ‘serial entrepreneur’ (Li et al., 2009)). 
In this respect, entrepreneurship remained the blacker box within what 
is referred to as ‘the black box of technology’ (Rosenberg, 1994) that 
evolutionary economics sought to confront. As the ultimate arbiter of 
technological choice, the entrepreneur defied modelling, a point the 
case studies in this dissertation will reinforce.27  
 
Another limitation of evolutionary economics was both specific to the 
case of developing countries and this dissertation on the one hand, and 
general to economic analysis on the other. It was that by focusing so 
acutely on technological change, evolutionary economics lost, or at least 
occluded, some of the insights of an orthodox focus on competitive 
efficiency. In particular, costs disappeared into the background. Hence, 
for example, while Nelson and Winter paid great attention to internal 
firm capabilities, they said nothing about vertical integration as a means 
of economising on the acquisition of technology.28 Yet, as TCE (albeit 
somewhat inadvertently) showed, institutional adaptation, including 
																																																								
27 Nelson and Winter played down the contribution of their formal modelling and simulation efforts: 
‘Of the two parts of the endeavor, we view the development of the general theoretical approach 
[rather than the models] as by far the more important,’ (1982:399). 
28 Nelson and Winter (1982:37) stated that they drew on the insights of Williamson, but it is difficult 
to identify where. 
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changes to vertical scope, to reduce costs, was a rational response to the 
challenges of technological progress. 
 
1.2.4. Endogenous Growth Theory 
A third area of theoretical development in the period when the east 
Asian ‘tiger’ economies were booming was Endogenous Growth Theory 
(EGT). This was an attempt to endogenise the technical change that the 
Solow-Swan growth model recognised (Solow, 1957), but left as an 
exogenous variable, and hence something unexplored in terms of the 
R&D efforts within individual firms. Romer (1986, 1990) formalised 
models of the development of new technological ideas based on the 
observations that ideas were non-rivalrous (unlike physical phenomena, 
ideas were not consumed when used) and only partially excludable – in 
other words, firms’ capacity to prevent other firms using their new ideas 
was limited by the extent and enforceability of legal protections and by 
practicability. These considerations led, on the one hand, to increasing 
returns -- because ideas were characterised by high development costs 
but low marginal utilisation costs -- and imperfect competition because 
firms achieved temporary or partial monopolies as the result of 
developing new ideas. On the other hand, ideas produced large 
‘spillovers’, or ‘externalities’, because their full economic value could not 
be privately captured.29 
 
Many models of endogenous technical growth were created in the 
1980s and 1990s. Romer focused on the creation of new ideas, for which 
firms prospected as if for nuggets of gold. Aghion and Howitt (1990) and 																																																								
29 This heuristic embodied the technological ‘copying’ phenomenon at the heart of economic catch-
up. 
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Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) based models on improving the 
quality of existing technology. Lucas (1988, 1993) focused not on 
improved ideas but on increased human capital.  
 
EGT models had the benefit of recognising increasing returns, and giving 
up the decreasing returns that entered economic theory through an 
analysis of the economics of land in the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, yet remained dominant during the era of global 
industrialisation (Dasgupta, 1985). The models also showed that markets 
failed to optimise R&D because markets did not value externalities, only 
private profit. The case for government intervention to support the 
creation of positive externalities was made clearly. Moreover, while 
increased intellectual property rights (IPR) might help firms in rich 
countries, the models sometimes showed that growth in technologically 
backward states was impeded by enhanced IPR. Helpman (1992), for 
example, employing a model similar to those of Romer and found that 
the net effect of stronger global IPR was negative for developing 
countries as increased innovation in rich states failed to offset decreased 
possibilities for imitation in poor states. 
 
Nonetheless, EGT models suffered from serious analytical limitations. As 
Blankenburg (2007) noted, ever since externalities entered the economic 
lexicon in the 1920s, in an attempt to make Marshallian partial 
equilibrium analysis logically consistent, they defied effective 
categorisation (see Bator (1958) for an attempt to categorise 
externalities). Or, as Krugman put it in a recent critique of EGT: ‘too 
much of it [EGT] involved making assumptions about how unmeasurable 
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things affected other unmeasurable things’.30 Unlike TCE and 
evolutionary economics, which had far greater micro-analytical content 
and connected directly to the management literature that is central to 
arguments presented in this thesis, EGT was really a macro-economic 
contribution to growth modelling that rested on appropriated and 
unexpanded micro foundations. EGT put learning inside the production 
function, but it had little to add about how learning took place in the 
real world. 
 
EGT economists connected their work to developing countries through 
models of technology transfer, and through institutional improvements 
in poor countries that facilitated the allocation of resources to an 
economy’s ‘best’ firms, in the marginalist tradition (Jones, 1998). The 
logic of this approach assumed that capable firms pre-existed in poor 
states, that the development problem was one of resource allocation, 
and that the state’s key tasks were to improve institutions, write laws 
and ensure macro-economic stability.  
 
In contrast, the main deduction from EGT for this thesis, which holds 
pro-active, state-led infant industry policies to be essential to 
accelerated economic transitions, is that the non-excludability of ideas is 
greater in developing countries than in developed ones. In poor states, 
not only is IPR weaker, facilitating imitation within an economy, but 
most technology is imported, in a mature condition, from more 
developed countries, meaning that technology is acquired off-the-shelf 
and has a particularly strong tendency to non-excludability. In addition, 																																																								
30 http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/the-new-growth-fizzle/?_r=1 Accessed 12 May 
2016. 
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since the successful developmental state must foment competition 
under its industrial policy, it frequently dictates that imported 
technology is distributed to multiple firms, as was the case in China’s 
thermal power equipment sector after 1978. These considerations help 
to explain how firms in an FDC like China competed for a long time on 
the basis of price (and hence volume) rather than product differentiation 
and why new ideas and techniques entering the market through one 
firm diffused quickly to other firms.  
 
Two important theoretical points, supported by both empirical evidence 
in the literature and the empirics of this thesis, connect to this basic 
deduction about the non-excludability of information in early-stage 
development. The first is that there is a natural, dynamic trend over time 
from less to more excludability of information as an IP regime is slowly 
put in place and enforced in an FDC. The successful developmental state 
in east Asia moved from ensuring non-excludability of imported 
manufacturing technology to slowly building a regime in which 
excludable, monopolistic information could be protected. The tolerance 
and enforcement of non-excludability fomented firm-level competition. 
The gradual building of an IP regime allowed firms, once their 
capabilities had grown, to reap temporary monopoly profits from 
innovations that they were gradually able to self-develop. This is 
essential context for the 1978-2017 China case studies in this thesis. 
 
The second point is that, logically, effective state industrial policy for 
technology acquisition is conservative in the choices that it makes. The 
successful east Asian FDC was -- particularly at an early stage -- content 
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to purchase technology of limited excludability because it was mature, 
well-understood technology, because it could be learned despite low 
capabilities, and because it facilitated competition that identified the 
most capable firms and entrepreneurs in an emerging capitalist 
economy. Equally logically, the pursuit of more excludable technology at 
an early stage would have been a policy mistake. More excludable 
technology tended to be newer, more tacit and more complex, the 
pursuit of which would have relegated competition between firms to a 
lower level than was desirable.  
 
Despite this, the empirical reality in east Asian FDCs has been that 
policymakers sometimes were tempted by early purchases of more 
excludable technology, seeking to jump to the technical frontier rather 
than arrive there step by step. The empirics in this thesis will speak to 
this point in China’s energy equipment sector. To set the scene for that 
analysis, I highlight here a two-country case study comparison from 
extant empirical literature that contrasts a successful FDC with a 
putative FDC that failed.  
 
Amsden (1989) analysed the growth of South Korean steel producer 
Posco under developmental state direction, highlighting a conservative, 
methodical approach to technological learning that deliberately began 
with manually-controlled production lines and only later progressed to 
computer-controlled lines. Because of the vast investment required, 
Posco was not subjected to domestic competition at the outset, 
however the firm was pressured to export, while competing facilities – 
including a sister plant at Gwangyang and steel plants owned by private 
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chaebol – were authorised in the 1980s (Amsden, 1989, Kirk, 1994). 
Posco was a remarkable success. 
 
In Malaysia, under the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad from 1981, 
the state pursued a strategy of emulating the industrial policies of Japan 
and South Korea. The strategy was called ‘Look East’ (Khoo, 1995, Jomo, 
1994, Wain, 2012). At the heart of Look East was a project to develop 
integrated steelmaking capabilities, like those learned by Posco. 
However, Mahathir decided to make a technological jump. His 
government committed an initial US$520m31 to build Perwaja, a cutting-
edge, Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) steel plant that would turn iron ore 
directly into high-grade sponge iron, ready for steelmaking without 
sintering and blast furnace procedures. The lead technology provider 
was Nippon Steel, the same firm employed by Posco in its earliest 
phases (Jomo, 1994, Studwell, 2013, Wain, 2012, Amsden, 1989).  
 
This leap was a disaster. Nippon Steel had never operated a commercial 
DRI plant, and its technology failed. Mahathir pressed on with a ‘big 
push’ industrial policy requiring high-grade sheet steel for sectors 
including car making. However, Perwaja could not deliver. Replacement 
DRI capital equipment was purchased and brought on line, in 1993. But 
Malaysian engineers understood too little about the complex 
technology, and only ever produced low-grade DRI sponge. In more than 
30 years since inception, Perwaja never produced high-grade steel; it 
mostly supplied the construction sector (Studwell, 2013, Wain, 2012, 
Jomo, 1994). 																																																								
31 Converted to USD at the average 1985 exchange rate. 
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Posco started production in 1973 with rudimentary technology that 
could be quickly absorbed. In 10 years, proceeding in fast incremental 
steps, the firm learned the full range of high-grade steelmaking 
processes, and increased capacity from 1m to 9m tonnes for an 
investment (at today’s prices32) of US$20 billion. Perwaja attempted to 
leap to the technological frontier in 1985 with 1.5m tonnes of capacity. 
The firm still has only 1.5m tonnes of capacity, never became an 
internationally competitive steelmaker and consumed, over the next 25 
years, an estimated US$6-8 billion. The failure of Perwaja also helped to 
undermine Malaysia’s broader industrialisation efforts (Studwell, 2013, 
Wain, 2012, Amsden, 1989).33	
 
The final point – a caveat -- to note in this section on EGT is that 
technology transfer, the prevailing IPR environment, and ‘externalities’ 
are only part of the overall context for growth and competition at an 
early stage of economic development. The other, main parts are the 
evolving internal capabilities, and positional choices in the value chain, 
of firms, where EGT models offer no useful insights. As Blankenburg says 
of externalities, their main role is to impart theoretical coherence to the 
																																																								
32 I have adjusted reports of Posco investment, and estimates (budgets were never made public) of 
Perwaja investment, to 2016 prices using the US consumer price index. This is crude; however, the 
comparison is sufficiently stark that this crudeness can be tolerated (Studwell, 2013:117pp, Wain, 
2012). 
33 A single pair of case studies was offered for the sake of brevity. However, there are many others. 
Nakaoka (1991) examined the acute technical difficulties early Meiji firms experienced in Japan in the 
1870s and 1880s with advanced, imported textile machinery, before the country had adequately 
trained engineers. The better, stop-gap technical solution was for small textile producers to use 
modified and improved foot-pedal (takabata) looms, and to weave imported cotton weft to provide 
strength with Japanese silk warp. The output was sold as ‘silk’. It was only after engineers returned 
from training in the UK, from the mid-1880s, that production using imported power looms became 
relatively more efficient. Subsequently, the Japanese reengineered, improved and re-exported the 
power loom technology. 
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marginalist framework (echoing Williamson’s objective for TCE), thereby 
reconciling entrepreneur and R&D-led microeconomics with balanced 
growth dynamics at the macro level. However, if we ask probing 
questions about externalities, we may sympathise with Blankenburg’s 
dismissal of them as a ‘vacuous concept’ (2007:166).  
 
1.3. Assumptions in a changing world 
The shortcomings of the three theoretical constructs discussed recall 
Kindleberger’s sharp question as to whether there could ever be ‘one 
general economics’ (1962:foreword). Dasgupta (1985) argued cogently 
that the answer, based on historical analysis, was no, and that different 
schools of economic theory have been defined by their different 
historical foci resulting from the different stages of economic 
development they confronted.34  
 
TCE sought to provide orthodox, marginalist economics with solid 
microeconomic foundations, but many of the analytical insights it gave 
rise to simply highlighted the shortcomings of standard marginalist 
models and their failure to deal explicitly with technological change. EGT 
models of the 1980s and 1990s brought technology within the 
production function and modelled increasing returns, but relied on 
assumptions that technological progress occurs in a predictable fashion, 
whether reflected in accumulation of new units of ideas determined by 
the population of researchers or by an increase in some measure of 
human capital (Jones, 1998, 2005). These assumptions were crude for a 																																																								
34 Dasgupta’s observations echoed, in turn, Sraffa’s assertion that grand theories of causation are an 
impossible dream for economics, and that the best we can hope for is ‘snapshots’ of reality (discussed 
in Blankenburg (2007:chapter 2). 
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developed economy, but exponentially cruder for a developing 
economy, where the role of the state is highly unpredictable. In a 
developing country, the state’s role varies from being the vanguard in 
organising technological learning (Abramovitz, 1986, Gerschenkron, 
1962) to extractive kleptocracy (Krueger, 1974, Acemoglu and Robinson, 
2013). A technology transfer function with a degree of automaticity – 
such as those employed in extensions of EGT models to developing 
countries – cannot reflect a situation in which the state is not simply a 
conduit for technology, but anything from the dominant entrepreneur to 
a highly-resourced thief; and, of course, is capable of sometimes abrupt 
change.35 
 
Evolutionary economics models did capture the often spasmodic and 
unpredictable nature of technological progress. However, where EGT 
models assumed too much automaticity with respect to technology 
transfer to developing countries, evolutionary economics assumed too 
little – at least with respect to the capable developmental state. Such 
states, as active players in the technology acquisition process, confront 
much clearer choice sets than those envisaged by evolutionary 
economics. Since a developmental state operates within the global 
technological frontier, it can, to a considerable extent, ‘see’ the 																																																								
35 Note that the world in which TCE developed in the 1970s and 1980s has been altered by 
globalisation. A vastly increased global division of labour and outsourcing possibilities have not ended 
the case for vertical integration in order to acquire new technological capacities. But it will be argued 
that the advantages of investment in vertical integration tend to be more fleeting than ever when 
fast-evolving global supply chains offer asset-light alternatives to the firm that has acquired the 
requisite capabilities to become a system integrator. Equally, a constant trade-off between either 
investment in R&D or capacity expansion, such as was modelled by Nelson and Winter (1982:chapter 
12), is no longer inevitable. In a globalised world, outsourcing is available not just for assembly and 
manufacturing, but also for subsidiary design work. To some extent, it is therefore possible for firms 
that acquire dominant capabilities to have their cake and eat it -- cutting both in-house manufacturing 
costs and R&D costs. 
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technological path the economy needs to follow (Abramovitz, 1986, 
Gerschenkron, 1962, Reinert, 2007). As the economy moves closer to 
the technological frontier, of course, the choice sets become less clear 
(Wong, 2011).  
 
In north-east Asia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and now China, moved 
from an early-stage developmental state-led economy to a relatively 
mature, decentralised economy in a matter of half a century, growing at 
up to 10 percent a year on a sustained basis. Rather than a unified 
theory of causation to explain this FDC experience, this thesis focuses on 
a process of transition, from a political economy that emphasises 
learning to one that emphasises efficiency. The latter is broadly 
consistent with orthodox, marginalist economics. However the former is 
very different; its focus on accelerated technological progress is such 
that the economics of learning is sometimes, as Amsden (1989:chapter 
6) put it, about ‘getting relative prices wrong’ in order to incentivise 
firms to prioritise investment in technology in order to secure higher 
profits in the future. 
 
The notion of a political economy transition is what Friedrich List had in 
mind in his debate with Adam Smith. List did not reject free trade or 
Smith’s incipient economic orthodoxy. Rather he argued that the 
economics of efficiency was reached by a transition from an earlier-
stage economics of learning: ‘In order to allow freedom of trade to 
operate naturally, the less advanced nations must first be raised by 
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artificial measures to that stage of cultivation to which the English nation 
has been artificially elevated.’36 (List, 1885 (1841):72) 
 
1.4. Micro insights: the pure firm level 
Under the developmental state, the transition from the economics of 
learning to the economics of efficiency is centred on the changing 
relationship between government, firms, and markets. The firm is the 
hinge in this relationship. Initially, the firm learns under the guidance of 
a state whose capacities exceed those of the private sector (the core 
logic for the existence of the developmental state). But over time the 
firm acquires greater capacities, is ready for a more arm’s length 
relationship with the state, and a closer one with decentralised, 
independent markets.  
 
To understand how, exactly, this transition occurs, requires an 
investigation of the manner in which firms learn. In this respect, two 
literatures are particularly relevant to this thesis: a rich empirical 
literature on the nature of firm-level learning developed by heterodox 
development economists beginning in the 1980s; and a business school 
strategic management literature that emphasised the dynamic nature of 
firm-level capabilities and their co-evolution with vertical scope. The 
																																																								
36 Elsewhere (1885:2), List made the point still more explicitly with reference to the historical example 
of the Venetian Republic: ‘Unrestricted freedom of trade was beneficial to the Republic in the first 
years of her existence; for how otherwise could she have raised herself from a mere fishing village to 
a commercial power? But a protective policy was also beneficial to her when she had arrived at a 
certain stage of power and wealth, for by means of it she attained to manufacturing and commercial 
supremacy. Protection first became injurious to her when her manufacturing and commercial power 
had reached that supremacy, because by it all competition with other nations became absolutely 
excluded, and thus indolence was encouraged. Therefore, not the introduction of a protective policy, 
but perseverance in maintaining it after the reasons for its introduction had passed away, was really 
injurious to Venice.’  
	 62	
second literature captured, refined and expanded many of the insights 
generated, or provoked, by TCE and evolutionary economics. 
 
1.4.1. Development economists and the firm level 
Among heterodox economists who set out to describe the process of 
firm-level technology acquisition beginning in the 1980s, Sanjaya Lall 
was particularly important. Lall’s empirical studies segmented the 
technology learning process, stressing its gradual and cumulative nature, 
and its tendency to path dependency once initial choices had been 
made. One of Lall’s earliest examinations of the learning process (Lall, 
1987) set out a stages framework that progressed from pre-investment 
choice, to project execution, to plant operation, to technological 
improvement, to technology transfer to other businesses. In a series of 
studies (Lall, 1990, 1992, 1996, 2001a, 2001b, Najmabadi and Lall, 1995, 
Urata and Lall, 2003) such segmented analysis allowed Lall to show that 
technological, including organisational, choices were heterogenous, that 
the earliest decisions set the context for later ones, that firms faced 
ongoing uncertainty about objectives and techniques because of the 
importance of tacit knowledge, and that knowledge built up 
incrementally. In addition, Lall expanded from his earlier work on 
transfer pricing by multinational companies (Lall and Streeten, 1980 
(1977), Lall, 1983, 1985, 1993) to show that foreign direct investment 
(FDI) played a qualitatively different, indirect, often weak and 
sometimes counter-productive role in local technology accumulation.  
 
Lall’s concern to nail down the basic characteristics of what he termed 
‘capability building’ and ‘micro-level technical change’ was echoed in 
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related publications of the era including Rosenberg (1982), Pack and 
Westphal (1986), Bell and Pavitt (1993), and Radosevic (1999).  
Rosenberg stressed variation in firms’ capacity to absorb technology as 
the single biggest differentiator of their progress, echoing Abramovitz’s 
(1986) concept of ‘social capital’, as distinct from technological capital. 
Bell and Pavitt segmented learning challenges for developing countries 
according to the characteristics of target industries in developed 
countries: machinery and input supplier dominated; scale-intensive; 
information-intensive; science-based; and vertically-disintegrated 
supplier networks led by system integrators. Radosevic pointed to 
changes in the nature of technology and in the global trading 
environment as requiring firm-level adjustment of technology 
acquisition strategies in the globalisation era.  
  
Studies of firm-level and industry-level technology acquisition in the late 
1980s and 1990s were a natural fit with the co-evolving National 
Innovation Systems (NIS) school, to which scholars such as Lall 
contributed. NIS, as the name suggested, stressed national economies – 
informed by national political economy conditions – as repositories of 
evolving technological capability within which firm- and industry-level 
technological accumulation took place. The point was that the national 
innovation economy was more than the sum of its firm-level parts, 
because it included the state -- in all its manifestations, direct and 
indirect – and other non-state institutions as economic actors. State 
action was considered in dimensions ranging from industrial policy to 
management of education systems. 
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Freeman’s (1988) work on Japan was an important early text under the 
NIS rubrik. Almost concurrently, Lall (1987) published a study of India, 
part of a World Bank-financed project to compare technology acquisition 
in India, South Korea, Brazil and Mexico. Nelson (1986, 1987, Rosenberg 
and Nelson, 1994) examined public versus private sector contributions 
to innovation in the United States, seeking to fill gaps in our 
understanding of the role of institutions that he had noted in the 
conclusions of Nelson and Winter (1982). Porter (2011 (1990)) published 
an ambitious survey of technology acquisition experiences across 10 
countries. Lundvall (1992) edited a collection of papers by mostly 
Scandinavian scholars, reflecting a long research effort that built on the 
catch-up experiences of Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Nelson (1993) 
brought together the most widely cited and geographically wide-ranging 
collection of papers, covering both developed and developing 
economies. 
 
Each of these studies examined interactions between private firms, 
government industrial policy institutions, and public institutions ranging 
from financial sector agents to structures of S&T research. Differences 
were largely a matter of emphasis. Freeman focused on institutions 
making and implementing industrial policy; Nelson focused on 
interaction between public and private actors and institutions; Porter 
focused on firm strategy in the context of national structures of industry, 
institutions and factor endowments; the Scandinavian scholars 
attempted to identify all the institutional components and relationships 
that mattered at national level – hence their claim to the national 
systems moniker. All the empirical studies in the NIS tradition recognised 
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the historical contexts and precedents for the technology acquisition 
strategies they described. Freeman (1995) set out the historical 
analytical antecedents for NIS beginning with List’s (1885 (1841)) 
National System of Political Economy. Shin (2013) further emphasised 
historical continuities with a comparison of national technology policies 
in Germany, Japan and South Korea that referenced experiences ranging 
from the late nineteenth century to the 1980s. 
 
All such heterodox development economics and NIS research and 
taxonomies brought attention to the multi-faceted, variable nature of 
learning challenges. Among the themes of greatest relevance to this 
thesis were: segmented analysis of the technological learning process; 
concepts of structural variation between industrial sectors, where 
scholars introduced multiple stylised taxonomies; examination of the 
roles of gradualness and steady accumulation in technological learning; 
path dependency; uncertainty about the best course of action and the 
role of tacit knowledge; recognition that there are multiple ways to 
achieve a learning objective; exploration of the positive and negative 
impacts of FDI; a heuristic separation of ‘absorptive capacity’ and ‘social 
capital’ from narrow technological capital; and elevation of the whole 
subject of institutional interplay of state and firm -- via NIS scholarship -- 
to a central status in development economics.  
 
However, the studies cited concurred that cross-sectional analysis 
should be the default methodology. NIS, indeed, was the logical 
conclusion of the cross-sectional approach. Both the potential and the 
limits of this methodology were made clear in one of the most rigorously 
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analytical studies in the NIS tradition, Evans’ (1995) work comparing 
state industrial policies across South Korea, India and Brazil. 37 Evans’ 
schema distinguished four different archetypes of state intervention in 
the firm-level technology acquisition process: the state as direct 
manufacturer (‘demiurge’); the state as ‘midwife’ to different industries; 
the state performing ‘husbandry’ of individual private firms; and the 
state as arms-length regulatory ‘custodian’. Across these different 
possibilities, the optimum development policy mix was held to be one of 
‘embedded autonomy’ – a combination of midwifery and husbandry 
stated to be present in South Korea -- under which the state nurtured, 
but remained independent of, rising firms.  
 
The analysis was compelling in delineating the myriad choices available 
to the state and situating them by means of careful description in local 
political-economic conditions. Evans’ assertion that state policy must 
never become captive to private sector interests also appeared to be 
universally valid. But the study’s superficially attractive conclusion that 
there was an optimum balance in the relationship between state and 
private sector depended on its being situated in what might be called 
the ‘middle reaches’ of capability development. The economies analysed 
were neither so weak in capabilities that government had to play a 
dominant role in technology acquisition (Thun, 2006), nor so strong that 
there was a case for state withdrawal to the ‘custodian’ position.  
 
The conclusions were valid for the developmental moment considered, 
but they obscured the stark historical fact that all successfully developed 																																																								
37 Evans (1995) did not self-identify as an NIS study, but is self-evidently in this tradition. 
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countries, though they featured industrial policy in their early stages 
(Lockwood and Bronfenbrenner, 1970, Lockwood, 1974 (1954), Hudson, 
2010, Chang, 2002, Trebilcock, 1981) progressed to more ‘free market’ 
policies over time (Carlile and Tilton, 1998, Lardy, 2014, Kroeber, 2016, 
Pempel, 1998, Lundvall et al., 2006, Amsden and Chu, 2003). Most 
important, the development of entrepreneurial capability and globally 
competitive firms in leading economies continued across this transition, 
something the NIS analyses ignored. Finally, in Evans’ study as in others, 
entrepreneurs remained in the background, pushed and pulled by 
whatever state policy was pursued. In the real, longitudinal world, as this 
dissertation will show, entrepreneurs stepped out of the shadows of 
state industrial policy as economic development progressed. 
 
Cross-sectional analyses labelled state policies as one type or another, 
occluding the longitudinal reality that those policies evolved over time. 
Indeed, at the extreme, the cross-sectional studies exhibited the very 
lack of dynamism that heterodox economists accused orthodox, 
marginalist economics of exhibiting. Radosevic, in his study of 
international technology transfer, was unusual in explicitly 
acknowledging the limitations of the cross-sectional approach:38 
 
‘The processes of integration of technological knowledge into a domestic 
economy co-evolve with the structural features of the domestic 
environment. Trying to capture the determinants of such a process 
through cross-sectional studies is faced with serious limitations and 																																																								
38 Unusual but not unique. Lundvall (2006:pp5) stresses the need for national systems of innovation to 
evolve as an economy develops; however, his research is overwhelmingly concentrated on questions 
of state choices in industrial policy. 
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requires knowledge of history and the specific nature of this co-
evolution.’ (Radosevic, 1999:243) 
 
The co-evolution of technological capacity and political economy in the 
form of a changing state-firm-market relationship required empirical 
research directly focused on a longitudinal rather than a cross-sectional 
axis of analysis. For this thesis, some of the most enlightening research 
in this respect has been published by strategic management scholars at 
business schools. Moreover, business school researchers brought to the 
fore a character who rarely appeared in any detail in the empirical 
analyses of development economists – the entrepreneur. 
 
1.4.2. Strategic management research and the firm level 
Scholars in the field of strategic management had no choice but to tackle 
the subjects of longitudinal dynamism and the role of the entrepreneur 
because their discipline focused them narrowly on the operational 
realities of the individual firm.  
 
The difficulties of research into entrepreneurship are well known. 
Researchers have struggled both to define meaningfully what 
entrepreneurship is (Baumol, 1968, Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, 
Davidsson, 2005), and to empirically link cause and effect in predicting 
which human character traits and qualities lead to entrepreneurial 
success (Sandberg and Hofer, 1988, Chrisman et al., 1998, Zott and Huy, 
2007, Chandler and Lyon, 2001, Schoonhoven et al., Venkataraman, 
1997). Nonetheless, the status of entrepreneurship as the least 
understood aspect of microeconomics does not justify ignoring it any 
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more than when the subject of technology was ignored by marginalist 
economics. No scholar of venture formation – and particularly no scholar 
of developing country venture formation – would omit the entrepreneur 
who sets strategy. Early-stage, private FDC companies are, almost by 
definition, ‘big boss’ companies driven forward by a charismatic leader 
(Chandler, 1959, Lockwood and Bronfenbrenner, 1970, Huang, 2008, 
Chernow, 1999, Kirk, 1994). Beyond the earliest state work units, the 
case study firms in this dissertation are barely intelligible without an 
introduction to their entrepreneurial leaders.  
 
With respect to their investigation of dynamic change over time, 
management scholars were less concerned with the quest for a 
monolithic methodology of economics at the macro level than the 
originators of TCE and evolutionary economics.39 The result was that 
scholars were able from the 1990s to move towards a synthesis of 
insights from TCE and evolutionary economics, one that proceeded in 
three stages. First, they examined the ‘absorptive capacity’ through 
which firms digested and utilised new information and techniques. This 
was, in part, an investigation into the preconditions for dynamic learning 
and productivity enhancement.40 Second, management theorists looked 
at the manner in which, as firms built capabilities, their operating 
environments changed. These external changes recommended 
adjustments within firms, both reactive and pro-active. A firm’s ability to 
adjust to its changing environment reflected what were dubbed its 																																																								
39 David Teece, a strategic management theorist and one of the key developers of the concept of 
dynamic capabilities (see below) was a student of Oliver Williamson. Teece never exhibited the same 
concern to make his construct complementary to the tenets of marginalist economics. 
40 Under the original definition of absorptive capacity given by Cohen and Levinthal (1990). As 
reconceived by Zahra and George (2002), the meaning of absorptive capacity becomes explicitly 
dynamic and much closer to the concept of dynamic capabilities.  
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dynamic capabilities – capacities to forge and manage change, 
particularly organisational change. Third, researchers examined the 
manner in which a changing environment impacted, over time, a firm’s 
optimal structure of vertical integration. This led to a theory of dynamic 
co-evolution of operating environment and vertical scope that involved 
both disintegration and re-integration of activities depending on 
circumstances and learning needs. Finally, the stress that these theories 
placed on the requirement for dynamic action brought the entrepreneur 
into view because it was the entrepreneur – operating in the context of 
evolving state industrial policy -- who set the agenda for strategic 
change. 
 
From a development economics perspective, absorptive capacity at the 
firm level (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) was in many respects an analogue 
of the concept of ‘social capital’, used by development economists to 
describe the requisite capability of states to engage in effective 
industrial policy (Okawa and Rosovsky, 1973, Abramovitz, 1986, 1995). 
Cohen and Levinthal defined a firm’s absorptive capacity as its ability to 
value, assimilate, transform and exploit knowledge. Their empirical 
findings – in line with those of researchers of technology acquisition 
experiences like Lall, as well as north-east Asian experience cited above 
– stressed that the ability to learn was cumulative and path-dependent, 
and ‘largely a function of the firm’s level of prior related knowledge’ 
(1990:128). However, while the concept of absorptive capacity 
emphasised the preconditions for, and importance of, dynamic change, 
Cohen and Levinthal failed to articulate that embedded knowledge and 
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routines within the firm could be impediments to adjustment when 
external circumstances changed.   
 
It was the concept of dynamic capabilities that shifted the focus from a 
firm’s internal capability and absorptive capacity development alone to 
its internal capability and absorptive capacity development in the 
context of changes in its operating environment. In a seminal paper, 
Teece and Pisano (1994), expanded and restated in Teece et al. (1997), 
the authors defined the reconfigured perspective as follows: 
 
‘This source of competitive advantage, “dynamic capabilities”, 
emphasizes two aspects. First, it refers to the shifting character of the 
environment; second, it emphasizes the key role of strategic 
management in appropriately adapting, integrating and re-configuring 
internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional 
competences toward changing environment.’ (1994:537)  
 
Dynamic capabilities were defined under three headings, each of which 
involved internal and external considerations. ‘Organizational processes’ 
covered a firm’s routines for coordination, learning and transformation, 
including such outward-looking capabilities as strategic alliances, 
technical collaborations, and benchmarking systems. ‘Asset positions’ 
included a firm’s technological endowments, customer base, supplier 
base and relations with ‘complementors’. ‘Paths’ referred to the possible 
technological and organisational paths of development open to the firm 
(Teece et al., 1997:518). A sharp distinction was drawn between these 
capabilities, which were firm-specific, hard to replicate, and therefore a 
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durable source of competitive advantage, and factor endowments which 
were generic, more easily replicated, and therefore not usually a source 
of durable competitive advantage. The dynamic capabilities that were a 
firm’s most valuable asset were its ‘ability to integrate, build and 
reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly 
changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an 
organisation’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of 
competitive advantage given path dependencies and market positions’ 
(Teece et al., 1997:516).  
 
The critical point here was that dynamic capabilities were not simply an 
ability to identify and ingest in the manner of absorptive capacity – akin 
to a sponge absorbing liquid. Instead, dynamic capabilities involved 
reconfiguration (including technological ‘recombination’ (Lawson, 2017)) 
when external conditions changed. To continue the metaphor, under 
dynamic capabilities the sponge of learning could be squeezed out, 
ridding it of redundant knowledge and routines, and then refilled, in a 
repeatable process.  
  
Teece and Pisano (both 1994 and 1997) listed ‘Schumpeter (1934), 
Penrose (1959), Williamson (1975, 1985), Barney (1986), Nelson and 
Winter (1982), Teece (1988), Teece et al. (1994)’ as providing the 
theoretical foundations for dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano, 
1994:538).41 These were the key texts of TCE and evolutionary 
economics. Teece and Pisano stressed the need to protect capabilities 
and to avoid opportunistic behaviour as the drivers to conduct particular 																																																								
41 The cited works not mentioned elsewhere in the body of this chapter are Barney (1986), Teece 
(1988), Teece et al. (1994).  
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activities within firms, consistent with TCE. They stressed the role of the 
firm as a vehicle for learning, and as a repository of, capabilities, as well 
as for re-configuring capabilities, consistent with evolutionary economics 
and the resource-based view of the firm.  
 
Nonetheless, a full integration of the ideas contained in TCE and 
evolutionary economics required an understanding of how a firm’s 
vertical scope evolved dynamically. Building on Teece and Pisano (1994, 
Teece et al., 1997), empirical studies began to confront vertical 
integration more directly in the context of discussions of dynamic 
capabilities (Poppo and Zenger, 1998, Schilling and Steensma, 2001, 
Afuah, 2001, Doig et al., 2001, Jacobides, 2004, Jacobides and Hitt, 2005, 
Raynor and Christensen, 2002). Afuah, for example, showed through 
empirical research in the computer industry that firms suffered if they 
were already vertically integrated when a new technology came into 
play because they were committed to unhelpful forms of internal 
organisation with respect to learning and the absorption of new 
technology. On the other hand, firms benefited from becoming vertically 
integrated when a new technology was being absorbed and developed 
because the vertical integration was tailored to, and supported, a new 
learning experience.  
 
It was Jacobides and Winter (2005) who synthesised a general 
theoretical framework for the co-evolution of capabilities, on the one 
hand, and vertical scope informed by transaction costs on the other. 
They argued that a unifying theory needed to move beyond the focus of 
dynamic capabilities on the firm in the context of its environment, and 
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instead view the firm and its environment as strictly co-dependent. 
Capabilities within a firm, and transaction costs relating to suppliers, 
partners, buyers and competitors outside the firm, were inseparable and 
mutually influential -- particularly over long periods of time: 
 
‘The analysis at the individual firm level must be complemented by a 
systemic view that takes the full roster of participants into account... 
Further, important causal mechanisms operate over substantial time 
periods; to elucidate these requires a dynamic, co-evolutionary view of 
how capabilities and transaction costs change and interact.’ (2005:396)  
 
The ‘systemic’ view emphasised four interactions, operating in a circular 
fashion. First, a firm’s capabilities (and its ongoing need to develop new 
capabilities) influenced its vertical scope at any given moment. Second, 
firms invested to manipulate their operating environments and thereby 
reduce those transaction costs that it was within their power to affect. 
This tended to facilitate vertical disintegration, particularly where 
dominant firms could pass on risk and capital expenditure requirements 
to suppliers. Third, any change to vertical scope, at both the firm and the 
wider industry level, affected the ways in which new capabilities 
developed. Periods of vertical disintegration might be followed by 
periods of re-integration as a response to new learning challenges, 
supplier hold-ups and new market demands.42 Fourth, vertical 
disintegration and changing capabilities across an industry opened up 																																																								
42 In general, vertical structures tended to become more homogeneous across firms, and vertical 
disintegration tended to increase, over a product or business lifecycle: ‘Whether integration or 
disintegration provides the stronger basis for capability improvements is an empirical issue; the 
answer tends to vary with industry life-stage.’ (2005:404). This finding is consistent with Stigler (1983 
(1968)). 
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opportunities for participants from other sectors to enter the market, 
with potentially disruptive effects. 
 
Jacobides and Winter (2005) offered as one example of vertical 
disintegration, driven by differential capabilities and competition, the 
break-up of US mortgage banking in the 1980s. The value chain split into 
wholesale loan management and trading on the one hand, and retail 
loan origination activities on the other. Upstream, wholesale firms 
invested to standardise mortgage data, thereby reducing transaction 
costs and facilitating a more focused competitive advantage. 
Downstream, disintegration had the effect of allowing real estate 
agencies into the previously bank-dominated mortgage origination 
business.  
 
In the Swiss watch manufacturing industry, by contrast, Jacobides and 
Winter showed how the advent of quartz movement technology 
disrupted an already-disintegrated industry. The new technology 
favoured more vertically integrated Japanese firms, as well as a new, 
vertically-integrated Swiss entrant, Swatch -- at least until incumbent 
firms also moved to greater integration.  As Jacobides and Winter 
subsequently summarised the keys to their theoretical framework, 
changing ‘industry architecture’ and capabilities constantly interacted: 
‘structure determines the feedback that will drive the system’s 
dynamics. Thus we highlight the role of context and higher level causal 
forces that cannot be understood simply by looking at the level of 
individual agents’ (Jacobides and Winter, 2012:1366). 
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To the knowledge of the author, the concept of dynamic capabilities has 
not previously been applied to work on emerging economies. This may 
be because the world of high-technology business, high-velocity markets  
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000), and firm boundaries that are either non-
existent or shifting (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009) -- on which most 
dynamic capabilities and dynamic vertical scope literature concentrates -
- appears far removed from that of an FDC like China.  
 
However, this presumption is questionable for two main reasons. First, 
FDCs are characterised by a constant flow of experience with (locally) 
new technologies, induced by the state-led drive to industrialisation. 
High-velocity markets and unclear boundaries are probably closer to the 
experience of many Chinese firms than are the experiences of mature 
industries in developed economies. Second, the ambition of industrial 
policy is to reach the global technological frontier quickly, and in this 
respect leading Chinese firms already began to experience the frenetic 
uncertainties of advanced high-technology markets. Indeed, the most 
successful Chinese firms assessed in this dissertation exhibit a capacity 
to create, invest in, and manage cross-border networks and alliances to 
capture value that appears superior to that which Japanese, Korean or 
Taiwanese firms achieved at a similar level of national development 
measured by GDP per capita. Herein – despite (or perhaps because of) 
China’s more fraught political relations with the West – may lie a distinct 
Chinese ‘cosmopolitan advantage’ that derives from a forced march of 
global integration when compared with the paternalistic American 
indulgence of infant industry policies during the Cold War 
industrialisation of Japan, Korea and Taiwan. 
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The development of dynamic capabilities and the co-evolution of 
capabilities and vertical scope are important concepts in framing the 
case studies in this thesis. The concepts provide benchmarks for the 
capabilities that the best case study firms are constructing in the context 
of rapidly changing operating environments.  
 
1.5. Limitations of the current literature; the case for theory building; 
and measuring firm-level success 
There are several important limitations to the existing developmental 
state and industrial policy literature. First, the existing literature 
implicitly downplays longitudinal changes required for effective 
industrial policy. There is a gap in the literature for studies that focus 
explicitly on longitudinal change.  
 
Second, although strategic management literature emphasises that 
longitudinal change is at the heart of firm-level competitiveness, this 
literature has not been integrated into the industrial policy framework. 
An understanding is required of how the theoretical constructs of 
strategic management scholars connect to infant industry literature. 
Such an understanding will in turn guide the implementation of more 
effective policies. In particular, studies at the individual firm and sectoral 
level are required in order to parse capability development that is 
derived through developmental state policies versus capability building 
that is orchestrated from within the entrepreneurial firm. 
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Third, empirical studies have continued to concentrate on quantitative 
analyses, using output measures such as R&D expenditures, 
publications, and patent applications to judge capability building. 
However, data aggregation and proxy measures do not capture the 
complexity and nuances of industrial capability building and the effects 
of developmental state industrial policies. There remains a gap in the 
literature for highly detailed qualitative case studies.  
 
The review of selected empirical and theoretical literatures in this 
chapter indicates that an analytical structure to deal with the transition 
from a developmental state-led to a more decentralised, entrepreneur-
led economy can be built on foundations from extant literature 
employing a multi-disciplinary approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007). This is the approach taken in this thesis. 
 
Both empirical studies in north-east Asia, and theoretical explications of 
the logic of ‘getting prices wrong’ in order to incentivise firm-level 
capability-building (Amsden, 1989), demonstrate the catalytic role of the 
developmental state. Transaction cost economics (TCE) highlights the 
role of vertical integration in promoting firm-level learning and TCE 
extended to the institution of the developmental state (Chang, 1994) 
explains why such governments play a critical early role in coordinating 
the economic capability-building process at the firm level. The weak 
excludability of intellectual property in early-stage developing 
economies, which is highlighted by endogenous growth theory (EGT), is 
not an obstacle to developmental state-led acquisition of technologies. 
Instead, EGT recommends that developmental states focus early 
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upgrading efforts on non-excludable technologies and orchestrate high 
levels of competition at the firm level in order to ensure those 
technologies diffuse widely.  
 
Empirical studies of how firms learn manufacturing technologies stress 
that successful acquisition is sequential and cumulative, flowing from 
less to more challenging tasks, and from lower to higher requirements 
for tacit knowledge. The successful developmental state is the institution 
that ensures this conservative, cumulative approach to manufacturing 
technology acquisition is observed. The state’s key roles are those of 
identifier of sequential targets for technology absorption and organiser 
of the requisite mix of subsidy and competition that ensures firm-level 
attention to those targets. 
 
However, longitudinal empirical studies in north-east Asia also 
highlighted that narrowly-constructed manufacturing technologies were, 
on their own, insufficient to make emerging firms globally competitive. 
Evolutionary economics in turn theorises that the most difficult to 
replicate firm capabilities, and the ones that provide the most durable 
competitive advantages, are tacit capabilities that are not located in 
machine-embedded production skills, but rather in firms’ strategic and 
organisational resources and their capacity to change ‘ways of doing 
things’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982:207). This theoretical construct echoes 
the empirical regularities highlighted by Chandler in his historical studies 
of US industry. More recently, the view was reinforced and crystallised 
by the empirical and theoretical work of management scholars, who 
emphasised not only the importance of dynamic capabilities within 
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firms, but also that those capabilities must co-evolve with changing 
external environments. When the external environment is frenetic, as it 
is in high-technology sectors or in the high-growth environment of an 
FDC, the importance of entrepreneurial dynamic capabilities in 
determining firm-level success is particularly pronounced.  
 
A multi-disciplinary analytical framework suggests there will be an 
inevitable tension between the competitive advantages that the 
developmental state delivers and those that the entrepreneur delivers. 
The fundamental reason for this is that the developmental state’s 
contribution is focused on the management of technological upgrading, 
whereas the entrepreneurial firm’s contribution derives principally from 
the development of dynamic capabilities – capabilities that are more 
clearly reflected in ongoing strategic choices rather than in narrow 
technological capacity. This distinction is, of course, a simplifying one. In 
reality, the developmental state impacts on the creation of firm-level 
dynamic capabilities and firms are the institutions through which 
developmental state technology plans are actioned. Nonetheless, the 
empirical and theoretical literature reviewed highlights that the 
contributions of the developmental state and the entrepreneurial firm 
differ. The manner in which they differ is stylised in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Developmental state versus entrepreneurial firm: an 
analytical framework  
   
 
The strategic management literature highlights dynamic capabilities as 
the defining attribute of the most competitive firms and hence the 
challenge in the developmental state-led economy is that of a transition 
in which the interventionist strategies of the state do not impede the 
growth of dynamic capabilities within entrepreneurial firms. The three 
empirical chapters of this thesis examine how the transition took place 
in three different, but related, industrial sub-sectors. Within the three 
sub-sectors, firms were repeatedly pressed by the developmental state 
to learn new, imported technologies. These technological challenges, or 
‘resets’, provide the tests by which transitions in different sub-sectors, 
and the performance of individual firms, are qualitatively assessed. 
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In terms of quantitative assessment, the research questions require that 
the most globally competitive case study firms are identified. In order to 
do this, the thesis follows orthodox convergence theory (Dollar and 
Wolff, 1993, Kerr, 1983, Spence, 2011, Baumol et al.) in assuming that, 
as the Chinese economy develops, there will be a convergence of profit 
margins between China’s best firms and their leading multinational 
peers.  
 
Consequently, the best companies in the power equipment businesses 
surveyed are compared on a range of standard profit ratios, including 
gross margins, operating margins, net margins and returns on assets 
with the most profitable multinational firms. All but one of the case 
study companies are listed on stock markets in Hong Kong and the 
United States, and so financial returns under similar accounting regimes 
are available for them and can be compared with multinational 
competitors. Inevitably, such comparisons are subject to many possible 
distortions; the comparison seeks only to establish long-run trends.  
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Chapter 2 
Methodology and research design; and the research challenge posed 
by China’s decentralised polity 
 
2.1. Methodology and research design 
In order to address the research questions, this thesis uses a positivist, 
exploratory case study methodology. Yin (2003) asserted that case 
studies are appropriate for research questions that tackle ‘how’ and 
‘why’ questions and require the building of explanatory links. The 
research questions in this thesis demand that explanatory links are 
developed as to how state-to-firm relationships evolved under 
conditions of industrial policy and industrial capability building; and how 
this process connected to the rise of the most competitive firms in 
China’s electricity generating equipment sector.  
 
Yin (2003) also noted that case studies are appropriate where research 
has minimal control over events and focuses on contemporary 
phenomena. On the first point, the evolution of state-firm relations in 
China could not be subjected to experimental control. On the second 
point, the subject of this thesis is the evolution of relationships and 
conditions that exist in the contemporary economy. In addition, 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Eisenhardt, 1989) argued 
that case studies may be used to build theory where existing theory is 
insufficient to answer research questions. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
there is a paucity of theoretical work on the longitudinal evolution of 
state-firm relations under industrial policy, or the factors that contribute 
to firm-level success during this process.  
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This thesis employs an embedded case study design, allowing for 
multiple levels of analysis (Scholz and Tietje, 2002, Yin, 2003). The 
reason is that the research questions can only be answered by 
examining both the industry sub-sector and firm-level experiences in 
each of the thermal, wind, and solar power equipment businesses.  The 
different electricity generating sub-sectors allow this thesis to use 
technological ‘resets’ – the launch of a new product category – to 
determine which government- and firm-level structures and strategies 
led to the best firm-level outcomes when new learning challenges 
occurred.  
 
The research construct does not, however, include every sub-sector of 
the electricity generating industry. Hydropower turbines were excluded 
as being too technologically similar to thermal coal turbines, and made 
only by state-owned firms. Large gas turbines (LGTs) are also made only 
by state-owned firms, but were included because they represented a 
significant step up in terms of the technological challenge to 
manufacturers. Nuclear power equipment was excluded, despite China 
having a major commitment to it, because: only two, state-owned firms 
are involved; nuclear technology – like thermal coal turbine technology – 
evolved in a linear, non-disruptive fashion; and it is less certain that 
nuclear power will be as important in the future as wind and 
photovoltaic power (Madhavan et al., Forthcoming, Lu, 6 June 2016).43 
The choice of technological resets considered is summarised in Table 1. 																																																								
43 The two Chinese nuclear firms are China National Nuclear Corp. (CNNC) and China Guangdong 
Nuclear Power Corp. (CGN), founded in 1989 and 1994 respectively. Madhavan et al.’s recent study of 
China’s nuclear programme provides strong ‘validating’ support (see discussion below) for the 
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Table 1. Technological resets by scale of technical challenge and firm 
ownership 
Sub-sector Major new technology 
challenge? 
Diverse firm-level 
ownership? 
Included? 
Coal turbines Yes No Yes 
Hydro turbines No No No 
Large gas turbines Yes No Yes 
Nuclear turbines Yes No No 
Wind turbines Yes Yes Yes 
Photovoltaics Yes* Yes Yes 
*It is argued in Chapter 5 that photovoltaics (pv), represents a major technology challenge in terms of 
the production of polysilicon and pv manufacturing equipment, as well as downstream servitisation, 
rather than in the pv module assembly area in which China started. 
 
There was a further constraint of space in an 80,000-word thesis. On this 
point, it should be noted that I visited key lithium-ion battery and 
electric vehicle manufacturers in China in order to further inform and 
test the evolving theory in this thesis. These sub-sectors of the broad 
power industry are characterised by both diverse firm-level ownership 
and major technological resets. The firms visited included Tianjin Lishen 
Battery (K-(), Great Wall Motor in Baoding, and BYD in 
Shenzhen. The empirical material is not included in the thesis, however 
it did further validate several of the findings presented in Chapter 6. 
 
Within the thermal, wind and photovoltaic sub-sectors, the research 
strategy, similar to the logic of Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), was to 
visit a larger number of case study firms and then to focus on a 																																																																																																																																																															
findings of this thesis. In particular, the authors highlight returns from China’s ‘skilful [centralised] 
bargaining’ for nuclear technology; and they find that it was three forces, namely ‘industrial policy, 
regulation and enterprise initiative [that] have shaped the direction and scale of investment and 
capability building in this technically demanding field’ (forthcoming:510). 
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subsidiary group of firms that appeared most likely to succeed. The 
identification of success was based on polling industry leaders, 
consultants, suppliers and customers throughout an extended fieldwork 
period, from 2009 to 2016.44 As was expected, particularly in an FDC 
environment, there was some adjustment of choice of core case study 
firms during the fieldwork. In the wind sub-sector, Envision Energy rose 
rapidly in the estimation of industry participants to be recognised as the 
key challenger to leader Goldwind.45 In photovoltaics, the industry 
leader in the middle of the manufacturing chain, Suntech, collapsed in a 
spectacular bankruptcy. However, the mistakes that Suntech 
management made were sufficiently informative to the theory-building 
exercise to warrant the firm’s inclusion in this study. With respect to the 
sectoral leaders in thermal, wind and photovoltaics, an overwhelming 
majority of persons polled was in agreement throughout the research 
period: Shanghai Electric, Goldwind, and GCL Poly, respectively. 
 
The sampling framework for the research varied across the three sub-
sectors. In the thermal sub-sector, universal state ownership was 
accompanied by a competitive environment in which only three large 
firms – Shanghai, Harbin and Dongfang – were permitted to operate and 
hence the sampling frame was very small. In the wind and photovoltaic 
sub-sectors, unrestricted market entry saw more than 100 firms enter 
each of the businesses, according to anecdotal press reports and 
industry estimates. No complete sampling frameworks were available as 
many of these firms were small and not identified in national lists. 																																																								
44 The fieldwork started in 2009-10; I then intermitted for almost two years. 
45 Industry participant estimation of Mingyang fell significantly during the research period as the firm 
failed to deliver technologically; however, Mingyang remained a major player in volume terms (see 
Chapter 4).  
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However, industry associations – the China Wind Energy Association 
(CWEA) and the China Photovoltaic Industry Association (CPIA) – and 
data aggregators including Bloomberg New Energy Finance provided 
sampling frameworks for larger firms based on sales volumes that were 
cross-referenced. In both the wind and photovoltaic sub-sectors, the 10 
largest firms accounted for the majority of output and it was among 
these firms that the most promising businesses were sought. The 
sampling framework was not complete, but it was comprehensive. 
Ongoing analysis of performance data and polling of industry 
participants were employed to tackle any selection bias in identifying the 
most successful firms. Nonetheless, it should be noted that it was not 
critical to the research programme that only the very best firms were 
studied, rather that those studied were among the best and reflected 
strategies leading to success in each sub-sector. 
 
The focusing down of the core case study group of seven firms was 
important in two ways. First, as with Zott and Huy’s seminal 
investigation of entrepreneurship and symbolic management (Zott and 
Huy, 2007), it was the core group of more successful firms that produced 
the clearest insights; the discarded, or secondary, case study firms 
simply tended to confirm the findings because their relative lack of 
success was consistent with them.46  
 
Second, as Eisenhardt (1991) noted in an earlier analysis of case-study 
based research, what she termed ‘background’ cases validate core case 																																																								
46 Zott and Huy (2007) focused down from 26 to seven firms; in this thesis I focused down from 20 
(three thermal firms, seven wind firms, 10 photovoltaics firms) to seven firms; the less established the 
industry sub-sector the more firms I initially looked at. 
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studies. There was an instance of this in my fieldwork, where early 
research into the development of the Harbin and Dongfang thermal 
equipment manufacturers, covered in Chapter 3, produced sufficiently 
similar results to what was observed in Shanghai that it was decided to 
make the former subsidiary, background cases. Fieldwork in the thermal 
sub-sector could therefore be concentrated on Shanghai, with sufficient 
information about Harbin and Dongfang available from secondary 
sources, from technology suppliers to Shanghai who also worked with 
Harbin and Dongfang, and from Shanghai’s own managers, to be 
confident that Harbin and Dongfang’s experiences validated the 
development pattern set out. This focusing approach allowed for the 
conduct of a large number of interviews in Shanghai, and the 
identification of difficult-to-trace interview subjects who worked there 
starting in the 1980s, providing a level of analytical detail for the most 
successful firm in the sub-sector that would not otherwise have been 
possible.    
 
The successful firms in the chosen electricity generating equipment sub-
sectors provide a qualitatively homogenous group in which I searched 
for variances in order to build ‘precise mid-range theories’ (Zott and 
Huy, 2007:75, Gartner, 1985). The seven foreground case study firms are 
listed in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The seven case study firms and their industry sectors 
Formal firm name Sector Abbreviation 
Shanghai Electric Group Co. Thermal Shanghai 
Xinjiang Goldwind Science and Technology Co. Wind Goldwind 
China Mingyang Wind Power Group Wind Mingyang 
Envision Energy Co. Wind Envision 
Suntech Power Holdings PV Suntech 
Canadian Solar Inc. PV Canadian Solar 
GCL-Poly Energy Holdings PV GCL 
 
One drawback of the selected core case study firms was that one firm, 
Envision Energy Co., remained unlisted and hence audited financial 
statements were unavailable. However, as noted, Envision was deemed 
sufficiently important by industry participants -- in representing a new 
stage of strategic competition -- that it was included. 
 
This thesis employs two types of data. The first is semi-structured 
interviews (Flick, 2002): with contributors to the government industrial 
policy-making process; with entrepreneurs and managers at the firm 
level; and with foreign technology suppliers able to comment on both 
government industrial policy evolution and the development of firm-
level technological capabilities. In their analysis of effective theory-
building from case studies, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) highlighted 
the need for numerous, highly knowledgeable informants; and for 
informants at different hierarchical levels within organisations, who are 
able to offer different perspectives. 
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In this thesis, the government group of interviewees included employees 
of the NDRC, of subsidiary ‘support units’ (shiye danwei) that provide 
research input to the NDRC and its National Energy Adminstration, 
academics retained as government policy consultants at Tsinghua and 
Jiaotong (Shanghai) universities, and third-party analysts of government 
policy evolution. The firm-level group included founding entrepreneurs 
at two of the case study firms, main board directors at two others, and 
senior managers at the remaining three. Mid-level managers with 
relevant specialist knowledge, mostly in strategic planning and 
technology sourcing, were interviewed at all of the firms. In the case of 
Shanghai Electric Group Co., where it was necessary to interview 
managers responsible for technology transfer beginning in 1978, current 
management convened a group of retired managers and technical 
specialists for a full day of discussions. The third, foreign technology 
supplier group of interviewees comprised on-site and off-site 
consultants to Chinese firms, third-party vendors of technology, joint 
venture partners, and foreigners directly hired by Chinese companies for 
limited periods to deliver specific technical upgrades. 
 
In total, 74 interviews were undertaken, lasting between one and three 
hours (Tables 3 and 4). Most interviews took place face-to-face in China; 
those with executives of Chinese firms employed outside China, and 
with foreign technology providers based outside China, took place either 
face-to-face or by telephone in Europe and the United States. This 
dissertation is based primarily on detailed field notes rather than full 
transcripts as most interviewees requested not to be recorded. The 
researcher took extensive notes of each interview and reviewed and 
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annotated these within 24 hours of the interview. The interviewees 
were granted anonymity. An anonymised list of the interviewees with 
indicative information about their roles is contained in Appendix 1. 
 
Table 3. Interviewees by category 
Government industrial policy institutions 
and analysts 
11 
Case study firm interviewees 39 
Technology partners and suppliers 24 
Total 74 
 
Table 4. Firm-level interviewees by category*  
Thermal power equipment case study firm management 5 
Thermal power equipment case study firm technology partners 
and suppliers 
10 
Wind turbine case study firm management 16 
Wind turbine case study firm technology partners and suppliers 8 
Photovoltaic case study firm management 18 
Photovoltaic case study firm technology partners and suppliers 6 
*Two important interviewees in the solar sector were private equity financiers who funded 
technology acquisition at Chinese firms prior to their IPOs. They are not included here. 
 
Interviewees were selected by snowball sampling (Flick, 2002), 
beginning with cold call approaches by the researcher to target firms 
and government agencies. In a small number of instances, executives at 
target firms were immediately responsive to requests for meetings. In 
others, multiple approaches were necessary before an initial interview 
was secured. In still other instances, initial contacts were made with 
otherwise inaccessible firm employees and government officials through 
technical and sales conferences and seminars that the researcher 
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attended. One important introduction to a senior Chinese government 
official was secured via a senior academic with whom the person had a 
long-term working relationship. In all cases, the logic of the snowball 
sampling was to identify and interview subjects who could materially 
contribute to answering the research questions of the thesis. 
 
At the case study firms, a consistent approach was taken to interviews 
with senior executives by beginning the interview with a standard set of 
five questions, which forms Appendix 2. The questions focused on 
executives’ perceptions of key issues in the research: the nature of 
competition in their industry; their firm’s relationship with the 
developmental state; their firm’s strategic choices; their firm’s approach 
to innovation; and their firm’s export strategy. The questions were 
consistent but broad and open-ended, and used as part of a quest for 
common themes as the number of interviewees at case study businesses 
built up. 
 
Interviews were analysed through thematic coding (Flick, 2002). Manual 
coding was preferred to an automated software package since the 
interview data was mostly derived from detailed field notes. The use of 
manual coding allowed for greater precision and flexibility in discerning 
thematic patterns. Data analysis in the thesis follows Yin’s (2003) pattern 
matching technique, requiring revision to the theoretical expectations 
set out in Chapter 1 based on data findings. Multiple sources were used 
to enable data triangulation in the quest for ‘replication logic’ (Yin, 
2003).  
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The second type of data in this thesis is firm, government, and industry 
association documents such as quarterly and annual company reports, 
technical publications, government reports, and written press coverage. 
Some Chinese language radio and broadcast interviews with 
entrepreneurs and government personnel handling industrial policy 
were also reviewed. The sampling method for this data source was 
theoretical sampling (Flick, 2002). In practice, this meant that as 
interpretative theory was developed during the interview coding 
process, secondary materials were sought on the basis of their 
relevance, either supporting or contesting the interpretation (Marshall, 
1996).  
 
All monetary figures quoted in this thesis that are given with currency 
conversion, usually from Renminbi to US dollars, were converted on the 
basis of the average exchange rate during the year in question. 
 
The central unit of analysis in the thesis is the seven case study firms. 
Since the different firms developed capabilities in three different, but 
related, businesses, and did so in periods ranging from the late 1970s to 
the current era, a standard template is applied in examining their 
progress. This template is consistent with studies in the development 
economics (for instance: Lall, 1987) and value chain (Gereffi, 1999, 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001) literatures on technology acquisition in 
using a stage-based approach. Three fundamental stages are considered. 
The first is dubbed ‘search and bargaining’, when either the state or 
firms search for, assess, and bargain for necessary technology. The 
second stage is one in which firms initially master the manufacturing of 
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globally mature technologies. The third stage is one in which firms 
approach the global technological frontier and begin to adapt and alter 
current technology in a step towards the capacity to create new 
technology. This three-stage construct is not designed to analyse the 
acquisition of manufacturing technology in exhaustive detail, since the 
thesis concentrates much of its attention on aspects of competition 
outside narrow manufacturing capabilities. However, the arrangement 
does provide a common structure for discussion across all three business 
sectors.   
 
The sample size of seven firms in this thesis is sufficient to enable valid 
inferences to be drawn in Chapter 6 for three reasons. First, the research 
is limited to three sub-sectors of the electricity generating equipment 
industry and does not claim wider generalisability, something that is not 
necessary to valid qualitative research (Marshall, 1996). Instead, this 
thesis contributes to a theory building process and identifies important 
areas for fruitful future research. Second, the focus of the research 
questions is on successful firms and successful policies that nurtured 
those firms. The sample includes some of the best-performing firms, if 
not the best firms, in the three sub-sectors. Seven cases is therefore a 
substantial population. Third, and of greatest practical consequence, 
answering the research questions required a high level of case study 
detail involving many interviews and the sample size is necessarily 
reduced in order to deliver this detail. 
 
As noted, the findings set out in Chapter 6 do not claim generalisable 
status across different industries; however, it is hoped they will be 
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tested across different industries. The minimum aim of Chapter 6 is to 
highlight empirical regularities that contribute to a theory-building 
process that aspires to produce ‘theory that is accurate, interesting and 
testable’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007:26). 
 
2.2. The research challenge posed by China’s decentralised polity 
China fits the industrial policy model associated with Japan, South Korea 
and Taiwan for four main reasons. The first is the simple fact of central 
government’s commitment to proactive industrial policy since 1978, in 
addition to market reforms (Naughton and Tsai, 2015). The second is the 
presence of a small, focused, formal industrial policy planning apparatus, 
centred on the NDRC, and playing a role similar to that in the past of the  
MITI in Japan, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in South Korea, and 
the Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) in Taiwan (Studwell, 2013). The 
third reason is that, as in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, China’s 
planning bureaucracy is coupled with a substantial, applied science and 
technology (S&T) apparatus that supports and funds research at firm 
level, overseen by the MOST. And the fourth reason is the presence of 
close state control over the financial system in order to support 
industrial policy objectives (Naughton, 2007, Patrick and Park, 1994, 
Woo, 1991). 
 
However, as noted in Chapter 1, China differs from the other three 
north-east Asian states in its degree of political and fiscal 
decentralisation. A large literature exists about whether, from a 
developmental perspective, China’s decentralisation has been beneficial 
or not. Optimists argued that powerful local governments competed 
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with one another and delivered efficient, pro-development governance 
(Oi, 1999, Montinola et al., 1995, Xu, 2011) while still answering to and 
coordinating with central control (Landry, 2008, Li and Zhou, 2005). 
Pessimists argued that China’s decentralised polity was associated at 
local level not with efficacious competition, but with protectionism, 
industrial over-capacity and local government debt (Poncet, 2005, Li et 
al., 2004, Young, 2000, Li, 2002, Walter and Howie, 2012), while vested 
interests and policy idiosyncrasies frequently undermined central 
government objectives in industrial policy planning (Wong, 1987, Thun, 
2004, Li and Wu, 2012). 
 
This variation of views reflected the fact that decentralisation had both 
positive and negative implications for development. What was 
consistent was that central and local influence over policy-making in 
China ebbed and flowed. This makes a longitudinal research design in 
China (at least where the research is not focused on the phenomenon of 
changing centre-local relations) particularly challenging. In the case of 
this thesis, when the research design was initially put together in 2010, 
the photovoltaics sector was one whose development was largely 
determined by local government policy, making it a ‘control’ for the 
influence of central government industrial policy support when 
compared with the wind turbine business. For reasons discussed in 
Chapter 5, in 2012 central government changed its policy on the 
photovoltaics sub-sector, becoming more important to the industry than 
local government and creating national, demand-side subsidies on par 
with those in the wind sub-sector. However, as will be detailed, the 
NDRC and the NEA, following central government’s change of policy, 
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were slow to adjust to the idiosyncrasies of the solar sector and to 
centralise policy control. The result was that the impact of a changed 
state-firm relationship in the photovoltaics industry was only just 
becoming apparent at the time of writing. This renders some of the 
conclusions reached with respect to the solar sector more tentative than 
they would be in a country where local policy-making was less important 
and the centre-local policy relationship more stable.  
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Chapter 3 
Thermal power: the state sets off 
 
Of the three case study sectors analysed in this thesis, the thermal 
power equipment business is the one that shows the Chinese 
technological learning process in its earliest stages after 1978. The sector 
highlights both how much the developmental state was able to achieve 
in setting the agenda and framing the means for manufacturing 
technology acquisition, and how this was ultimately inadequate for 
competitiveness at the global frontier, as suggested by the strategic 
management literature. In particular, state policies tended to ossify pre-
existing path dependencies in the sub-sector, inhibiting the emergence 
of the most globally competitive firms possible.  
 
3.1. Historical background 
From 1954 to 1960, as part of the Sino-Soviet technology transfer 
partnership begun during the first Five-Year Plan (1953-7), China 
imported manufacturing technology and production training for 6MW, 
12MW and 50MW coal-driven turbine-generator sets from Russia and 
Czechoslovakia. The technical cooperation ended prematurely when 
Russian advisers left in 1960 as a result of the Sino-Soviet split (Lüthi, 
2010). In the following two decades, Chinese state-owned 
manufacturers sought to scale up the imported technology. Harbin, the 
locus of the Russian technology transfer project, developed a 200MW 
turbine-generator set, as did Dongfang, a ‘third-line’ (Naughton, 1988) 
manufacturing unit located in Sichuan province, and Beijing Heavy 
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(BeiZhong) in the capital. Shanghai developed a 125MW unit and a 
300MW unit.47  
 
While Shanghai’s 125MW turbine-generator set, first commissioned in 
1969 at the city’s Wujing power plant, functioned reliably, the 200MW 
and 300MW units were plagued with breakdowns, including turbine 
blade breakages that closed plants for months and caused considerable 
collateral damage, and even with instances of turbine rotors being bent 
out of shape such that entire turbines needed to be replaced. In sum, 
Chinese engineers were unable to deliver reliable performance when 
much higher operating pressures and multiple cycle steam re-heating 
were required for the larger turbine units. Even in the mid-1970s, with 
an installed electricity generating base of just 60GW, China was unable 
to meet its demand for power equipment from domestic sources and 
consumed a substantial share of scarce foreign exchange reserves 
importing generating units of 300MW and above from European and 
Japanese suppliers (Shi, 2013).48 
 
3.2. Stage 1: Search and bargaining 
The importation and absorption of modern technology for making 
power equipment was a Chinese priority from the inception of the 
‘reform and opening’ era. In the two months leading up to the Third 
Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of 18-22 December 1978 – the 																																																								
47 The key, state-owned power equipment production units discussed in this chapter have changed 
the names of their main manufacturing units on numerous occasions since 1978. For the sake of 
consistency and simplicity, the businesses are referred to simply as ‘Harbin’, ‘Dongfang’ and 
‘Shanghai’; see Company names, p9, for their current formal names. This paragraph and the following 
one are based on Th11, Th13, Th14, 20 July 2016 involving current and retired staff of Shanghai 
Electric Group. See also Tan and Seligsohn (2010). 
48 Th11, 20 July 2016 confirmed this background. Installed power-generating capacity in China rose to 
65.9GW by the end of 1980 according to data from the National Bureau of Statistics.  
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event from which the reform and opening era is normally dated – two 
multi-week, high-level Chinese government delegations visited more 
than one dozen manufacturers of power-generating equipment in six 
European countries and Japan. The Europe delegation was led by Zhou 
Zijian, Minister of the First Ministry of Machine Building (FMMB), and 
the Japanese delegation by Zhou Jiannan, a vice minister of the FMMB 
(Shi, 2013).  
 
The visits to power equipment makers and scores of other European and 
Japanese industrial firms in priority sectors covered by the FMMB49 led 
to a ‘Report on the use of foreign experience in order to speed up the 
development of the machinery industry’50, submitted to the State 
Council on 25 January 1979, shortly after the Third Plenum concluded. 
The power equipment sector was a particular focus of the report.  
 
The report reviewed the range of possibilities for technology transfer, 
including licensing, joint ventures, and personnel training by 
international firms, as well as suggesting the possibility of exporting in 
order to recoup investment in technology transfer.51 During 1979, the 
State Planning Commission and interested agencies, including the FMMB 
and the Ministry of Electric Power (MEP, which operated the power 																																																								
49 As well as power equipment, the FMMB was responsible for industrial sectors including agricultural 
equipment, automotive, and machine tools. Not all company visits on the foreign tours by the 
Ministry in October-December 1978 were formally scheduled. According to Martin Posth, who 
headed Volkswagen’s first joint venture in China, a group led by Minister Zhou Zijian turned up at 
Volkswagen’s Wolfsburg headquarters in November 1978 unannounced. Through an interpreter 
Minister Zhou told a security guard: ‘I am the Chinese Machine Building Minister, and I would like to 
speak to somebody in charge at Volkswagen.’ (Anderson,2012:56). 
50 In Chinese the report was titled Guanyu jiejian guowai jingyan jiakuai jixie gongye fazhan de 
baogao. 
51 Wishful thinking about export possibilities and foreign exchange earnings from upgraded industrial 
plants was a common theme of early Chinese industrial planning. See Anderson’s (2012) review of the 
automotive industry. 
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plants), reached a consensus that the best strategy was to license the 
use of manufacturing technology and to purchase necessary training to 
make the transfer successful (Shi, 2013). The specific focus of the 
technology transfer would be 300MW and 600MW sub-critical turbine-
generator sets and auxiliary equipment, representing the mature 
contemporary products of multinationals. (The technological frontier 
undergoing commercialisation at the time was 750MW units with super-
critical heat and pressure performance.)52  In February 1980, the 
strategy was formally approved by the State Council (Shi, 2013). 
Negotiations with foreign technology suppliers were to be led by the 
FMMB. The MEP, which wielded outsize influence as the end-user of 
power-generating equipment, was also involved. 53 
  
It is unclear how many foreign power equipment firms entered 
negotiations for the technology transfer. A senior technical director at 
Shanghai who participated in the negotiations recalled General Electric 
(GE); Brown, Boveri & Cie. (BBC, from 1988 part of the ABB Group); 
Alstom; and Westinghouse.54 It is unlikely that Japanese firms tendered 
because at the time they remained dependent for thermal power 
																																																								
52 Westinghouse was commercialising 750MW super-critical units in 1980; Th1, 9 June 2014. Super-
critical power plants operate at higher temperatures and pressures (approximately 565 degrees 
centigrade and 24 MPa depending on mechanical configuration) in order to increase the efficiency of 
energy conversion from coal to electricity to 37-42 percent. Ultra super-critical plants, discussed later 
in this chapter, operate at approximately 600-615 degrees and 32 MPa to achieve conversion 
efficiencies of 42-45 percent (Nalbandian, 2008). 
53 Th2, 26 January 2016. Th11, 20 July 2016. Within the FMMB, the Electrical Power Bureau and the 
Machinery Import-Export Bureau were the offices leading negotiations. A retired senior engineer at 
Shanghai who was present at the negotiations said that the MEP was in practice more powerful than 
the FMMB because the end-user had greater budgetary clout than the equipment supplier. 
Westinghouse executives involved in the negotiations concurred that MEP officials consistently gave 
the impression of having great power in the negotiations. 
54 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
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equipment designs on technology licences from GE and Westinghouse.55 
Overall, Chinese government approaches to potential technology 
providers appear not to have been exhaustive in their scope. According 
to a senior Westinghouse executive, the firm found out about the 
technology transfer tender only because of information gleaned in the 
marketplace by its Hong Kong marketing manager.56 
 
There were three main areas of discussion for a Chinese technology 
transfer agreement. First, the cost and parameters of the technology 
transfer: would it include only plans for the machines that were licensed 
or would it include the IP rights, files, software and so on necessary to 
develop a design capability? Second, the cost and scope of worker and 
management training. And third, the arrangements for payment of 
royalties on power equipment manufactured under licence. 
 
General Electric (GE) and Westinghouse, which emerged as the two 
preferred bidders, had licensed power equipment technology to 
manufacturers in different parts of the world, including Europe. In east 
Asia, the precedent for what might happen in China was Japan, where 
GE and Westinghouse were licensors, respectively, to Hitachi and 
Toshiba, and to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), before the Second 
World War, and entered new licensing arrangements after the war 
ended. 
 
																																																								
55 Details two paragraphs below. The Japanese firms did not achieve technological independence until 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as discussed later in this chapter. 
56 Th3, 11 February 2016. The information led to a request to tender from Westinghouse and a visit by 
Eugene Cattabiani, President of the firm’s Power Generation business group, to Beijing.  
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A retired executive from the licensing department at Westinghouse 
(which won the tender) outlined the history of licence agreements with 
MHI. Until the late 1960s MHI, which had been making turbine-
generator sets to Westinghouse designs since the early 1920s, was 
content with what he described as ‘build to print’ licences, meaning that 
the firm simply produced machines based on specifications and drawings 
it was supplied with. MHI was granted 10-year licences, for which it paid 
upfront fees plus royalties on every machine sold. In negotiating royalty 
percentages, Westinghouse aimed, as a rule of thumb, to secure one-
quarter to one-half of the net profit expected on each machine.  
 
Beginning in the late 1960s, and continuing in 10-year licence 
renegotiations in the late 1970s, and 1980s, MHI pressed to include 
progressively more design know-how, including access to software used 
to calculate stresses on different parts of a turbine, as well as requesting 
to be allowed to change the designs of different parts of turbine-
generator sets without case-by-case payment to or approval from 
Westinghouse. MHI’s technical capabilities continued to increase and, in 
a final 10-year agreement signed in the late 1980s, the Japanese firm 
made a ‘concluding’ payment for technology so far received and 
henceforth became an equal co-developer with Westinghouse of new 
products, on which no royalties were paid.57  
 
The context of the negotiations in China in 1980 for US power 
equipment firms was markedly different to that in Japan following its 																																																								
57 Th4, 4 February 2016; Th1, 9 June 2014. The focus of co-development work was gas turbines. The 
joint development relationship was terminated prior to, and as part of, Siemens’ takeover of 
Westinghouse in 1998. 
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defeat to the US in the Second World War. In 1980, the US economy was 
in recession, with the power equipment sector in dire straits. After a 
boom in the mid-1970s, domestic demand for coal-fired power plants 
fell close to zero, while the partial nuclear meltdown at Three Mile 
Island in March 1979 put the American nuclear sector, which had been 
expected to deliver steady growth for power equipment firms, into 
reverse (Cen et al., 2009:26-31). 
 
In these conditions, noted a senior Westinghouse executive responsible 
for technology licensing, Chinese central bargaining for the technology 
transfer was highly effective in negotiating up the scope of the 
technology transfer and negotiating down the final price. The package 
ultimately agreed with Westinghouse in September 1980 included all 
documentation, software and software source code necessary to design 
as well as manufacture 300MW and 600MW turbine-generator sets. The 
contract included 1,700 man months of worker training and 260 man 
months of management consultation. Royalties were not payable on 
power equipment produced for the domestic market, only on exports.58  
 
The terms were far superior to those secured by Japanese companies, 
which Westinghouse never provided access to computer program source 
code and which always paid royalties on domestic sales, including at a 
rising rate for turbine-generator sets of higher output. In the course of 
negotiations in China, Westinghouse reduced its price for the complete 
technology transfer package from US$60m to US$13.8m.59 Moreover, 																																																								58	Th8, 14 September 2016.	
59 Th2, 26 January 2016. In a separate interview, a senior engineer from Shanghai Electric who was 
present at some of the negotiating sessions said GE asked US$60m for the technology licence alone, 
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payment for the licence was conditioned on the successful 
commissioning of two ‘verification’ power plants to show that the 
technology had been accurately transferred and absorbed; again, there 
was no precedent for this in Japan.60  
 
Westinghouse executives involved in the negotiations recalled that the 
Chinese side was able to maximise competitive pressure and create a 
Dutch auction atmosphere in the final days of bidding by assembling 
representatives from Westinghouse and GE on different floors of the 
same building in Bejing. On occasion, representatives from the two firms 
found themselves in the same elevator, but did not speak.61 GE was the 
favoured bidder of the MEP, the end user, which preferred its 
technology. However, GE would not match Westinghouse’s terms and 
Westinghouse technology had supporters within the FMMB and among 
a handful of senior Chinese engineers who had received Westinghouse 
training in the 1940s.62 
 
In the year that followed the contract signing, Westinghouse dispatched 
20 tonnes of equipment specifications, manufacturing layout plans, 
engineering drawings, computer program and source codes to China.63 																																																																																																																																																															
before any training, while BBC asked US$30m for the technology licence alone; it is not known what 
the final offers from these two firms were; Th11, 20 July 2016. A 2001 case study of Harbin reported 
that for boilers (which Westinghouse did not manufacture), Harbin signed a contract with Combustion 
Engineering of the US that specified payments of US$13.45m for 600MW boiler technology and 
US$20m for ‘air pre-heating technology’; the case study provided no source for this information. If 
accurate, the information suggested Combustion Engineering, which was taken over by ABB in 1990, 
fared much better than Westinghouse in negotiations (Nolan, 2001:chapter 6).  
60 Th8, 15 September 2016, Th2, 26 January 2016. The verification plants were built under separate 
contracts under which Westinghouse supplied those components that could not yet be 
manufactured. 
61 Th2, 26 January 2016. 
62 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
63 Th2, 26 January 2016. A Chinese interviewee said he was told that documents alone amounted to 
17 metric tons. Separately, 102 computer source codes were provided. Th11, 20 July 2016. 
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Westinghouse and Chinese interviewees who were party to the 
negotiations concurred that Chinese negotiators consistently demanded 
‘everything Westinghouse uses and everything Westinghouse has’64 be 
included in the technology transfer contract;65 however it appears that 
the final text specified all technology in commercial operation.66  
 
In order to deliver on the terms of the contract, Westinghouse managers 
described the development of scores of training manuals -- typically 
several hundred pages long -- to support training across manufacturing, 
quality control, and engineering design. Since the contract defined 
training time as that of the trainer, not the trainee, the Chinese were 
able to send an average of three trainees for every module taught. 
Managers, power plant engineers, design institute engineers and others 
were all dispatched to the United States for training. At a peak at 
Westinghouse’s Pittsburgh generator plant alone, there were 100 
Chinese trainees; a total of 554 persons were trained at different 
factories, staying in the US for an average 2-3 months.67 
 
At one level, China secured an exceptional deal. All Westinghouse 
executives interviewed concurred that the US company lost money in 
delivering the training involved in agreement. The senior leadership of 
																																																								64	Th2, 26 January 2016.	
65 Or as a Chinese interviewee put it: ‘all the technology they had in their database’. Th11, 20 July 
2016. 
66 It was not possible to view the final contract. It became apparent to the Chinese side during training 
that Westinghouse was developing new technology. The FMMB asked for access to this but was told 
that it was not included under the terms of the contract. 
67 Th2, 26 January 2016. Persons travelling to the US for manufacturing and quality control modules 
normally stayed around two months; those travelling for engineering design modules stayed 2-5 
months. All those who travelled from China were given a six-week crash course in English-language 
power equipment vocabulary before they left. Interviewees at Westinghouse reported that language 
barriers were less of a problem than anticipated, largely because engineering concepts are universal. 
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Westinghouse had given clear instructions to negotiators that they 
should not lose the tender on price; the contract was regarded as a loss 
leader and a foot in the door of an important new market.68 On its side, 
apart from paying a low price, China gained access to the information 
and training required not only to manufacture thermal turbine-
generator sets, but to develop a design capability, too.  
 
3.3. Stage 2: Manufacturing of mature technology 
China’s capacity to absorb the technology it secured, however, was 
limited. The FMMB acted as the central technical hub for all power 
equipment production, and key technical personnel worked there. This 
facilitated the central bargaining process and the diffusion of the 
technology acquired, but it discouraged competition and initiative at the 
manufacturing sites. Westinghouse technical documentation was 
received in Beijing, copied, and distributed to the manufacturing 
operations in Harbin, Shanghai and Sichuan, and to relevant design 
institutes. The ministry assigned roles to the different manufacturers, 
with Harbin told to produce a 600MW turbine-generator set, Shanghai a 
300MW turbine-generator set, and Dongfang (in Sichuan) the auxiliary 
pump turbines required by power plant boilers.  
 
However, the manufacturing operations, as units of the FMMB, showed 
almost no independent initiative in carrying out their tasks. In a 
grindingly bureaucratic working environment, Westinghouse managers 
responsible for training noted, for example, that Chinese engineers from 
the manufacturing sites would not engage in any learning beyond their 																																																								
68 Th2, 26 January 2016. 
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remit and did not share information.69 Some of the constraints were 
directly attributable to the legacy of the Cultural Revolution, during 
which the FMMB had been run by a ‘revolutionary committee’ and 
headed by an army officer (Gilley, 1998:64pp). Despite several rounds of 
personnel changes since the mid-1970s, in 1981 Westinghouse 
managers noted that military officers and semi-literate political cadres 
continued to hold senior positions at the production sites. Many among 
the first groups sent to the US for training -- who tended to be politically 
senior employees -- were described by a Westinghouse manager 
responsbile for training as ‘not qualified to learn’. 70 With respect to the 
analytical framework employed in this thesis, the Chinese government in 
the early 1980s was struggling to build an effective developmental state. 
 
It was not until the mid-1980s, when the production plants developed 
greater independence from what became the Ministry of Machine 
Building (MMB)71 and began to show individual ambition, that 
Westinghouse managers noted the pace of technological learning 
modestly increased.72 The central government’s reform strategy was to 
devolve steadily expanding authority to enterprises, achieved in part by 
allowing them to retain larger shares of profits. Moreover, as discretion 
at firm level increased, headcount at the central line ministries was cut 
(Nolan, 2001a).  
 
																																																								
69 Th1, 9 June 2014; Th2, 26 January 2016; Th8, 15 September 2016; Th11, 20 July 2016. 
70 Th2, 26 January 2016. 
71 The First Ministry of Machine Building became a bureau of the Ministry of Machine Building as of 
May 1982. In 1998 the Ministry of Machine Building became a bureau of the State Economic and 
Trade Commission. See Watson et al., (2011).  
72 Th1, 9 June 2014. 
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Nonetheless, despite a clear perception by Westinghouse managers that 
technology transfer and firm performance improved in the mid-1980s, 
the learning process remained slower than contractually envisaged. 
Under the technology transfer contract, the objective was to build a 
300MW verification power plant within five years -- by the end of 1985 -
- and a 600MW plant within six years. In the event, both the 300MW and 
600MW verification plants were commissioned in 1987.73  
Even after more units were manufactured across the first full decade of 
technology transfer cooperation, ending in 1991, Westinghouse 
executives reported that they remained frustrated by the slow pace of 
technological and productivity progress.74 By 1992, the Shanghai site 
produced only eight 300MW turbine-generator sets.75  
 
There was some further acceleration of production during the last four 
years of the Westinghouse licence, from 1992 to 1995, against the 
background of a booming domestic economy sparked by Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’. Harbin manufactured only five 600MW 
turbine-generator sets by 1996, but it produced 23 300MW units, 
preferring to refocus its efforts on these in the early 1990s (Nolan, 
2001a:377). Moreover, Harbin began from 1990 to secure a significant 
number of export orders from Pakistan and Vietnam, albeit for units 
smaller than 300MW.76 Shanghai also secured export orders in this 
																																																								
73 Th2, 26 January 2016; Th11, 20 July 2016. The 300MW verification plant was in Shandong province, 
the 600MW verification plant in Anhui province.  
74 Th1, 9 June 2014; Th2, 26 January 2016.  
75 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
76 According to a table provided by Nolan (no source given), between 1990 and 1995 Harbin signed 
contracts to export 16 units, with capacities ranging from 18MW to 250MW. Westinghouse managers 
interviewed noted that the technology transfer programme enabled the Chinese producers to 
substantially improve the quality of their smaller turbine-generator sets as well as manufacture 
300MW and 600MW units. 
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period, including for 300MW units directly based on Westinghouse 
technology.77 
 
According to official data, China’s installed generating capacity increased 
from just under 66GW in 1980 to 138GW in 1990 and 217GW in 1995. 
Annual production of power-generating equipment rose from less than 
5GW in the early 1980s to 11-13GW between 1988 and 1992 and over 
16GW in 1994-7 (Nolan, 2001a:342). (See Table 5). In many respects, this 
was an impressive performance. However, between 1980 and 1995, the 
growth of installed electricity generating capacity in China was only 0.79 
times the growth of GDP. Since the long-run elasticity of power output 
growth to GDP growth in the global economy has been close to 1, 
China’s increase in installed generating capacity needed to accelerate 
further if it was not to constrain future economic growth (Nolan and 
Dong, 1990: chapter 15). In 1992 and 1993, against a background of real 
GDP growth of 14.2 percent and 13.9 percent, China experienced 
electricity brownouts and rationing (McElroy et al., 1998:643pp). 
 
  
																																																								
77 The exported 300MW units from Shanghai were the only ones on which Westinghouse received 
royalty payments. A retired Westinghouse executive recalled the total number as ‘a few’; Th8, 14 
September 2016. 
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Table 5. China’s installed power generating capacity and domestic 
output of power generating equipment, 1980-1997. GW 
 Installed capacity Output of power 
generating equipment 
1980 66 4.2 
1981 69 1.4 
1982 72 1.7 
1983 76 2.7 
1984 80 4.7 
1985 87 5.6 
1986 94 7.2 
1987 103 9.4 
1988 116 11.1 
1989 127 11.7 
1990 138 12.3 
1991 151 11.6 
1992 167 13.0 
1993 183 14.7 
1994 200 16.7 
1995 217 16.7 
1996 237 16.1 
1997 250 16.9 
Source: Nolan (2001:342) 
 
3.4. Stage 3: Manufacturing current technology; and incremental 
modification of current technology    
It was in this era of frenzied economic growth that the Chinese 
government approached the end of the 15-year Westinghouse licence 
period. Super-centralised control of power equipment manufacturers by 
the MMB had ended. However, the firms were far from autonomous and 
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required central government approval for changes in production 
strategy, contracts with foreign technology providers, and more. Within 
this framework, it is significant that Harbin and Dongfang were centrally-
owned state enterprises, while Shanghai was a provincially-owned state 
enterprise (Thun, 2006, Evans, 1995). 
 
The interest of multinational power equipment manufacturers in the 
China market in this period was increased by rising imports of generating 
equipment, which compensated for domestic producers’ inability to 
keep up with demand. Where China imported 20GW of power 
generation equipment in the 1980s, it imported a further 20GW in the 
four years from 1990 to 1993 (McElroy et al., 1998: 664-5). At the same 
time, a very weak global market for coal-based turbine-generator sets – 
the market in developed countries was dominated by large gas turbines 
(LGT) from the late 1980s – meant that the multinationals looked to 
China, with its dominant coal resource, as the critical future consumer of 
steam turbine equipment.78  
 
This context in the power equipment sector, and the broader one of 
state sector reforms in the 1990s, gave rise to a second phase of 
technology transfer characterised by experimentation and uncertainty. 
Experimentation reflected central government’s commitment to further 
reform and opening of the economy. Uncertainty reflected the fact that 
while greater authority had been devolved to firms, they remained 
state-controlled and subject to central government supervision; it was 																																																								
78 In 1995 it was reported that China was already the largest market in the world for power 
equipment and 70-80 percent of this was for coal-burning plants. Financial Times, 16 May 1995 and 
26 June 1996. 
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not clear what strategic firm choices might be approved at the central 
level. A symptom of central government’s own struggle to manage the 
dissonance created by reform was the setting up of a Ministry of Energy 
in June 1988, with the aim to provide central oversight for the entire 
energy sector. The ministry failed to integrate with the more powerful 
State Planning Commission, and was disbanded after less than five years, 
in March 1993 (Cunningham, 2015).79 
 
Central government indicated greater willingness to entertain joint 
ventures following Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour and, in the absence of 
a clear template on technology transfer strategy from the centre, in the 
1992-5 period each of the three key Chinese power equipment 
manufacturers engaged in joint venture negotiations with multinational 
firms. Shanghai entered discussions with GE and (what since 1990 was) 
ABB in order to compare terms offered by, and increase negotiating 
pressure on, its licensing partner Westinghouse. Harbin entered 
discussions with multiple potential partners, and in 1994 signed 
memoranda of understanding to set up joint ventures with both GE and 
ABB (Nolan, 2001a: 391-2). Dongfang was involved in joint venture 
negotiations with Siemens and Hitachi.80 According to a senior 
Westinghouse manager, the firm attempted initially to pull both Harbin 
and Shanghai into a joint venture that could dominate the Chinese 
market. However, the MMB informed Harbin that a joint venture with 
																																																								
79 A deficit in comprehensive energy sector planning remained a recurrent theme for the next two 
decades. 
80 Th7, 13 September 2016. 
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two partners would not be approved, leaving Westinghouse to 
concentrate on a deal with its preferred single partner, Shanghai.81 
 
It was notable that the three state-owned Chinese firms all preferred to 
enter joint ventures with foreign firms, even though this might limit their 
capacity to develop independent technological capabilities. In Japan, the 
private firms that developed modern power equipment manufacturing 
capabilities – MHI, Hitachi, Toshiba, Fuji – did so through licensing 
arrangements. It was not the need for capital from the multinationals 
that drove the Chinese firms; they had other funding options. In 1994, 
Harbin and Dongfang were included in a second batch of companies 
permitted to list in Hong Kong (Smyth et al., 2004), raising Rmb1.26bn 
and Rmb752m respectively.82 Nonetheless, in the absence of clear 
central government direction on the technology transfer process, each 
of the big three firms sought to transition from licensing to joint 
ventures with multinational partners. 
 
Ultimately, central government decided that Harbin would not be 
allowed to follow this route. Its joint venture plans with GE and ABB had, 
according to Nolan (2001a:391), been given a green light by both the 
Harbin city government and the MMB. But the State Council rejected the 
plan, insisting that Harbin remain fully in state hands. Provincially-owned 
Shanghai, in contrast, concluded negotiations in 1995 for a series of five 
joint ventures with Westinghouse. According to Westinghouse 
managers, Shanghai government leaders lobbied aggressively in Beijing 
																																																								
81 Th4, 4 February 2016. 
82 Harbin Electric Co. annual report 1996, Dongfang Electric Co. annual report 2000. 
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for approval of the joint venture deals,83 which covered not only 
turbines and generators, but auxiliary equipment, control systems and 
overseas project development. The contract, according to one of its 
principal Westinghouse negotiators, specified Shanghai’s full access to 
current Westinghouse technology, no royalty payments on domestic 
sales, and Westinghouse minority positions in the different businesses 
ranging between 30 and 40 percent; the other multinationals were 
unwilling to meet these terms. The interviewee stated that 
Westinghouse was made acutely conscious by Shanghai counterparties 
of the need for central government approval, and that this enhanced the 
Chinese firm’s bargaining position.84  
 
Notably, before the joint ventures began to operate, in 1996, Shanghai 
had already established itself as the leading Chinese power equipment 
firm in terms of output of thermal units (Table 6). Shanghai did not 
require joint ventures in order to become number one in China, despite 
having trailed well behind Harbin in the 1980s. Equally, in preventing 
Harbin from entering joint ventures, central government was not 
insulating its best-performing power equipment firm, but rather the one 
with the greater historical and political significance for the CPC and 
government. 
 
  																																																								
83 Th7, 13 September 2016. One of the Westinghouse negotiators said that Wu Bangguo, Shanghai 
Party Secretary when the joint ventures were being negotiated, was instrumental in winning support 
for them in Beijing. Wu became a vice premier in 1995. 
84 Th4, 4 February 2016. The Westinghouse stakes in the key production ventures were: turbines 33%, 
auxilaries 35%, generators 40%. The Westinghouse investment was valued at US$82m, of which 
approximately 20 percent was the price of technology, 20 percent was training and management 
input, and 60 percent was cash. 
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Table 6. Output of thermal power equipment, 1990-95. MW 
 Shanghai Dongfang Harbin 
1990 2140 2420 1960 
1991 2387 1577 2095 
1992 2536 1934 2975 
1993 3002 2347 2910 
1994 3510 3296 3410 
1995 4023 2372 2835 
Source: Song and Wang (1997). 
 
In Sichuan, Dongfang’s protracted negotiations with Siemens failed to 
produce an agreement, largely because Siemens’ negotiators insisted on 
a majority equity position and were unwilling to include access to all the 
firm’s current steam turbine technology.85 Monopsony bargaining was 
not effective where a counterparty was willing to walk away. Instead, 
from 1991, Dongfang began to work with Hitachi, buying Hitachi 
components that could not be manufactured in China in return for 
technical support with steam turbine-generator sets (Nishimura, 2014). 
In 1994, Dongfang entered a 50:50 boiler joint venture with Hitachi, the 
terms of which included further technology transfer to support the 
manufacture of larger turbine-generator sets (Nolan, 2001a). As a result, 
the first 600MW and 660MW Dongfang turbine-generator sets went into 
service in December 1996.86 (Dongfang had participated in 
Westinghouse technology transfer in the 1980s but only it to improve its 
existing, smaller turbines.87) Dongfang did not enter into other equity 
tie-ups for coal-fired power equipment. 																																																								
85 Th7, 13 September 2016.  
86 Annual report, 1997. 
87 Th2, 26 January 2016; Th4, 4 February 2016.  
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Industrial policy in the midst of an FDI boom 
The early to mid 1990s was a time when line ministry control of state 
companies weakened considerably – a core aim of market reformers like 
Zhu Rongji (Zheng, 2004) – and this contributed to incoherent outcomes 
in terms of technology transfer arrangements. On the question of joint 
ventures, there was no consensus in central government as to how 
necessary these were to technological progress in the power equipment 
sector. Rather, increased openness to joint ventures was one, evolving 
and ill-defined, aspect of a new push on ‘reform and opening’ put into 
full throttle by Deng’s February 1992 peregrination in southern China 
(Vogel, 2011).  
 
Between 1993 and 1997, foreign direct investment in China exploded to 
an unprecedented level, accounting for almost one-sixth of fixed 
investment (Kroeber, 2016). This investment was not the result of 
radical changes to laws and regulations governing foreign capital. 
Instead, the surge in FDI was the result of the political call to arms 
expressed by the country’s senior political figure (Chen et al., 1995, 
Chen, 1997).  
 
In this context, there was no intention of central government to reduce 
its industrial policy role in researching and framing technology transfer 
objectives for different sectors of the economy, or in funding S&T 
programmes in order to see objectives realised. In fact, mechanisms to 
support the more effective central leadership of manufacturing 
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capability development were given greater weight (Zhong and Yang, 
2007, Huang et al., 2004).  
 
The earliest of the major programmes was the National Key 
Technologies Research and Development Programme, established in 
1982 and operated in conjunction with China’s Five-Year Plans (Li et al., 
2008). In the period 1986-95, the manufacture of large-scale, sub-critical 
electricity generating equipment was a listed ‘key project’ in both the 7th 
and 8th Five-Year Plans (1986-90 and 1991-95). In 1986, the High-
Technology Research and Development Plan (known as the 863 
programme for the year and month of its inception) was initiated, with a 
specific focus on high-tech sectors supported through grants for applied 
research. These two programmes became the most important vehicles, 
in terms of budget and impact, in providing firm-level subsidies for 
technological development. In 1997, a National Basic Research 
Programme (known as the 973 programme, again for the year and 
month of its inception) was added in order to systematically support 
more basic research, although still, normally, linked to current 
technology acquisition objectives.88 As an OECD review observed, the 
defining characteristic of the S&T programmes in China, from their 
inception, was their top-down nature, involving central government 
agencies unilaterally setting out manufacturing technology road maps 
for different industries (OECD, 2007).89  																																																								
88 When China localised super-critical and USC power equipment technology in the 2000s, for 
instance, the 973 programme contributed through a number of national research centres, including 
the National Research Centre for Clean Coal Combustion, the National Laboratory for Multiphase 
Flows, the High Temperature Material Performance Laboratory, and the Coal Characterisistics and 
Combustion Test Laboratory (Zheng, 2004, Tan and Seligsohn, 2010a).  
89 Feigenbaum (1999) noted that the role of military scientists in conceiving the 863 program and 
convincing Deng Xiaoping to support it guaranteed its super top-down nature from the outset.  
	 119	
 
The overarching idiosyncrasy of the Chinese reform era was that it 
combined two distinct and sometimes conflicting tasks: the opening and 
marketisation of a socialist command economy and the introduction of 
an east Asian ‘developmental state’ approach to industrial upgrading 
(Kroeber, 2016). This explains how, on the one hand in the mid-1990s 
the power equipment sector could open up to foreign equity 
participation in a manner which would subsequently be criticised as a 
‘market for technology’ model that under-emphasised the need for 
domestic capability building (Cheung and Ping, 2004, Li et al., 2008, Zhou 
et al., 2016) and, on the other, the central government could continue to 
increase its developmental state capabilities with respect to the 
oversight and support of technology transfer. Indeed Zheng (2004:96) 
went so far as to say that Zhu Rongji’s creation of the State Economic 
and Trade Commission (SETC) when he was vice-premier in 1993, which 
absorbed line ministries including the Ministry of Machine Building 
under his premiership in 1998, was an attempt to create ‘a Chinese 
version of [Japan’s] MITI’.90 
 
Shidongkou and the quest for super-critical technology 
On the eve of the establishment of the SETC, there occurred an event 
that highlighted the limitations of centrally-managed technology 
transfer, consistent with experience in other developmental states. This 
was the 1992 start-up of China’s first, 600MW super-critical power plant, 
a demonstration project operated by Huaneng. The MMB had since the 
mid-1980s taken an interest in super-critical technology, which would 																																																								
90 The SETC absorbed 10 line ministries, state conglomerates and industry councils as part of an 
overhaul of central government bureaucracy in 1998. 
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increase electricity yields from China’s dominant coal energy source.91 
Super-critical technology was not new, having been pioneered in the US 
and Germany in the 1950s and 1960s; however, nor was it a mature 
technology. In the US, 147 super-critical coal plants were built before 
1990, mostly in the 1970s (Cen et al., 2009:28). But problems of 
reliability and high operating costs meant that US utilities stopped 
constructing super-critical plants in the late 1980s in the context of 
falling coal prices and limited regulatory pressure to curb emissions. In 
choosing a technology source for super-critical power generation, 
Chinese bureaucrats therefore had to decide between US power 
equipment manufacturers with greater production experience but no 
current orders, and European ones, which claimed to have undertaken 
development work – particularly related to new materials – that would 
resolve reliability problems (Otsuka and Kaneko, 2007).92 
 
According to a retired technical director at Shanghai, the MMB, the MEP 
and Huaneng formed a consensus that ABB was the leader in super-
critical technology. During negotiations for a demonstration project, 
pressure was applied on the European company to structure a co-
manufacturing deal with Shanghai (outside its Westinghouse joint 
venture). However, in this instance the Chinese side did not appear to 
exercise the same negotiating power it had enjoyed with Westinghouse, 
either in 1980 or in the 1995 joint venture discussions. A US$5m 
technology fee was paid as part of a Shanghai co-production agreement, 
and the licence was a one-off for the Shidongkou plant, while ABB did 																																																								
91 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
92 A common problem with early super-critical units was the introduction of contaminants from new 
‘once-through’ boilers into the steam turbines causing turbine blade degradation and breakages. It 
was therefore necessary to make the central turbine rotors ‘more rugged’. Th7, 13 September 2016.  
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not transfer any computer source code or other design capacity-enabling 
IP.93  
 
Worse still, ABB turned out not to have reliable technology. Within 
weeks of commissioning, the Shidongkou plant suffered a blade 
breakage and a control station failure. ABB replaced the casing, rotor 
and blades of the high-pressure section of the turbine, but still it did not 
achieve its contractually guaranteed efficiency level. The low-pressure 
section of the turbine was then replaced. According to the Shanghai 
technical director, the experience was a chastening one for the Chinese 
side, making bureaucrats and engineers alike nervous of taking risks with 
new technologies for several years.94 
 
It was not until 1995 that the MMB (which became the State 
Administration of Machinery Industry (SAMI) under the SETC in 1998), 
began a new, protracted feasibility study into super-critical technology. 
Meanwhile, through the 1990s, construction and technical development 
of super-critical plants continued in Europe and in Japan. Japanese 
government agencies in particular pushed programmes to overcome 
reliability problems. Beginning in 1980, MITI orchestrated a national 
project to develop new steel alloys that were essential to robust super-
critical and ultra super-critical (USC) power equipment.  
 
																																																								
93 Th11, 20 July 2016. The fee was Swiss francs 7m, converted here at the average 1992 exchange rate 
to US dollars. The interviewee at Shanghai said that all software provided as part of the co-production 
arrangement was set to stop functioning after three years. The Shidongkou power plant boilers were 
manufactured by Combustion Engineering, which was acquired by ABB in 1990. 
94 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
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During the 1990s, 30 super-critical and USC power plants were built by 
Japanese firms in Japan without reports of reliability problems (Otsuka 
and Kaneko, 2007).95 It was in this context that in the later 1990s the 
MMB/SAMI directed key research institutes, such as the Xi’an-based 
Thermal Power Research Institute, and universities including Tsinghua 
and Shanghai Jiaotong, to engage with foreign technology owners and to 
identify the R&D programmes that would be necessary to localise super-
critical technology. 
 
By 2000, almost a decade after Shidongkou was contracted, the SETC 
was confident that reliability problems with super-critical units were 
resolved. From 1995 to 2005 (when domestic production ramped up), 
China imported 30 super-critical power plant units without operational 
problems occurring (Zhao, 7 February 2007:slide 11). The localisation of 
super-critical technology was included in the 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-
5), and the SETC and the then State Development and Planning 
Commission (SDPC) orchestrated a collaborative R&D project, funded 
through the applied and basic research funding vehicles, that brought 
together state research centres, universities, and the big three 
manufacturers to attack identified targets for technology. The decision 
was taken to license technology from Japanese firms. In 2002, MHI was 
chosen for the turbines, and Hitachi for the generators and boilers, for a 
new demonstration super-critical, 600MW-unit power plant, Qinbei, in 
Henan province (Tan and Seligsohn, 2010b).  
 
																																																								
95 Th11, 20 July 2016 confirmed that this was also the Chinese view of the Japanese firms’ progress in 
the 1990s. 
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MHI offered to work with either Harbin or Shanghai in assembling the 
turbines; the central government indicated its preference for Harbin.96 
Hitachi collaborated with Harbin for the generators, and with its existing 
joint venture partner, Dongfang, for the boilers. The Japanese firms 
supplied the most technologically demanding components – including 
the high- and medium-pressure rotors and blades for the turbines – and 
oversaw assembly by their Chinese partners. In this respect, the 
arrangements were similar to those between ABB and Shanghai for 
Shidongkou in 1991-2. However, in this case the Chinese side was 
sufficiently confident of the reliability of the technology that new 
agreements with the Japanese firms were signed while Qinbei was still 
under construction. In late 2003, MHI agreed a deal with Harbin for the 
co-production of 12 600MW super-critical turbines (Minchener, 2010). 
Qinbei was commissioned in 2004. In terms of the analytical framework 
of this thesis, the lesson was that manufacturing capabilities had to be 
built sequentially and incrementally, using established technologies. 
 
Ultra-supercritical (USC) technology 
The SDPC had begun an initial feasibility study of USC technology in 
2000. As the super-critical programme moved forward smoothly, this 
was accelerated. The transition from super-critical to USC involved 
further upgrades to materials and coatings; however, the design of the 
turbines and valves was similar.97 Research and development projects 
for USC technology, overseen by the MOST, were put in place in 2002. 
The overall project management role of the SETC was taken over from 																																																								
96 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
97 As a senior Siemens engineer put it: ‘the design of high-pressure and intermediate-pressure 
turbines and valves [in USC units] is basically the same as in previous super-critical design.’ (Quinkertz 
et al., 2008:6). 
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2003 by the renamed planning agency, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC).98  
 
Given that Shanghai played no part in the Qinbei project, there was 
aggressive lobbying from both the Shanghai government and the firm for 
the latter’s joint venture partner, Siemens, be considered as the 
technology provider for the USC demonstration project.99 Siemens 
installed its first large-scale USC plant, Isogo, in Japan in 2001.100 In the 
event, in 2004 Siemens, which had been leading European development 
of USC technologies through the 1990s, was chosen to supply both 
elements of the turbine-generator set for a 1,000MW USC national 
demonstration plant, Yuhuan, in Zhejiang province. MHI was selected to 
supply the boilers, in collaboration with Harbin.  
 
However, Shanghai and Siemens, assembling the turbine-generator set, 
and MHI, manufacturing the boiler, were not really given a head start 
with the demonstration project. At the same time as Yuhuan was 
contracted in early 2004, Hitachi was awarded a contract in tandem with 
Dongfang to provide turbines, generators and boilers for another 
1,000MW USC plant, Zouxian, in Shandong province. And in 2005, 
Toshiba was awarded a contract in tandem with Harbin to provide 
turbines and generators for a 1,000MW USC plant, Taizhou, in Jiangsu 
province; the boilers were ordered from MHI in conjunction with Harbin. 
Yuhuan and Zouxian were both commissioned in December 2006, only 																																																								
98 The SETC, which had overall responsibiity for the super-critical R&D programme, was abolished in 
2003, with most of its functions absorbed by the SDPC, which was in turn renamed the NDRC. 
99 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
100 Isogo was undertaken in partnership with Fuji Electric, a long-time licensee of Siemens. Other 
Japanese power equipment manufacturers developed USC technology independently. 
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two years after Qinbei (Zhao, 7 February 2007). Taizhou was 
commissioned in 2007.101 
 
Table 7. Sources of super-critical and USC technologies for the big three 
Chinese power equipment firms 
 Equipment Technology Source Transfer method 
Shanghai Turbine Siemens Joint venture 
Generator Siemens Joint venture 
Boiler Alstom Licensing 
Dongfang Turbine Hitachi Licensing 
Generator Hitachi Licensing 
Boiler Hitachi Joint venture 
Harbin Turbine 600MW: MHI 
1000MW: Toshiba 
Licensing 
Generator 600MW: MHI  
1000MW: Toshiba 
Licensing 
Boiler SC: Mitsui-Babcock 
USC: MHI 
Licensing 
Sources: Company reports, interviews, Tan and Seligsohn (2010a) 
 
The background to the rush to deploy USC technology was China’s 
accelerating economic expansion, beginning in 2002. Having entered 
double digits in 2003, GDP growth continued to increase to a peak of 
14.2 percent in 2007. The growth was accompanied – contrary to China’s 
long-term post-1980 experience – by a rise in energy intensity (Zhou et 
al., 2010). This resulted in an unprecedented increase in demand for 
new electricity generating equipment, just as super-critical units were 
commencing local manufacture in 2003-4, and continuing through the 																																																								
101 In 2007 Harbin also commissioned two 600MW USC units, the first in China. Annual report, 2007. 
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inception of USC manufacturing. There was a remarkable ramping-up of 
production capacity from 2003 (Table 8). A technical director at 
Shanghai stated: ‘2003-4 was the fastest learning experience we ever 
underwent.’102  
 
Table 8. Real annual change in GDP, year-end installed thermal 
generating capacity, and annual change in installed capacity. % and GW 
 Real GDP 
growth. % 
Installed thermal 
generating 
capacity at year-
end. GW 
Annual increase in 
installed thermal 
generating capacity. 
GW 
1999 7.6 210 18 
2000 8.4 238 28 
2001 8.3 253 15 
2002 9.1 266 13 
2003 10 290 24 
2004 10 329 39 
2005 11.4 391 62 
2006 12.7 484 93 
2007 14.2 556 72 
Sources: World Bank, NEA 
 
From end 2003 to end 2007, China’s installed thermal electricity 
generating capacity increased by more than 260GW, or four-fifths of the 
existing base. Where the total increase in installed generating capacity in 
the period of the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) averaged 16GW per 
year, during these four years the annual increase in thermal capacity 
alone averaged more than 60GW. Based on the reports of its listed unit, 
Harbin’s revenues from thermal generating equipment tripled from 																																																								
102 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
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Rmb7.2bn in 2004 to Rmb21.8bn in 2006. Shanghai’s revenues from 
thermal generating equipment were already Rmb11.4bn in 2004, having 
outstripped Harbin since the mid-1990s; by 2007 they also tripled, to 
Rmb33.4bn (Table 9). Dongfang’s listed unit did not consolidate 
comparable thermal power equipment sales until after a 2007 
restructuring.103 
 
The huge increases in output were accompanied by abrupt shifts to 
production of the new super-critical and USC machinery. Chen and Xu 
asserted that from the commissioning of Qinbei in 2004 to the end of 
2007, China constructed 124GW of super-critical power station capacity 
(2010:2126). Separately, China’s Thermal Power Research Institute 
reported that as of 2007 more than 150 super-critical and USC units 
were on order for domestic installation (Zhao, 7 February 2007). With 
respect to the analytical framework of this thesis, the observation is that 
sequential learning steps could be made very fast in conditions of high-
volume manufacturing. 
 
The NDRC directed the electricity utilities towards purchasing larger, 
super-critical and USC units with a number of new policies: a 
requirement that all new generating plants of 600MW or greater 
capacity should be super-critical or USC plants; higher tariffs for 
electricity from super-critical and USC plants (all electricity prices were 
subject to centrally-set caps); regulations that from 2007 encouraged 
grid managers to dispatch power from the most efficient power plants 																																																								
103 Dongfang’s listed business bought controlling interests in its previously unlisted boiler unit and 
other subsidiaries in 2007. From the time of its 2008 annual report, Dongfang claimed, across its 
thermal, hydro, nuclear and other businesses, to be ‘the world’s largest power equipment 
manufacturer’. 
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first; and, from 2006, a programme of forced closure of the smallest and 
least efficient power plants (Cen et al., 2009: 234pp, IEA, 2009, Tan and 
Seligsohn, 2010a).  
 
Table 9. Revenues from thermal power generating equipment, 2003-7.  
 Harbin. Rmb bn  Shanghai. Rmb bn 
2003 2.9 na 
2004 7.2 11.4 
2005 13.3 19.5 
2006 21.8 25.7 
2007 20.5 33.4 
 Source: company reports 
 
What guaranteed the building of large super-critical and USC plants, 
however, was their cost. In the 1990s, the big three Chinese 
manufacturers sold sub-critical power generating equipment in the 
domestic market for 60-70 percent of the cost of imported units.104 With 
the localisation of super-critical and USC technology in the 2000s, this 
price differential was maintained or increased. A number of studies of 
the complete cost of Chinese power plants – including both equipment 
and construction costs – estimated that costs per kilowatt of installed 
generating capacity for super-critical and USC units ranged from one-
third to three-fifths of prices in other developing and developed 
countries.  
 
The total cost of the first localised super-critical plant, Qinbei, was 
reported as Rmb4,000/KW (US$588/KW) (Chen and Xu, 2010). The cost 																																																								
104 Th7, 13 September 2016. The source was responsible for the sale of a number of imported 
generating units in the early and mid-1990s that were funded internationally. 
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of the first localised USC plant, Yuhuan, was reported as Rmb3,625/KW 
(US$541/KW) (Tan and Seligsohn, 2010b). Different reviews of power 
plant costs between 2005 and 2010 concurred that costs remained 
within range of these projects (Table 10). The capital cost per KW of new 
generating capacity in other countries is indicated in Table 11. Based on 
these estimates, the cost of super-critical generating capacity in China 
was at most 60 percent of that in India, and an even lower percentage of 
that in the US or Romania.105 
 
Table 10. Estimated capital costs of new electricity generating capacity 
in China. US$/KW 
 International 
Energy Agency 
2009 
World Bank 2009 World Resources 
Institute 2010 
Sub-critical 465-590 600-650 650-800 
Super-critical 490-770 540 550-700 
USC 535-700 540 550-700 
Sources: (IEA, 2009), (Pauschert, 2009), (Tan and Seligsohn, 2010a) 
 
Table 11. World Bank estimates of capital costs of new electricity 
generating capacity outside China, 2009. US$/KW 
 United States India Romania 
Sub-critical 2290 1440 2530 
Super-critical 1960 1290 2250 
Sources: (Pauschert, 2009). Note that a report prepared for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
forum in 2007 (Hogan et al., 2007) collated studies from 2001-4 for capital costs of sub-, super- and 
USC plants in ‘a variety of economies’ and found them to be significantly lower in this earlier period 
compared with Pauschert, ranging from US$950-1350 per KW. 
 
																																																								
105 The price differentials for finished power plants indicated that substantial cost differences existed 
for basic goods, from steel to concrete. Materials accounted for approximately half of total costs 
(Pauschert, 2009). 
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Harbin leads, then lags 
At face value, each of the big three manufacturers was able to meet the 
challenges of massively increased demand as well as localisation of 
super-critical and USC technology. Harbin’s output and sales of thermal 
generating equipment increased faster than either of its competitors in 
the mid-2000s, while the firm produced its first super-critical equipment 
before Shanghai and its first USC equipment at the same time as 
Shanghai. However, Harbin’s explosive growth was not sustainable.  
 
After peaking at Rmb21.8bn in 2006, the firm’s revenues from sales of 
thermal generating equipment declined every year through 2015. 
Shanghai managers observed that once the initial rush to end the power 
shortages and brown-outs of 2004-5 ended, customers preferred the 
turbine-generator sets of Dongfang and Shanghai, although Harbin’s 
boilers retained a better reputation and strong sales.106  Furthermore, 
Harbin’s high aggregate thermal power equipment sales in the 2000s 
were secured at the expense of much lower gross margins than 
Dongfang and Shanghai (Table 12). When Harbin’s margins were raised, 
beginning in 2011, its sales decline accelerated. 
 
  
																																																								
106 Th5, 4 July 2014; Th6, 2 February 2016; Th13, 20 July 2016. 
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Table 12. Sales of thermal power equipment and gross margins; 
Shanghai, Dongfang, Harbin, 2000-2015. Rmb bn and % 
 Shanghai 
sales 
Gross 
margin % 
Dongfang 
sales 
Gross 
margin % 
Harbin 
sales 
Gross 
margin % 
2015 28.7 16.8 23 16.1 9.3 21.4 
2014 28.7 16.9 24.2 15.3 12.3 15.1 
2013 32.7 17.6 23.3 19.9 12.4 20.3 
2012 35.7 19.1 20.2 22 15.5 22.3 
2011 30.2 21.8 24.5 19.5 17.3 22.2 
2010 27.2 17.3 20.4 18.8 17.9 14.1 
2009 27.4 15.7 20.9 21.5 19.2 13.4 
2008 34 18.6 20.3 17.9 20.5 14.9 
2007 33.4 16.3 19.6 21.8 20.5 16.7 
2006 25.7 18.2 **  21.8 12.1 
2005 19.5 21.8   13.3 11.4 
2004 11.4 21.6   7.2 7.8 
2003 *    2.9 13.7 
2002     1.9 19.2 
2001     1.4 23.8 
2000     1.37 21.4 
Sources: company reports 
* Data for Shanghai not available prior to its listing. 
** Dongfang’s listed business underwent a major restructuring in 2007. Data prior to 2007 are not 
comparable. 
 
Dongfang’s performance was more impressive. The Sichuan-based 
manufacturer not only maintained margins in line with those of 
Shanghai, but further increased its thermal equipment sales after the 
mid-2000s (Table 12, above). Moreover, in most years Dongfang led 
Shanghai in the reported share of revenues expended on R&D (Table 9). 
Nonetheless, Dongfang’s thermal power equipment business remained 
smaller than Shanghai’s, and its overall business substantially smaller 
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(partly because of the large Shanghai-Mitsubishi joint venture in elevator 
and escalator manufacturing).107 In sum, the technological progress of 
Dongfang – with only a single, Hitachi joint venture in boilers – was 
within range of Shanghai. But Dongfang did not enjoy the same 
economies of scale and scope. 
 
Shanghai, which outstripped the production volumes of the traditionally 
dominant power equipment producer, Harbin, before entering joint 
ventures in 1995 (Table 6, above), embedded its industry leadership in 
the late 1990s and 2000s. In terms of products, Shanghai’s Siemens-
licensed 1000MW USC turbine-generator sets – the preferred size in the 
Chinese market – became increasingly dominant through the 2000s 
(Table 13), commanding a market share of 55 percent in 2010, forecast 
to be as high as 70 percent in 2016.108 In recent years, as industry 
operating conditions became more challenging, revenues and profits at 
Shanghai held up, whereas they fell markedly at both Dongfang and 
Harbin (Table 14).  
 
Table 13. Operational power plants (>250MW) of the big three 
equipment suppliers as of end-2013 
 300MW 600MW 1000MW Total 
Shanghai  91 105 52 248 
Dongfang 75 99 18 192 
Harbin 74 97 13 184 
Source: provided to the author by Siemens 
 																																																								
107 In 2015, for example, revenues at the Shanghai-Mitsubishi elevator-escalator joint venture 
accounted for 31 percent of Rmb78bn total revenues. 
108 Company reports, 2010, 2015, and Th11, 20 July 2016. 
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Table 14. Big three revenues and net income, 2013-15 and peak year. 
Rmb bn 
 Shanghai 
revenues 
Shanghai 
net profit 
Dongfang 
revenues 
Dongfang 
net profit 
Harbin 
revenues 
Harbin 
net profit 
2015 78 4.7 36 0.46 25.1 0.31 
2014 76.8 4.5 39 1.3 23.8 0.57 
2013 78.8 4.2 42.4 2.4 20.5 0.7 
Peak year 78.8 
(2013) 
4.7  
(2015) 
42.9 
(2011) 
3.1  
(2011) 
29.9 
(2008) 
1.8  
(2007) 
Sources: company reports 
 
Although Harbin and Dongfang spent a higher share of revenues on R&D 
until the late 2000s, Shanghai spent far more on imported technology in 
the form of patents, licences, software and other technology rights, in 
both in absolute and relative terms (Table 15). Much of this purchased 
technology came from the firm’s post-1998 joint venture partner, 
Siemens. An indication of the scale of the difference in expenditure on 
imported technology is given by the book value at cost of patents, 
licences, software and other technology rights on the balance sheets of 
the three firms at the end of 2015: Shanghai, Rmb1,990m; Dongfang, 
Rmb482m; Harbin, Rmb495m.109 
 
  
																																																								
109 Data reflect the full scope of the listed businesses; numbers are not broken out for power 
equipment segments. 
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Table 15. Expenditure on R&D and expenditure on patents, licences, 
software and other technology rights*. Rmb m and % 
 
Shanghai 
R&D  
spend 
R&D 
% of  
rev’s 
 
Shanghai 
tech’ 
rights 
spend 
Dongfang 
R&D 
spend 
 
 
R&D 
% of  
rev’s 
 
Dongfang 
tech’ 
rights 
spend 
Harbin  
R&D 
spend 
 
 
R&D 
% of  
rev’s 
 
Harbin 
tech’ 
rights 
spend 
2015 2500 3.2 102 1250 3.47 21 320 1.3 15 
2014 2800 3.6 77 1300 3.3 14 370 1.5 10 
2013 2000 2.5 105 1300 3.1 57 350 1.7 12 
2012 2100 2.7 327 1250 3.3 42 360 1.4 1 
2011 1600 2.4 209 1200 2.8 49 340 1.2 192 
2010 1500 2.4 158 980 2.6 76 650 2.2 8 
2009 1100 1.9 69 650 2 8 460 1.6 7 
2008 990 1.7 225 500 1.8 25 470 1.6 10 
2007 560 1 331 500 2.1 69 460 1.7 132 
2006 300 0.7 108 ** 3.1 ** 450 1.5 12 
2005 190 0.5 72  2.7  300 1.6 54 
2004 120 0.5 44  2.4  200 2 *** 
2003 Pre-listing  Pre-listing  3  120 2.4 *** 
2002 Pre-listing  Pre-listing  3  46 1.2 *** 
2001 Pre-listing  Pre-listing  6.2  32 1.1 *** 
2000 Pre-listing  Pre-listing  0.5  39 1.3 *** 
*Recorded as additions to intangible assets on the balance sheet and amortised over multiple years. 
(These data do not include ongoing royalty payments for equipment manufactured as part of 
technology licensing agreements, which are recorded as current expenditure.) 
** Absolute data for Dongfang not comparable prior to 2007; R&D % of revenues for earlier years 
included as a qualified comparison based on data for the turbine business alone. 
*** No figure given. 
Sources: company annual reports. 
 
There is little doubt that the five Westinghouse/Siemens joint ventures 
negotiated in 1995 supported Shanghai’s efforts to reinforce its industry 
leadership, although the precise contribution of the joint ventures to 
Shanghai’s competitive advantage is impossible to gauge. Nonetheless, 
Shanghai’s industry leadership was associated with a tendency to 
technological dependence. In 1998, when Siemens bought 
Westinghouse’s global thermal power business, Shanghai had a 
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contractual right to terminate the joint ventures. Despite having made 
early learning gains in the joint ventures in terms of management 
training programmes, technology upgrades and new plant design, a 
senior manager at Shanghai said the possibility of termination was never 
seriously entertained.110 On the contrary, Shanghai accepted Siemens’ 
demands for geographical limits on exports from continued joint 
ventures, and agreed – in contrast to the Westinghouse joint venture 
terms -- to pay royalties on domestic sales of equipment based on 
Siemens’ technology.111 Former Westinghouse and Siemens managers 
estimated the royalties at 1.5-3 percent of equipment sales prices.112 
When Siemens sought to increase its equity to 40 percent across a 
unified turbine, generator and auxiliaries joint venture, Shanghai also 
agreed. It is unclear why. The Chinese firm had no need of cash and did 
not gain further access to technology in exchange for the sale of equity; 
the reconfiguration was completed in 2009.113 What stands out in terms 
of the theoretical concepts employed in this thesis is the power of path 
dependencies at Shanghai. 
 
3.5. Gas turbine technology 
Shanghai had no more luck extracting complete technology for LGTs 
from its joint venture partner than did Dongfang and Harbin from other 
multinationals (Majidpour, 2012). In the 1990s, LGTs became the key 
international growth business for the leading multinationals. Gas-fired 																																																								
110 Th11, 20 July 2016. 
111 Th11, 20 July 2016; Th8, 15 September 2016. According to Shanghai interviewees, Siemens 
included a sweetener by providing Westinghouse technology updates for 1995-2000, the five years 
following the original joint ventures, on a royalty-free basis.  
112 Th8, 15 September 2016; Th4, 4 February 2016. 
113 Th11, 20 July 2016. The interviewee at Shanghai claimed that Siemens promised to bring 
substantial new international business to the joint venture if its equity increased, but this never 
happened. 
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power plants offered flexibility and readily-adjustable output, and met 
demands for reduced waste emissions. They required lower capital 
investment than coal-fired plants, but generated higher levels of service 
business (Watson, 2004).  
 
In 2003, the NDRC attempted to use two rounds of tenders for 39 LGTs – 
a large build-out of capacity – to organise a comprehensive technology 
transfer programme, similar to previous ones for coal-fired steam 
turbines and large hydro turbines.114  Siemens and Westinghouse 
interviewees stated, however, that following the lead of the longest-
standing multinational LGT supplier in the market, GE, all the 
multinationals insisted that joint ventures for LGT production be 
majority foreign-controlled, and that the most intellectual property-
intensive components – referred to as Hot Gas Path Parts (HGPP) – be 
imported.115 
 
This episode offered support to Nolan’s argument (2001a, 2001b, 2002) 
that an increasing level of concentration among multinational business 
since the 1980s inhibited developing countries’ capacity to obtain 
technology. Several waves of consolidation in the 1980s and 1990s left 
only GE, Siemens, Alstom and MHI as suppliers of the largest units.116 
However, a number of caveats should be considered before concluding 
																																																								
114 For a discussion of technology transfer in the hydro-power sector, which was closely linked to 
tenders for turbines for the Three Gorges project, see RedTech (2011) and McDonald et al. (2009). 
115 Th5, 4 July 2014; Th7, 13 September 2016; Th8, 14 September 2016.  GE operated a 51 percent-
owned joint venture with Shenyang Liming Aero-Engine for E- and F- class LGTs. MHI formed a 51 
percent-owned joint venture for LGTs with Dongfang.  Siemens formed a 51 percent-owned joint 
venture for LGTs with Shanghai. Each of the joint ventures began production in 2004-5. The 2003 LGT 
orders went ahead despite the multinationals’ refusal to engage in full-scale technology transfer; GE 
supplied 20 of 39 units. 
116 The latest consolidation occurred in 2000, when ABB divested its LGT business to Alstom. 
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that China will be unable to obtain and develop its own technology for 
LGTs.  
 
At the time of the NDRC’s 2003 effort to bargain for LGT technology, this 
objective was not a top priority for central government, and bargaining 
pressure applied to foreign technology providers was not maximised. 
China had limited proven natural gas reserves (IEA, 2009). The first, 
major, east-west gas pipeline did not open until 2005. It was only as the 
strength of central government commitment to reducing coal 
dependency and tackling pollution increased in the mid-2000s, and large 
shale gas deposits came into consideration (IEA, 2009), that interest in 
LGT technology increased. MOST’s grant support for LGT R&D was 
greatly expanded under the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-5) (Gallagher, 
2014) and, in these conditions, the big three manufacturers became 
much more concerned to obtain and develop proprietary gas 
technology.  
 
Claims of an inexorable trend to concentration in global multinational 
business must also be set against regulatory limits to concentration. 
Since business concentration hurts consumers, governments in 
developed countries are incentivised to limit it. This can support 
developing countries’ access to technology. A case in point occurred 
with LGT technology in 2014, when GE made a successful bid to acquire 
the power and power distribution businesses of Alstom. This could have 
reduced global manufacturers of LGTs to just three. However, as part of 
negotiations with EU competition authorities to approve the deal, GE 
was required to sell the intellectual property for Alstom’s GT26-series 
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LGTs to Italy’s Ansaldo Energia, maintaining a fourth player. Two 
ambitious firms from outside the core multinational oligopoly – 
Shanghai and South Korea’s Doosan Heavy Industries – then competed 
to invest in Ansaldo and thereby gain access to LGT technology. 
Shanghai won. 
 
It was far from clear that the forced technology transfer to Ansaldo, and 
Shanghai’s investment in Ansaldo, could turn either or both firms into 
global players in the LGT business. The G-series technology that Ansaldo 
acquired – successive generations of gas turbine technology are 
identified by successive letters of the alphabet – was a generation 
behind the H-series machines that GE and Siemens already had on the 
market. Ansaldo needed to absorb the technology quickly and then 
break through, without licensing third-party technology, to a new level 
of capability – something it had not managed previously.  
 
From Shanghai’s perspective, it won the right to invest in Ansaldo by 
taking a minority, 40-percent stake. It was unclear if this would provide 
access to the core LGT technology. If it did, would Shanghai, which had 
never made a significant independent leap in technology development, 
be able to do so with LGTs? Time will tell.  
 
It could immediately be observed that Shanghai, which formed a 
separate joint venture with Ansaldo in China to manufacture LGTs for 
the Asian market, gained a greater level of access to LGT technology 
than had recently seemed possible. This occurred in the context of a 
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round of consolidation of multinational businesses.117 A Siemens 
interviewee confirmed that Shanghai closed down its minority-owned 
LGT assembly joint venture with Siemens in 2016 and was completing a 
new factory for its Ansaldo joint venture.118 
 
3.6. Wind turbines 
A more telling guide to the competitive limitations of the big three state-
owned power equipment manufacturers may be their performances in 
the wind turbine sector from the mid-2000s, where they had to contend 
with many new entrants, including private companies. In the US and 
Europe, the leading incumbent power equipment firms, GE and Siemens, 
both quickly established themselves as key players in the wind turbine 
market in the 2000s. GE became the dominant supplier in the US, while 
Siemens trailed only Vestas in Europe (and led in both Europe and the 
world market in sales of offshore turbines).119 In China, none of the big 
three power equipment firms numbered in the top five suppliers of wind 
turbines in 2015 (Table 16). The evolution of the wind business in China 
is the subject of the next chapter, however a brief outline of the 
development of the wind businesses of Shanghai, Dongfang and Harbin 
is presented here. 
 																																																								
117 Shanghai paid Euro400m for its 40 percent stake. Pro-rated, this was cheaper than a Euro1.3bn 
offer from Siemens to buy the whole business in 2012, which was blocked by the Italian government. 
Corriere della Sera, 8 May 2014; Modern Power Systems, 11 September 2015. 
118 Th9, 23 September 2016. An executive at Siemens reported that Shanghai absorbed all the LGT 
technology that Siemens was willing to hand over by 2010 and that the last four years of the joint 
venture were characterised by increasing frustration, with Shanghai demands to be allowed to buy 
the critical technology for HGPP repeatedly denied. The imported HGPP components accounted for 
around half the cost of the kind of 350MW LGT popular in China. 
119 Japan’s diversified power equipment firms were not drawn by their home market into the wind 
turbine business because Japan had few acceptable onshore sites for wind (for reasons of 
demographics and topography, as well as environmental restrictions), few shallow offshore sites and, 
prior to the Fukushima disaster, a strong commitment to nuclear power. 
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Table 16. The world’s 15 leading suppliers of wind turbines by volume, 
2015. GW 
Firm (Chinese 
firms in bold) 
Deliveries. GW Rank of  
Chinese firms 
Ownership of 
Chinese firms 
Goldwind 7.8 1 Private 
Vestas 7.3   
GE 5.9   
Siemens 3.1   
Gamesa 3.1   
Enercon 3.0   
United Power 2.8 2 State 
Mingyang 2.7 3 Private 
Envision 2.7 4 Private 
CSIC 2.0 5 State 
Senvion  1.9   
Shanghai Electric 
(Sewind) 
1.9 6 State 
XEMC 1.5 7 State 
Nordex 1.4   
Dongfang Electric 1.4 8 State 
Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance, company reports 
 
Taking the firms in reverse order, Harbin’s response to the growth of the 
domestic wind turbine market was the clearest failure. The firm only 
announced its intention to enter the market in 2009, four years after 
rapid growth in China’s wind turbine market began. Harbin opted to 
construct a wind turbine manufacturing subsidiary in Zhenjiang, Jiangsu 
province.120 However, there was no clear strategy for the development 
of the business. In 2010, Harbin agreed with GE to fold the Zhenjiang 
facility, and GE’s own wind turbine assembly plant in Shenyang, into two 																																																								
120 Annual reports, 2008, 2009. 
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joint ventures.121 The businesses were not successful. The partners 
disagreed over strategy and priorities, and the joint ventures were 
dissolved in 2013.122 Subsequently, Harbin continued to operate the 
Zhenjiang facility alone; however it never broke out data for sales, which 
appear to have been very limited. 
 
Dongfang, in contrast to Harbin, was one of the fastest Chinese firms in 
not only responding to, but predicting, the growth of the wind turbine 
market. Dongfang decided to develop a wind turbine capability in 2004, 
the year before China’s Renewable Energy Law (REL) was passed. In 
2005, Dongfang produced a first, 1.5MW turbine under licence from 
Germany’s REpower, and from 2007 manufactured a series of turbines 
under joint development licences with Austria’s Windtec and its US 
parent, American Superconductor Corp. (AMSC) (Zhou et al., 2016).123  
 
In 2008-9, Dongfang won large orders for China’s earliest ‘wind base’ 
developments, and ranked as the number three wind turbine supplier in 
the country.124 However, Dongfang was unable to maintain this position. 
In subsequent years, wind turbine shipments fell and the company 
dropped down the domestic ranking, managing only eighth place in 2015 
(Table 16, above). Dongfang does not publish data for wind turbine 
sales; however, its annual ‘new energy’ segment sales, which also 																																																								
121 Harbin held 51 percent of the Zhenjiang joint venture, and GE held 51 percent of the Shenyang 
joint venture. The motivation for GE was that foreign firms’ share of the Chinese wind turbine market 
declined precipitously, from three-quarters in 2004 to a little over 10 percent in 2010; however, a tie-
up with Harbin only made sense if the local firm could deliver cost reductions and sales. 
122 Wind Power Monthly, 2 July 2013. See http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1188550/ge-
harbin-end-chinese-joint-venture Accessed 24 November 2016. 
123 For an outline of the basic terms of the 2007 joint development licence, see http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=86422&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=983070&highlight= Accessed 24 
November 2016. 
124 In 2008, for instance, Dongfang shipped more than 800 1.5MW turbines. Annual report. 
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include shipments of conventional power generating equipment used as 
part of nuclear installations, give a sense of the trend in the larger wind 
turbine business. New energy sales peaked in 2010 and subsequently fell 
each year through 2015, involving a cumulative drop of more than 50 
percent (Table 17).125  
 
Table 17. ‘New energy’ segment sales at Shanghai and Dongfang, 2010-
15. Rmb bn. 
 Shanghai ‘new energy’ 
equipment sales* 
Dongfang ‘new energy’ 
equipment sales* 
2015 12.1 4.6 
2014 7.8 4.9 
2013 5.9 6.7 
2012 6.6 7.7 
2011 7.2 8.9 
2010 6.2 9.5 
*Includes wind turbines, conventional power generating equipment sold to nuclear projects, and 
miscellaneous other sales. 
Sources: company reports 
 
Shanghai was more than a year behind Dongfang in entering the wind 
turbine market and, until 2014, experienced lower sales. Shanghai began 
by licensing a 1.25MW turbine design from Germany’s DeWind in 2006. 
The company then purchased a complete design platform for 2MW 
machines from another German design firm, Aerodyn, in 2008. Having 
learnt from the tie-up with Aerodyn, Shanghai attempted to develop its 
own 3.6MW turbine. This move into self-development, however, was 
not a success.  
 																																																								
125 Annual reports. Dongfang released a figure for wind turbine sales in the peak year, 2010. Revenues 
from wind turbines were Rmb7.6bn of the total reported new energy sales of Rmb9.5bn. 
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Some 80 Chinese companies entered the wind turbine business by 2010, 
and prices per kilowatt of equipment almost halved. Facing 
unprecedented levels of competition, and incurring operating losses, 
Shanghai began to negotiate with Siemens for a joint venture. After two 
years, a business owned 51 percent by Shanghai was agreed upon in 
2012. The venture bought over Shanghai’s Aerodyn platform and, a 
senior Shanghai manager stated, was thenceforth only allowed to sell 
Siemens technology.126 
 
Siemens, however, did not prove to be a quick or effective solution to 
Shanghai’s problems. The German firm’s 2.5MW onshore turbine was 
not popular in the market. Although its 4MW offshore turbine won 
orders, technology transfer from Europe, and hence production, were 
delayed. Management relations at the joint venture, said the Shanghai 
interviewee, were strained almost from inception. In 2014, the two sides 
agreed to switch to a pure licensing arrangement. This appears to have 
worked better. Shanghai enjoyed greater success in the onshore market 
based on the Aerodyn 2MW platform, modified through work with UK-
based engineering consultancy Garrad Hassan127, while becoming the 
market leader, with a majority market share, in offshore turbines based 
on licensed Siemens technology. In 2014 and 2015 Shanghai’s wind 
turbine order growth outstripped the overall Chinese market, with 
orders reaching Rmb9.4bn and Rmb11bn, respectively. Revenues from 
wind turbines far outstripped those at Dongfang. 
 
																																																								
126 Th12, 20 July 2016. 
127 Th12, 20 July 2016.  
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Despite a difficult start in the wind turbine sector, when Dongfang 
forged ahead, Shanghai came back to lead the big three power 
equipment firms, and may move further up the overall rankings of 
Chinese wind turbine suppliers. The decision to abandon the wind 
turbine joint venture with Siemens, like the decisions to abandon the 
Siemens LGT joint venture and to purchase 40 percent of Ansaldo, might 
reflect a new appetite for technological autonomy. Unlike GE and 
Siemens, which moved into the wind business by buying, respectively, 
the mature businesses of Enron Wind in 2002 and Bonus Energy in 
2004128, Shanghai did not have a ‘buy, absorb, and market’ acquisition 
strategy available to it. Like other Chinese wind turbine companies, 
Shanghai had to build production capability from the bottom up. 
Nonetheless, Shanghai has not in wind, as in thermal power, yet broken 
decisively out of the need to license technology and pay out a 
continuous stream of royalties for doing so. None of the three thermal 
firms exhibited clear dynamic capabilities in adjusting to the 
technological reset of wind turbine manufacturing. 
 
3.7. Trends in profitability, scale and global reach 
The issue of continuing technological dependency leads directly to the 
most striking differences today between the big three Chinese firms and 
their most successful multinational competitors: differences in profit 
margins, scale and global reach. As Table 18 shows, the overall gross 
margins of Siemens over the past 10 years were approximately 10 
percentage points higher than those of Shanghai and Dongfang, and 																																																								
128 At the times of acquisition, Enron Wind was the leading wind turbine manufacturer in the US and 
Bonus Energy was number two, after Vestas, in Denmark; both ranked in the top ten suppliers by 
volume in the world. 
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further ahead of Harbin. As GE’s divestment of GE Capital’s business 
from 2010 made its gross margins qualitatively more comparable with 
those of other diversified industrial companies, the US firm’s gross 
margins were also reported around 10 percentage points higher than 
those of Shanghai and Dongfang. Net margins at Siemens and GE were 
similarly far superior to those of the Chinese companies over the same 
period (Table 19).129 Moreover, despite the great scale of China’s 
domestic market, none of the Chinese firms came close to operating at 
the global scale of Siemens or GE, whether in fossil-based power 
equipment or renewables (Table 20). Shanghai’s thermal power 
equipment business, much the biggest in China, was still one-third the 
size that of Siemens by revenues, one-quarter that of GE. Shanghai’s 
renewables segment was around one-third the size of the 
multinationals’.  
 
Part of the reason the scale of the Chinese firms trailed the 
multinationals was that, after an impressive build-up by Shanghai and 
Dongfang in 2009-12, the export shares of their sales fell back (Table 21). 
Harbin’s export share held up, but only at the expense of collapsing 
margins. The export shares of revenues reported by Siemens in 2015 (85 
percent) and GE (55 percent) were far ahead of the peak shares so far 
achieved in China. 
 
  																																																								
129 These margin comparisons refer to the complete, diversified businesses of all the companies. 
Although data for comparable margins were not broken out by the firms for the fossil-based power 
equipment on which this discussion is largely based, the differences would likely be even greater since 
fossil-based power equipment contributed an outsize share of profits at Siemens and GE in the period 
analysed. In 2015, for instance, the Power segment at GE accounted for 20 percent of industrial 
revenues but 25 percent of industrial profits.  
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Table 18. Gross margins: China big three power equipment firms versus 
leading multinationals. % 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Shanghai 18.9 17.7 18.2 16.5 17.7 19.4 19.8 19.4 20.9 21.4 
Dongfang * * 16.1 17.3 20.2 20.9 21.2 20.4 16.8 16.8 
Harbin 11.1 15.7 13.4 12.8 14.4 20 21.5 21.1 14 14.3 
Siemens  26.1 28.8 27.2 27 29 30.2 28.3 27.4 28.6 28.9 
GE** 55.9 57.6 53.9 51.1 52.1 53.4 49.3 29.5 28.6 29.6 
MHI 12.6 14 12.7 13.7 15.2 15.8 18.5 19.5 20.8 21.3 
Hitachi 21.1 21.8 21.8 23.6 25.2 24.7 25.4 25.8 26.4 25.7 
Toshiba 25.4 27.4 21.4 24 24.6 25.3 26.1 25 23.1 15.1 
*Dongfang data prior to 2008 not comparable due to corporate restructuring. 
**GE gross margin inflated by GE Capital prior to divestment. 
Source: Morningstar data 
 
Table 19. Net margin: China big three power equipment firms versus 
leading multinationals. % 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Shanghai 4.72 5.1 4.45 4.33 4.46 4.85 3.53 3.11 3.33 2.73 
Dongfang * * 0.63 4.73 6.77 7.12 5.75 5.54 3.27 1.22 
Harbin 3.52 5.53 3.48 2.12 3.56 4.31 5.42 3.44 2.38 0.77 
Siemens  3.47 5.25 7.4 2.99 5.13 8.36 5.69 5.65 7.47 9.63 
GE** 12.75 12.86 9.5 6.84 7.55 8.91 9.26 8.94 10.25 
-
5.23 
MHI 1.59 1.91 0.72 0.48 1.04 0.87 3.45 4.79 2.77 1.58 
Hitachi -0.32 -0.52 
-
7.87 
-
1.19 2.56 3.59 1.94 2.76 2.22 1.72 
Toshiba 1.93 1.61 
-
5.03 -0.3 2.12 1.19 1.31 0.93 -0.57 
-
8.12 
*Dongfang data prior to 2008 not comparable due to corporate restructuring. 
**GE net margin inflated by GE Capital, especially prior to 2008 global financial crisis. 
Source: Morningstar data 
 
	 147	
Table 20. Overall revenues, thermal power equipment revenues, 
renewables revenues; Siemens and GE versus China big three. US$ bn* 
 
Overall revenues 
US$bn 
Thermal power 
equipment 
revenues** 
US$bn 
Wind and 
renewables 
revenues*** 
US$bn 
Siemens 2015 83.9 14.7 6.3 
Siemens 2014 94.7 16.9 7.5 
GE 2015 117.4 21.5 6.3 
GE 2014 117.2 20.6 6.4 
Shanghai 2015 12.5 4.6 1.9 
Shanghai 2014 12.5 4.7 1.3 
Dongfang 2015 5.8 3.7 0.7 
Dongfang 2014 6.4 3.9 0.8 
Harbin 2015 4 1.5 na 
Harbin 2014 3.9 2 na 
*Currency conversions at average 2015 and 2014 exchange rates: Euro:USD 1.11 (2015), 1.33 (2014); 
USD:Rmb 6.22 (2015), Rmb6.14 (2014). 
** Different firms' reporting segments for thermal power equipment vary and are only loosely 
comparable. Siemens Power and Gas segment covers equipment for fossil-fuel-based power 
generation plus other equipment for the oil and gas sectors. GE's segment includes its GE-Hitachi 
nuclear joint venture. 
*** Different firms' reporting segments for wind and renewables vary and are only loosely 
comparable. Shanghai and Dongfang's segments include conventional power components for nuclear 
power plants and miscellaneous other goods, from sewage treatment to biomass power-equipment. 
Sources: company reports 
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Table 21. Exports and export share in total revenues, China big three, 
2007-15. Rmb bn 
 
Shanghai 
exports 
 % of 
total 
revenues 
Dongfang 
exports 
% of total 
revenues 
Harbin 
exports 
% of total 
revenues 
2015 8.8 11.3% 4.9 13.6% 6.6 26.3% 
2014 10.6 13.8% 6.1 15.6% 4.3 18.1% 
2013 13.2 16.8% 9.4 22.2% 2.2 10.7% 
2012 17.9 23.4% 8.7 22.8% 4 15.4% 
2011 15.9 23.4% 6 14.0% 6 17.5% 
2010 11.8 18.7% 4.4 11.7% 5.3 18.2% 
2009 9.4 16.3% 0.3 0.9% 4.3 15.0% 
2008 8.9 15.1% na na 2.8 9.4% 
2007 4.6 8.2% na na 2.2 8.0% 
Sources: company reports 
 
The performances of Shanghai and Dongfang did look better when the 
businesses were compared with Japanese peers that obtained power 
equipment technology from Westinghouse, GE and Siemens.  Gross 
margins at Shanghai and Dongfang over the past decade trailed those at 
Hitachi and Toshiba by less than they trailed GE and Siemens, and were 
superior to those at MHI. Net margins at the Chinese firms were superior 
to those at the Japanese multinationals, while returns on assets (Table 
22) were comparable. However, Shanghai, the largest Chinese business, 
was dwarfed by the scale and globalised character of the Japanese firms. 
Revenues at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) were 2.5 times those of 
Shanghai in 2015, with 53 percent derived overseas; revenues at Toshiba 
were 4.5 times those of Shanghai, with 59 percent derived overseas; and 
revenues at Hitachi were 6.5 times those of Shanghai, with 47 percent 
derived overseas.  
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Table 22. Return on assets: China big three power equipment firms 
versus leading multinationals. % 
ROA 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Shanghai 3.52 4.15 3.33 2.92 3 3.23 2.41 1.99 1.87 1.39 
Dongfang * * 0.38 2.43 3.32 3.71 2.73 3.01 1.57 0.51 
Harbin 2.77 3.84 2.29 1.19 1.99 2.45 2.68 1.23 0.92 0.31 
Siemens  3.42 4.17 6.16 2.42 3.94 5.94 4.2 4.08 5.2 6.47 
GE** 3.04 2.98 2.18 1.36 1.48 1.79 1.95 1.95 2.33 -1.08 
MHI 1.16 1.38 0.54 0.32 0.73 0.62 2.46 3.64 2.12 1.16 
Hitachi -0.32 -0.55 -7.91 -1.17 2.63 3.73 1.82 2.54 1.85 1.38 
Toshiba 2.58 2.15 -6.03 -0.36 2.55 1.33 1.31 0.98 -0.6 -7.82 
*Dongfang data prior to 2008 not comparable due to corporate restructuring. 
**GE return on assets diluted by GE Capital. 
Source: Morningstar data 
 
Finally, the single biggest profitability issue for the Chinese firms may be 
that they trailed far behind Siemens and GE in generating high-margin 
revenues from service activities in the forward parts of the power 
generation value chain. This reflected particular weakness in dynamic, as 
opposed to manufacturing, capabilities. 
 
3.8. Discussion 
China’s thermal power equipment sector fitted closely to the analytical 
framework set out in Chapter 1, whereby the contribution of the 
developmental state is focused on the upgrading of narrowly-defined 
manufacturing technology. Although the timing of the developmental 
state’s initial quest for technology was fortuitous, coming during a 
period of global overcapacity and recession at the end of the 1970s, its 
impact was profound. The power of the state’s monopsony negotiation 
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for technology delivered a remarkable deal, as Westinghouse agreed 
loss-leading terms.  
 
Consistent with what the analytical framework recommends in the early 
stages of capability building -- when the excludability of intellectual 
property is low -- the developmental state distributed mature, imported 
technology to multiple firms and created an environment where 
competition encouraged the diffusion of basic technological capabilities. 
Competition, and the pace of absorption of technology, increased from a 
very low base as the corporatisation and marketisation of a centrally 
planned socialist economy proceeded. Critically, the developmental 
state stuck with its technology transfer plan over a long period, allowing 
gradual, cumulative learning gains to accrue, and thereby increasing the 
base of capabilities with which new technological challenges were 
confronted.   
 
The developmental state’s capacity for coordinating the growth of 
manufacturing capabilities was further apparent in its success in forcing 
historically separate, state-owned R&D institutions and universities to 
integrate with and support the technology needs of less centralised, 
more market-driven firms (Gu and Lundvall, 2006, Gu, 1999, Fu, 2015a). 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, a long series of reforms and a budgeting 
structure that promoted ‘excellence-based allocation’ of public funds 
(Gu and Lundvall, 2006:13), led China’s R&D apparatus to commercialise 
and to support firm- and sector-level technology needs. Central 
government agencies both coordinated front-end research, 
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development and localisation efforts for technology acquisition, and 
shaped final market demand for new products. 
 
The one hiccough in the developmental state’s quest to build thermal 
sector manufacturing capabilities occurred when planners attempted to 
leap ahead from their previously step-by-step technology acquisition 
programme. In the early 1990s, the state sought to bargain not for 
mature technology, but for super-critical technology that was still 
causing technical problems in power plants in developed countries. 
Chinese government planners were unable to determine which 
multinational technology provider would overcome the technology 
issues. The lesson was simple: that the logic of catch-up and central 
bargaining did not imply a capacity to leapfrog the technological 
frontier. Fortunately, the Shidongkou failure led to a return to the 
gradualist technology programme, more double-checking of technology 
paths, and thereby set the scene for the rapid absorption of super-
critical and USC technology in the 2000s. 
 
As manufacturing capabilities increased, the two most salient themes of 
Chinese firms’ modifications to imported technology were cost 
reduction and adaptation to local market idiosyncrasies.  
The role of the domestic market in shaping products that were 
subsequently exported in the power equipment sector was considerable, 
reflecting Linder’s ‘home market’ hypothesis (1961). Demand in China 
was for the cheapest possible electricity generation facilities and 
modifications to existing global technology reflected this. For example, 
in 2003 Dongfang reworked the ‘pants legs’ design of an Alsthom 
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furnace for circulating fluidised bed (CFB) boilers into a single drum 
design, greatly reducing the manufacturing cost (Cen et al., 2009:219pp). 
Shanghai took Siemens designs for super-critical and USC systems and 
scaled them up to 1,000MW units, creating a product that met local 
demand for very large power stations, reduced emissions and the lowest 
possible generating cost.130  Each of the big three firms developed co-
generation equipment to supply both electricity and heating, per the 
tradition of north China (Cen et al., 2009:40pp and 345pp).131 When the 
Chinese power equipment firms began to export in the mid-2000s, it was 
their ‘good enough’ (Brandt and Thun, 2010, Ghemawat and Hout, 
2008), low-cost models honed in the domestic market that were shipped 
to early markets including Vietnam, India and the Middle East. 
 
The developmental state-led drive for manufacturing capabilities 
engendered products that were unbeatable in the domestic market and 
highly competitive in emerging country export markets. However, 
consistent with the analytical framework of this thesis, manufacturing 
capabilities alone did not make Chinese firms comparably profitable with 
leading multinationals (Tables 18, 19, 22). The qualitative reason for this 
was not a failure of the developmental state’s technology acquisition 
programme, but a shortfall of entrepreneurial dynamic capabilities. 
 
The most striking manifestation of this was the inability of the three 
thermal power equipment firms to integrate forward and build 
substantial, high-margin businesses downstream. As a benchmark, over 																																																								
130 Th6, 2 February 2016; Th9, 23 September 2016. 
131 By 2006, 16GW of air-cooled power plants were operational in China; co-generation equipment 
accounted for an unusually highly 15 percent of the national installed base. 
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the past decade and more, GE and Siemens developed engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) services; power station 
management, monitoring and optimisation services; and value-adding 
maintenance service such that, overall, services accounted for the 
majority of the revenues in their power businesses. GE derived 63 
percent of revenues in its Power segment from services in 2015, and 
those services secured much higher margins than manufacturing.132  
 
In 2015 Dongfang, the only firm to break out clear data for  ‘engineering 
and services’ revenues, reported that only 16 percent of turnover 
derived from those sources.133 Shanghai’s published accounts suggested 
that service revenues in the power equipment business may be around 
one-quarter of the total, but still far behind multinational peers.134 A 
Siemens interviewee noted that Chinese firms’ lack of service 
capabilities in forward segments of the value chain also limited their 
ability to offer what GE and Siemens term turnkey power system 
‘solutions’.135  
 
The shortfall of dynamic capabilities at the three thermal firms was 
brought into domestic competitive relief when they were confronted 
with the technological reset of wind turbine manufacturing. The 
competitive position of the thermal firms was undermined in particular 
by the need for rapid service response when mechanical problems 																																																								
132 GE annual report 2015, p38. Siemens does not break out service revenues. 
133 Dongfang annual report 2015, p12. 
134 Shanghai only reported an aggregate number for a ‘modern services’ segment that spanned its 
entire business portfolio, accounting for 23 percent of total revenues in 2015. Service revenues 
relating to power equipment may have been proportionally a little higher, based on interviews 
conducted. 
135 Th6, 2 February 2016. 
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occurred with the turbines. They were unable to deliver as effectively as 
new private firms, as discussed in Chapter 4. In Europe and the US, by 
contrast, the incumbent thermal power sector leaders, Siemens and GE, 
moved quickly to become the number two and number one global wind 
turbine firms respectively. The Chinese firms could not replicate this 
response to the changed competitive environment. 
 
What, then, accounts for the transitional difficulties from developmental 
state-led to entrepreneurial firm-led development among the thermal 
case study firms? Ownership is the variable that appears to link most of 
the competitive weaknesses identified among the Chinese power 
equipment firms. 
 
The risk taking and disruption associated with the growth of dynamic 
capabilities were inhibited by a traditional separation between state-
owned firms that manufactured power equipment, government design 
institutes that designed power plants, state-owned construction firms 
that built power plants, and state-owned utilities that operated them. 
Competition was introduced within each of these segments of the value 
chain, but in the absence of ownership reform Siemens interviewees 
noted that state-owned firms were reluctant to attack the business 
terrain of other state units located in different parts of the chain.136  
 
After the ending of central bargaining for technology in the thermal 
sector, universal state ownership also appeared to contribute to a 
culture of low risk-taking in the acquisition of technology. Shanghai 																																																								
136 Th5, 4 July 2014; Th6, 2 February 2016. 
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developed overwhelming dependency on technology derived through 
joint ventures. In the light of this dependency, when Siemens bought the 
Westinghouse power equipment business, Shanghai renewed its joint 
ventures on more onerous terms. When Shanghai struggled to compete 
in wind turbines, the firm turned to another joint venture with Siemens, 
before renegotiating a licensing deal. Even the investment in Ansaldo, 
attempting to access technology for LGTs that Siemens refused to sell, 
was structured with a joint venture as the main operating vehicle, in 
which Shanghai held a minority.  
 
Beyond ownership reform, the failure of the Chinese government in the 
thermal power sector compared with more effective developmental 
state policies in north-east Asia was that the state did not cull the 
weakest beneficiaries of state support (Chang, 1994:123pp).137 Despite 
the small size of the Chinese thermal power equipment firms relative to 
multinational peers, the developmental state never reduced their 
number or forced through a merger to allow for increased scale and 
competition focused more on quality and differentiation rather than 
price. This was despite the fact that Harbin was clearly the weakest link 
in the industry.138  
 
																																																								
137 Chang notes that only three of the top 10 South Korean chaebol in 1966 were among the top 10 in 
1974; only five of the top 10 in 1974 were in the top 10 in 1980; and only six of the top ten in 1980 
were still in the top ten in 1985.  
138 Several interviewees commented that there were repeated rumours in the 2000s and 2010s that 
Harbin would be merged with another firm. The fact that nothing occurred was attributed, in part, to 
the difficulties central government encountered in forcing through industrial rationalisation against 
the desire of local governments to hold on to sources of patronage, taxation and employment. Th5, 4 
July 2014; Th6, 2 February 2016; Th9, 23 September 2016; Th11, 20 July 2016. Lardy (2014:24-33) 
highlighted the low levels of concentration in many state-dominated industrial sectors, noting there 
were 880 SOEs in coal mining, 312 in steel, and 264 in non-ferrous metal processing. 
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With the strongest Chinese power equipment firm ostensibly beholden 
to multinationals for new technology, and the sector not set for 
privatisation, it is presently difficult to envisage how a Chinese company 
will close the innovation and profitability gap to the leading global firms 
in thermal power equipment. China has made enormous strides in the 
acquisition of manufacturing capabilities in the thermal power sub-
sector, but its firms show few signs of the dynamic capabilities that 
characterise leading global businesses. In the wind sector, by contrast, 
we will see how the transition from state-led to world-class firm-led 
development is proceeding more smoothly because the sub-sector 
dispensed with ubiquitous state ownership from the outset.139 Dynamic 
capabilities are in the ascendancy in China’s best wind firms. 
 
  
																																																								
139 It should be noted that consistent with Thun’s findings in the automotive sector (2006), in the 
power equipment business state ownership by a local government, in Shanghai, proved superior to 
state ownership by central government, in the cases of Harbin and Dongfang. Thun suggested that 
there was no logical reason why the ‘local developmental state’ should be superior in business sectors 
with simpler supply chains than the automotive sector; however, in this case study it was. 
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Chapter 4 
Wind power: state and private firms compete 
 
4.1. Background 
In the late 1990s and the 2000s, the Chinese government pursued a new 
set of national technology transfer objectives for non-hydro renewable 
energy. In framing this latest round of industrial policy, central 
government agencies modified their strategy for technology acquisition 
in three significant ways.  
 
First, central government ceased to restrict its support to a pre-selected 
group of state-controlled national champions, accepting that all firms, 
state-controlled and private, should enter into competition. A main-
board director at Goldwind, today China’s largest wind turbine 
manufacturer, noted that from the moment that the NDRC began to 
tender the first two wind farm concessions in 2003 it made clear that 
firms of all ownership types were welcome to bid.140 Indeed, while 
Goldwind, then a state-controlled firm, won one of the first two bids, the 
other went to a forerunner company of today’s Hanergy, a private 
enterprise.141 
 
Second, after early and unsuccessful state-led joint ventures in wind 
turbines (see below), central government withdrew from central 
bargaining and management of the process of technology transfer on 																																																								
140 W1, 27 May 2013. 
141 Goldwind won a concession in Guangdong’s Huilai county. Huarui, the precursor company to 
today’s Hanergy, won a project in Jiangsu province in combination with GE. These were the first two 
concessions granted by the NDRC, in late 2003. Note that the Huarui that became Hanergy is not 
related to the Huarui wind turbine manufacturer later established in Liaoning province, whose English 
name is Sinovel. 
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behalf of receiving firms. Instead, government limited itself to setting 
parameters for the transfer process – notably a minimum level of local 
content for turbines sold to domestic wind farms – and left 
manufacturers to decide for themselves how best to obtain technology 
inputs.  
 
Third, reflecting and reinforcing the move to more open competition, 
government used the passage of a Renewable Energy Law (REL) to 
establish the overall playing field for renewable energy sector 
participants. The approach echoed Japan and Korea’s earlier use of 
‘single-industry’ laws to frame the rules of competition under industrial 
policy (Amsden, 1989, Johnson, 1982). In terms of the analytical 
framework of this thesis, the three changes opened new possibilities for 
the development of dynamic capabilities, as well as manufacturing 
capabilities, at the firm level.  
 
The changes were tied up with progression of China’s post-1978 reform 
and opening process. In particular, the late 1990s and early 2000s were 
characterised by explicit political acceptance of the role of the private 
sector in the economy, including a decision in 2001 to admit private 
entrepreneurs to membership of the CPC (Tsai, 2007, Dickson, 2007), 
and related amendments to the Chinese state constitution in March 
2004.142 A new approach to industrial policy was also consistent with a 
																																																								
142 See http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/05/content_1381906.htm Accessed 3 
January 2017. Changes to the constitution included recognition of former General Secretary Jiang 
Zemin’s theory of the ‘Three Represents’, which asserted that the Communist Party represented the 
great majority of Chinese people (implicitly including capitalists) rather than just its traditional 
political constituencies, as well as a statement that lawful private property is ‘inviolable’. 
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further round of marketisation of economic relations connected to 
China’s 2001 accession to the WTO (Lardy, 2004). 
 
The march of reform and opening did not indicate a reduced role for 
state-led industrial policy. Rather, the era of wind turbine technology 
absorption was one in which government and a disparate array of firms 
groped their way towards new arrangements of ‘embeddedness’ 
between state and producers (Evans, 1995). Senior political figures 
continued to spend much time visiting companies deemed important or 
potentially important to national economic development. The MOST 
expanded its role as the key vehicle for the state’s research and 
development subsidies, increasing the budgets for its ‘863’ and ‘973’ 
R&D programmes year after year (Feigenbaum, 1999, Liu et al., 2011).  
 
Instead of directing activity at the firm level, the NDRC and the NEA 
focused on setting rules. Constrained by their small authorised civil 
service staffs following successive rounds of government downsizing 
(Yang, 2004, Brødsgaard, 2002), the NDRC and the NEA depended 
heavily on two specialist ‘service units’ (shiye danwei, ),143 the 
Energy Research Institute (ERI) and the National Centre for Climate 
Change Strategy (NCCCS), to develop different policy options. In turn, 
these subsidiary agencies entered into numerous formal and informal 
relationships with the private sector and academia. Much of the drafting 
of the 2005 REL, for instance, was subcontracted to experts at Tsinghua 
University (Huanjing_Baohu, 2010). 
 																																																								
143 The term is sometimes translated as ‘public service units’. See, for instance, OECD (2005).  
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At the same time as government adjusted its approach to industrial 
policy, a more diverse array of companies sought to influence 
government policy-making. The development of patterns of 
communication and lobbying between national government and 
companies varied by industrial sector in China, influenced by factors 
including levels of state ownership and market concentration (Kennedy, 
2009). In the renewable energy sector, Figure 4 presents a stylised 
representation of the three-tier structure that evolved. At the top, the 
NDRC, the NEA and other ministries concerned with renewable energy 
were, after 2008, coordinated by a National Energy Commission (NEC), 
chaired by the premier.144 An interviewee at the NDRC described how, 
below government, a tier of research agencies directly supported the 
government’s policy development work; these comprised the key formal 
service units for renewables, and third-party research suppliers including 
academia, think tanks, and sometimes foreign researchers.145 
  
																																																								
144 The NEC was set up at the same time as the NEA, in 2008. Where the NEA replaced the former 
Energy Bureau of the NDRC, the NEC replaced the former National Energy Leading Group. In essence, 
both new organisations were bureaucratic upgrades of their predecessors.  
145 G1, 31 May 2013. 
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Figure 4. Government, research and lobbying relationships in 
renewable energy. (Arrows with solid lines denote formal 
relationships, arrows with dotted lines denote informal relationships) 
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The third tier indicates how ministries and firms came to interact 
through different business associations that functioned as discussion 
and lobbying groups. All non-government organisations in China 
required a government unit to sponsor them; NDRC, MIIT, MOST and 
SASAC were among government agencies that sponsored different 
renewable energy industry associations (Table 23). In addition to 
associations established early in the reform era – which became much 
more active in the 2000s – new organisations were set up to represent 
particular groups of entrepreneurs.  
 
Most such organisations represented only Chinese businessmen, 
creating fora in which government could interact with entrepreneurs 
outside the gaze of foreign competitors. However, there were also 
dedicated institutions through which foreign investors were engaged. 
The Chinese Renewable Energy Industries Association (CREIA) was 
started with UN funds in 2002 and brought together ERI and key foreign 
and domestic firms in both the wind and solar industries. During the 
drafting of the REL, CREIA was a conduit for the views of foreign firms 
and governments.146 
 
  
																																																								
146 G2, 31 May 2013. 
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Table 23: Industry associations, government sponsors, start dates 
Name Acronym Sponsor Start date 
Chinese Renewable Energy Society CRES MOST 1979 
China Photovoltaic Society CPVS CRES 1979 
China Wind Energy Association CWEA CRES 1981 
China Energy Conservation 
Association 
CECA Unknown Unknown 
Chinese Renewable Energy Industries 
Association 
CREIA SASAC, NDRC 2002 
China New Energy Chamber of 
Commerce 
CNECC All-China 
Federation of 
Industry & 
Commerce 
2006 
China Renewable Energy 
Entrepreneur Club 
CREEC Unknown 2008 
Polycrystalline Silicon Alliance PSA MOST 2009 
China Photovoltaic Industry Alliance CPIA MIIT, NDRC 2010 
Sources: Public materials of the industry associations  
 
Most associations featured current and retired government officials as 
members alongside businessmen. In 2013, with respect to associations 
listed in Table 23: Retired NDRC vice chairman Zhang Guobao was Senior 
Advisor to the China Energy Conservation Association (CECA), an 
important lobby group; the current Head of ERI, Han Wenke, was an 
Executive Member of CECA’s Governing Council. Zhang Guobao was also 
Chairman of the Thin Film Committee of the China New Energy Chamber 
of Commerce.147 The Vice Head of ERI, Li Junfeng, was Vice Chairman of 
the Chinese Renewable Energy Society, a Committee Member of the 
China Photovoltaic Society, Deputy Secretary General of the China 
Photovoltaic Industry Alliance, and Chairman of the Chinese Renewable 
Energy Industries Association. Mao Rubai, Chairman of the Environment 
and Resources Protection Committee of the NPC, was Honorary 																																																								
147 Zhang Guobao retired from the NEA and NDRC in 2011. After retirement he was appointed head of 
the NEA’s new Specialist Consultancy Committee (Guojia nengyuanhui zhuanjia zixun weiyuanhui); 
See http://www.nea.gov.cn/nyzjzx/  Accessed 10 January 2017. 
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Chairman of the Chinese Renewable Energy Society and Chairman of the 
Advisory Committee of the China Renewable Energy Entrepreneur Club. 
Shi Dinghuan, Technical Consultant to the office of the premier at the 
State Council, was Chairman of the Chinese Renewable Energy Society 
and a Committee Member of the China Photovoltaic Society. In sum, 
China’s business associations existed as state-sponsored institutions 
designed for government officials to interact with an ever-more diverse 
range of corporate interests (Foster, 2002, Pearson, 2005). 
 
Firms also attempted to influence national government directly. As 
Kennedy (2009) illustrated, influence was strongly correlated with a 
firm’s size and position in its sectoral hierarchy. However, it was 
extremely rare for an individual firm significantly to impact national 
policy. There were too many different bureaucracies involved in policy-
making, and the central role of political consensus-building was inimical 
to firms’ particularistic demands. In this respect, Chinese central 
government continued to deliver both ‘embeddedness’ at the firm level 
and the ‘autonomy’ required to ensure competition (Evans, 1995). 
 
The above describes a terrain of central government-firm relationships 
that was evolving as state-owned, privately-owned and state-private 
firms competed to acquire wind turbine technology and build scale. 
While policy mechanisms were adjusted, central government’s 
determination to lead the technology acquisition process did not 
change. Consistent with best practice in the analytical framework of this 
thesis, and with earlier strategies to acquire super-critical and USC 
technology in the thermal power equipment sector, this meant an initial 
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discrete, extended period of research, feasibility studies, and small-scale 
experimentation. Wind power was one of a number of renewable 
technologies that underwent evaluation by government agencies. Only 
slowly did wind turbine technology become a strategic priority as the 
most cost-effective target for renewable power generation, as well as a 
technology with a low risk of disruption, and hence an acceptable risk 
profile for the developmental state (Figure 5).148 
 
Figure 5. Possible central government investment choices in selected 
green energy technologies 2000-2010, and outcomes.  
Technology  Strategic impetus 
for national support 
Perceived  
risk of 
technological 
disruption 
Outcomes 
Wind 
power 
High (government 
seeking renewables 
expansion; lowest 
cost technology 
after hydro) 
Low (only issue 
use of gears 
versus direct 
drive) 
Steady progression 
from experimentation 
to substantial state 
concession tenders to 
national FIT. Policy 
consensus 
Solar 
power 
Low (cost per kwh a 
multiple that of 
wind) 
High (unclear if 
polysilicon, thin-
film or other 
technology would 
triumph) 
Limited 
experimentation, 
limited state R&D, 
until falling pv unit 
costs and US/EU anti-
dumping cases led to 
re-evaluation. No 
policy consensus until 
solar price structure 
changed radically 
New 
energy 
vehicles 
High (automotive 
sector a major target 
for industrial policy 
action, but so far 
with limited success) 
High (batteries 
versus fuel cells) 
Experimentation, 
substantial state R&D 
No policy consensus 
																																																								
148 A insight into the extent to which Chinese planners considered risks of technological disruption 
was given in a speech about clean energy automotive technology by Zhang Guobao in October 2013. 
Zhang repeatedly stressed how unpredictable the technological development path of electric vehicles 
had been. See http://auto.sina.com.cn/news/2013-10-17/23211236461.shtml (in Chinese). 
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4.2. Stage 1: Search and bargaining 
The earliest Chinese experiences with wind turbine generators involved 
the acceptance of grants and low-interest loans in the 1980s, in 
particular from the Danish government, conditioned on imports of 
equipment from the funding countries (Lema and Ruby, 2007). It was in 
this manner that the forerunner of today’s Goldwind began its history as 
a research institute and manager of trial wind turbine installations in 
Xingjiang in 1986. In 1986 and 1989, Goldwind installed two, followed by 
13, 150kw Danish turbines, creating the then largest Chinese wind farm, 
at Dabancheng, a natural wind tunnel close to Urumqi. China’s first 
nationwide wind resource assessments were undertaken in the early 
1990s. Several government agencies secured grants in aid in this period 
that gave further impetus to wind technology research. Sources included 
the World Bank and the United Nations Environmental Program 
(Economy, 2011, Lema and Ruby, 2007). 
 
In the mid-1990s, different ministries and commissions began to develop 
plans for renewable energy. This occurred before there was any 
consensus about objectives at senior government level. There was 
consequently a period of uncoordinated and sometimes wasteful policy-
making development.  
 
In 1994, the Ministry of Electric Power set a target of 1GW of installed 
wind-generating capacity by 2000, but without arrangements to fund 
this. The SDPC (forerunner of the NDRC until 2003) published a lower 
target for wind installations (Lema and Ruby, 2007) and sponsored a 
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technology-transfer manufacturing programme based on two joint 
ventures – the first between Xi’an Aero Engine Corporation and 
Germany’s Nordex and the second between First Tractor Group in 
Luoyang and Spain’s MADE (Lewis, 2012). The SDPC’s joint venture 
strategy for wind turbines echoed the technology acquisition approach 
pursued by thermal power equipment firms in the same period. With no 
strategy to expand demand for wind power, however, the joint ventures 
foundered. The State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), 
responsible for large domestic enterprises and their technological 
development, published another, small-scale wind sector plan, while 
MOST developed its own technology transfer agenda (Lewis, 2005). In 
the face of these uncoordinated policy initiatives the wind sector 
remained small and dependent on imported turbines. As of 2000, only 
344 MW of wind power was installed in China. 
 
Despite the small scale of the wind sector, and the conflicting, 
uncoordinated plans of different central government agencies, Chinese 
researchers looked at and learned from a wide variety of foreign turbine 
technology. According to a database developed by Lewis (2012:134), 
prior to 2000 different projects employed turbines from 17 companies 
based in six European countries. Consequently, Chinese engineers, 
especially those at Goldwind, experienced substantively different 
approaches to not only the mechanical challenges of wind turbine 
manufacture, but also to siting and service issues. In addition, MOST 
provided its first R&D subsidies for wind turbines – for development of 
600KW machines – under the 9th Five-Year Plan (1996-2000) (Lewis, 
2012:56). 
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Central government consensus for wind 
At the start of the 2000s, a consensus slowly formed across different 
agencies of central government that China should pursue a substantial 
programme of wind turbine manufacturing. According to case study firm 
executives, a senior manager at ERI and an academic involved in framing 
the REL, there were three key considerations.149 First, the relatively low 
generating cost of wind power compared to other non-hydro renewable 
alternatives, most obviously solar (Table 24). Second, the wind sector’s 
relatively mature technology and low risk of technological disruption. In 
the solar sector in the early and mid-2000s, the future roles of thin-film 
versus polysilicon technologies were subject to widespread 
disagreement; in the wind sector, by contrast, the biggest technological 
issue was the secondary one of whether direct drive systems were 
preferable to gears. Third, local manufacturers dominated in almost all 
wind markets around the world, suggesting that Chinese firms would 
have an advantage in harnessing China’s wind resource. 
 
Table 24. Levelised cost of electricity generated from wind, solar and 
coal inputs in China. 2008 actual and contemporary forecasts for 2020. 
Rmb per MWH 
 2008 2020 forecast 
Wind 500-650 350-430 
Solar 2000-2500 700-750 
Coal 250-370 250-430 
Source: BTM Consult 2008 
 																																																								
149 W1, 27 May 2013, G3, 19 August 2016; G4, 30 July 2012. 
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An important figure in the pro-wind lobby was Zhang Guobao, since 
1999 a vice director of the SDPC responsible for energy matters (in 2008, 
he became the first head of the NDRC’s National Energy Administration). 
Zhang was a career NDRC bureaucrat with long experience in projects 
such as China’s east-west gas pipeline, the Qinghai-Tibet railway, and 
the industrial revitalisation programme in north-east China. From 1999, 
Zhang was involved in several overseas research trips that looked at 
foreign wind turbine manufacturers and utilities and was convinced 
there was a case for Chinese industrial policy to target the sector.150  
 
4.3. Stage 2: Manufacturing of mature technology 
In 2002, Zhang received a mandate from the State Council to organise a 
series of larger-scale wind farm tenders, each of 100-300MW. According 
to a main board director at Goldwind, the projects had two main aims: 
first, to establish the current price of wind-generated electricity in China; 
second, to assess the wind turbine manufacturing capabilities of Chinese 
firms.151 
 
The concession projects were carefully designed to ensure that 
developers and suppliers would participate. Sites were pre-selected by 
government and came with project approval, guaranteed grid 
connection, subsidies for supporting infrastructure, preferential tax and 
loan terms, and a power purchase agreement (PPA) for the first 30,000 
hours of output. Bids were judged on the price offered by the developer 
per kilowatt-hour. In order to achieve rapid acquisition of domestic 
technological capabilities, the NDRC stipulated an initial local content 																																																								
150 Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), 27 March 2008 and 14 January 2011. 
151 W1, 27 May 2013. 
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requirement for turbines used in the concession projects of 50 percent, 
increased to 70 percent in 2004. In 2005, the NDRC issued a further 
notice clarifying that no wind farms with less than 70 percent domestic 
content would be approved in China.152  
 
As noted, the criterion by which bids to construct the wind farm 
concession projects were judged was headline price alone. Unlike in 
international commercial tenders, there was no requirement for 
turbines to be certified by independent testing agencies and no 
consideration of estimated lifetime performance of the turbines. In 
consequence, while the prospect of large projects and the local content 
requirements encouraged many foreign manufacturers to open Chinese 
production facilities, the bidding system favoured Chinese 
manufacturers offering cheaper but lower quality machines.153  
 
From 2003 to 2007 a total of 18 concession projects were offered, 
spread across five bidding rounds; 3.35GW of wind power capacity was 
installed, a multiple of China’s existing wind generating capacity. The 
projects brought a large number of Chinese firms into the wind turbine 
manufacturing business. These included the big three state sector 
thermal power equipment firms, as well as many other state, private 
and mixed-ownership firms, the latter spun out by state enterprises.  																																																								
152 NDRC notice no.1204, July 2005. ‘Notice on the relevant requirements for the administration of 
the construction of wind farms’ (Fagaiwei guanyu fengdian jianshe guanli youguan yaoqiu de 
tongzhi). The local content requirements were almost certainly contrary to China’s undertakings as a 
member of the WTO, from 2001. The requirements were ended under US pressure in 2009, by which 
time wind turbines made in China were more than 90 percent localised. Many components were 
initially localised in the mid-2000s under programmes led by international firms including then market 
leaders Vestas and Gamesa; component producers subsequently sold components to domestic 
turbine manufacturers. See Keith Bradsher, ‘To conquer wind power, China writes the rules’, New 
York Times, 14 December 2010. 
153 Turbine size had to be a minimum 0.6MW. 
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From 2004, the State Council mandated different groups to begin 
preparatory work for the REL. Consistent with good practice in the 
analytical framework of this thesis, the Environmental and Resources 
Protection Committee of the National People’s Congress, in charge of 
drafting the law, consulted with domestic manufacturing firms on its 
content, while NDRC researchers continued to visit foreign wind turbine 
makers, as well as foreign government agencies with renewables 
experience.154 In an instance of low-cost regulatory borrowing, the REL 
was based on German legislation (as were subsequent environmental 
regulations, including those governing distributed solar power). The law 
set targets for renewables capacity, created a national reserve to 
subsidise the cost of renewable energy, and mandated grids to connect 
and buy renewable power; it came into force at the beginning of 2006.  
 
In 2007, the NDRC published its Medium- and Long-Term Plan for 
Renewable Energy Development in China, which provided the first 
comprehensive set of targets, including 30GW of grid-connected wind 
power by 2020. (The target was revised only five years later, in 2012, to 
200GW.) The 2007 Plan also stipulated that electricity generating 
companies must generate at least 8 percent of their power from 
renewables by 2020, a stipulation that became a major driver for the 
growth of the wind industry (Lewis, 2012:54). The 2007 Plan included a 
first mention of China’s strategy to develop multi-gigawatt wind power 
‘bases’. 
 																																																								
154 W1, 27 May 2013. GE and Suzlon were among foreign firms studied by the NDRC. 
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In 2009, as a result of operating experience, the REL was amended. 
Changes included regulations to address delays in providing grid 
connectivity (Schuman and Lin, 2012). The same year, the NDRC moved 
from a tendering process for wind projects to a four-category national 
feed-in tariff (FIT), creating an operating environment in which central 
government decided demand for wind power by setting medium- and 
long-term targets for its generation, and leaving developers to decide 
when and how to build wind farms.  
 
Table 25 shows the impact of the successive government policy 
initiatives from 2003 on the Chinese wind turbine market. Installations 
approximately doubled each year from 2003 to 2009, hitting a peak of 
almost 19 gigawatts in 2010. From 2009, China constituted the largest 
wind turbine market in the world. What was more telling, however, was 
that the signalling effect of government industrial policy was such that 
production capacity for turbines increased faster than demand. Until 
2006, when the REL came into force, capacity utilisation for wind turbine 
assembly in China was close to 100 percent. In 2007, when the Medium- 
and Long-Term Plan for Renewable Energy Development mandated 
targets for renewables generation, capacity utilisation fell to 75 percent 
as factory construction accelerated. In 2008, capacity utilisation fell to 
54 percent.155 The learned responsiveness of manufacturers to state 
policy echoed the developmental experiences of Japan, South Korea, 
																																																								
155 Data on capacity utilisation are taken from a 2009 report by the European Chamber of Commerce 
in China in conjunction with Roland Berger Strategy Consultants: ‘Overcapacity in China: causes, 
impacts and recommendations’. Available at http://173.254.52.9/~undersx4/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/European-Chamber-of-Commerce-_Overcapacity-in-China_Dez09.pdf 
Accessed 12 January 2017. 
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and Taiwan (Johnson, 1982, Amsden, 1989, Wade, 1990, Gold, 1986, 
Woo, 1991). 
 
Table 25. Annual installed and cumulative wind generating capacity in 
China, 2001-13. MW   
 
Source: CWEA 
 
Manufacturing capacity was constructed at an extraordinary pace. In 
August 2009, the State Council listed wind turbine production as an 
‘excess capacity sector’, causing the Ministry of Land and Resources to 
deny applications for new manufacturing facilities. Some 80 firms had 
already entered the business (Zhou et al., 2016:292). 
 
The rush to enter the market combined with the government’s 
withdrawal from central bargaining for technology to produce a new 
phenomenon: the tendency for technology costs to be bid up. In 2009, 
the Ministry of Finance published a report in which it claimed that 
unrestricted entry into the wind business caused prices of production 
licences for foreign-designed 1-1.5MW turbines to increase from 
US$1.4-2.8 million in 2005 to US$11-12.4 million in 2007 (Tan and 
Seligsohn, 2010a).  
 
Data for technology expenditure from Mingyang (see case study) 
showed in detail how small- and mid-size European design firms were 
able to extract hefty upfront payments as well as royalties with 
minimum charges per megawatt of turbine produced. Within 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
New Installed Capacity (MW) 42 66 98 197 507 1288 3311 6154 13803 18928 17631 12960 16089
Cumulative Installed Capacity (MW) 381 448 546 743 1250 2537 5848 12002 25805 44733 62364 75324 91413
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government there was criticism that the move to a more laissez-faire 
approach to technology transfer mostly benefited foreign technology 
owners.156 The anxiety echoed that 40 years earlier within the Japanese 
government when central bargaining for technology by MITI gave way to 
decentralised firm-level negotiation in sectors including electronics 
(Gregory, 1985, Lynn, 1982, Peck and Tamura, 1976).  
 
Nonetheless, Chinese firms were quick to absorb imported wind turbine 
designs and to modify them sufficiently to be able to claim 
‘independent’ design capabilities. A 2009 survey of 120 turbine models 
available in China found that the number claimed to be of ‘independent 
design’ more than doubled, to 51, compared with 25 in 2008. The 
number of turbines constructed under a basic foreign licence halved to 
less than 10 in 2009, while the number designed on the basis of ‘joint 
development’ with a foreign technology provider, under which IP rights 
were shared, increased from 10 to 25 (Wang et al., 2012).  
 
In the supply chain, by 2009 Chinese component providers achieved full 
localisation of blades, gearboxes, and generators, while domestic 
capabilities in bearings, converters and control systems progressed 
markedly.157 Chinese firms scaled up the size of the turbines they 
produced fast, in line with the key NDRC metric for technological 
progress. The average size of wind turbines installed in China doubled 
between 2000 and 2010, from 600KW to 1.3MW (Lewis, 2012, Ru et al., 
2012). What was striking in terms of the analytical framework of this 																																																								
156 W2, 30 July 2012. 
157 See: Li Junfeng et al, 2010 China Wind Power Outlook, Beijing: CREIA & GWEC. Available at  
http://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/wind-report0919.pdf Accessed 18 January 2017. 
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thesis was that if there was inflation of technology costs compared with 
centrally bargained outcomes, this was compensated by greater 
technological competition and greater variety in technological paths. 
 
The scale of domestic investment, the capability by the 2000s of Chinese 
manufacturers to produce most mechanical (as opposed to electronic) 
wind turbine components from wholly-domestic inputs, and project 
bidding based on headline price without independent quality 
certification, meant that international firms were barely able to 
compete.158 The foreign firm bid prices reported by the China Wind 
Energy Association (CWEA) were, on average, 13 percent and 20 percent 
higher than those of domestic firms in 2004 and 2005, when early 
concession projects were tendered. From 2006 to 2011, as domestic 
production capacity mushroomed, average foreign firm bids were one-
quarter to one-third higher than domestic ones (Figure 6).159 
Consequently, the foreign turbine makers’ share of the Chinese market 
fell, according to the CWEA, from 75 percent in 2004 to 70 percent in 
2005, 55 percent in 2006, 43 percent in 2007, 25 percent in 2008, and 10 
percent in 2010, a level at which it stabilised.  
 
																																																								
158 It was also alleged that during the concession project era, foreign firms were denied timely access 
to bidding information while domestic firms were sometimes allowed to raise their prices after they 
were awarded bids. Such allegations were raised in author interview W2, 30 July 2012, and are noted 
in Lewis (2012).  
159 The price difference between tenders inside and outside China was greater. When Suzlon 
subsidiary Repower Systems announced its withdrawal from China in 2011, CEO Andreas Nauen 
stated that the price per KW for onshore turbines in China that his firm experienced in 2011 was 
around Rmb4,800; the price in tenders elsewhere in the world averaged Rmb11,000. Sara Knight, 
‘Repower announces withdrawal from China’, Windpower Monthly, 23 September 2011. 
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Figure 6. Chinese and foreign average wind turbine prices in the 
Chinese market, 2004-2011. (Chinese turbine prices marked with 
triangles, foreign turbine prices with squares) 
 
Source: reported prices bid to concession and wind base projects. CWEA data 
 
The early market leaders through 2010 were Sinovel, a start-up of state-
owned heavy equipment maker Dalian Heavy Industry Group Co.; 
Goldwind, the domestic firm with much the longest experience with 
wind turbines; and Dongfang (Table 26). Dalian Heavy and Dongfang 
used similar strategies to leapfrog Goldwind. Early movers in creating 
production capacity when the NDRC began to tender concession 
projects, they both possessed engineering capabilities that enabled 
them to quickly localise (both internally and through suppliers) the 
production of mechanical wind turbine parts, and they focused on the 
1.5MW turbines that NDRC bureaucrats favoured in the first years of 
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market expansion.160 As large state-owned firms, Dalian Heavy and 
Dongfang enjoyed good lines of communication to government 
policymakers. The founder of Dalian Heavy subsidiary Sinovel, Han 
Junliang, knew NEA Director and wind industry promoter Zhang Guobao 
personally.161 
 
Dalian Heavy purchased a licence for a 1.5MW turbine from German 
design house Fuhrländer at the end of 2004. When the NDRC issued the 
notice in July 2005 that wind projects required a minimum 70 percent 
local content by value, Dalian Heavy was already localising major 
components, including a gearbox, generator, yaw system and tower.162 
Sinovel was incorporated in February 2006. While many observers 
regarded Sinovel as a state company, only 20 percent of its equity was 
owned by Dalian Heavy, both pre- and post- a 2011 initial public offering 
(IPO).163 Other substantial shareholders included a subsidiary of New 
Horizon Capital, a private equity firm co-founded by a son of premier 
(2003-13) Wen Jiabao; Wei Wenyuan, former general manager of the 
Shanghai stock exchange; Sinovel chairman Han Junliang; and other 
senior Sinovel managers.164 Sinovel was a complex mix of state and 																																																								
160 NDRC officials consistently pushed firms to produce larger turbines, as their metric of technical 
progress. W1, 27 May 2013. 
161 The perceived significance of the relationship between Zhang Guobao and Han Junliang was 
mentioned by several interviewees, including W1, 27 May 2013 and W2, 30 July 2012. See also 
references to the relationship in media reports including Pu Jun and Yu Ning, ‘Post-boom blowdown 
for wind energy’s Sinovel’, Caixin, 11 July 2013, and Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance, ‘Inside the 
Chinese boom in corporate espionage’, Bloomberg, 15 March 2012. Zhang and Han’s relationship was 
believed by interviewees to date from Zhang’s NDRC work in north-east China. 
162 Securities Review (Zhengquan Daobao), 24 August 2012. In Chinese. Available at 
http://zqdb.hinews.cn/html/2012-08/24/content_518332.htm Accessed 13 January 2017. Further 
background is contained in Pu Jun and Yu Ning, ‘Post-boom blowdown for wind energy’s Sinovel’, 
Caixin, 11 July 2013. 
163 Sinovel annual report 2010, pp5-6. The report stated that Sinovel had no controlling shareholder.  
164 Caixin reported that there were five original Sinovel shareholders in 2006, amongst whom a 
subsidiary of Dalian Heavy, New Horizon Capital, and Wei Wenyuan, constituted three. Pu Jun and Yu 
Ning, ‘Post-boom blowdown for wind energy’s Sinovel’, Caixin, 11 July 2013. 
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private interests; the firm’s core production base was in Dalian, but its 
headquarters were in Beijing. 
 
Dongfang also concluded a licence deal for a 1.5MW turbine in 2004, 
with German manufacturer and design house REpower (with which 
Goldwind already worked). Like Dalian Heavy, Dongfang began to 
localise component manufacture in 2005, assembling its first turbine at 
the end of 2006. By mid-2007, when Sinovel claimed a local content rate 
of 85 percent for its 1.5MW turbines, Dongfang reported 70 percent.165 
Both companies established dedicated wind power research institutes, 
backed by central government grants.166 
 
In 2008, Sinovel emerged as China’s biggest wind turbine manufacturer 
(Table 26). Goldwind was second, and Dongfang third. That year, Sinovel 
won much the biggest slice of the first tender for one of China’s multi-
gigawatt wind bases, Jiuquan in Gansu province, securing 1.8GW of 
orders for the 3.8GW first phase of the project (Backwell, 2014). That 
mammoth order, and other large ones for wind bases, set Sinovel up to 
pull further ahead of Goldwind in 2009 and 2010, delivering 3.5GW and 
4.4GW of turbines respectively. In January 2011, Sinovel completed an 
IPO in Shanghai, raising Rmb9.45bn. 
 
  
																																																								
165 The local content claims were not audited. See p18-19 of Li Junfeng and Gao Hu, 2007 China Wind 
Power Report, available at http://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/wind-power-report.pdf 
Accessed 16 January 2017. 
166 W3, 5 May 2010.  
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Table 26. Market-leading Chinese wind turbine manufacturers, 2008-
13. MW of annual installations and () rank  
 Sinovel  Goldwind Dongfang United 
Power 
Mingyang 
2008 1403 (1) 1132 (2) 950 (3) 24 146 
2009 3495 (1) 2722 (2) 2036 (3) 768 (4) 749 (5) 
2010 4386 (1) 3736 (2) 2624 (3) 1643 (4) 1050 (5) 
2011 2939 (2) 3200 (1) 946 (5) 2847 (3) 1178 (4) 
2012 1203 (3) 2522 (1) 467 (9) 2029 (2) 1134 (4) 
2013 896 (7) 3750 (1) 574 (9) 1488 (2) 1286 (3) 
Source: CWEA 
 
By the time of the Sinovel IPO, however, both Sinovel and Dongfang 
were experiencing equipment performance problems. The gearbox on 
Sinovel’s 1.5MW turbine was susceptible to damage from gusting wind. 
Anonymous internet postings warned of sub-standard and rusting 
components in Sinovel turbines. A windmill in Kulun county in Inner 
Mongolia, stated online to be a Sinovel product, lost an entire blade in 
May 2010.167 In spring 2011, technical failures at wind bases in Jiuquan 
in Gansu and Zhangjiakou in Hebei that threatened serious damage to 
local grids were reported in the Chinese press.168 In October 2011, five 
people died in an accident at a Sinovel assembly plant in Gansu.169 
 																																																								
167 W4, 3 May 2011. Claims of technical failures and poor quality in Sinovel turbines were previously 
posted and were viewed at http://bbs.simol.cn/archiver/tid-10279.html and http://www.windpower-
china.com/node/411 in 2011. At the time of writing these pages can no longer be accessed. Images of 
the purported fallen blade in Kulun county in Inner Mongolia were posted on a Chinese blog and can 
still be viewed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4cf4ed770100mkgu.html Accessed 16 January 2017. 
The blade is not explicitly identified as a Sinovel product in the posted photographs. 
168 Securities Review (Zhengquan Daobao), 24 August 2012. In Chinese. Available at 
http://zqdb.hinews.cn/html/2012-08/24/content_518332.htm Accessed 13 January 2017. 
169 Pu Jun and Yu Ning, ‘Post-boom blowdown for wind energy’s Sinovel’, Caixin, 11 July 2013. 
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The reports of technical failures came on top of increasing problems 
with the dispatch of electricity from wind bases in north China. 
Transmission capacity was inadequate. Increasing numbers of turbines 
were denied connection to the grid.  
 
Central government and the NEA therefore decided to slow the pace of 
wind power expansion and recentralise control of all wind farm 
development. In mid-2011, the NEA issued a game-changing regulation 
that made approval of small wind farms under 50MW – which previously 
required only local government permits – an NEA function.170 In effect, 
local governments lost their capacity to protect and subsidise favoured 
local firms. The new regulations came six months after the retirement of 
NEA head Zhang Guobao, in January 2011.  
 
Wind turbine installations fell by 7 percent in 2011, and by more than 
one quarter in 2012 (Table 25). The firm-level effect of the slowdown 
was to return manufacturing over-capacity to very high levels, just as 
turbine failures focused wind farm operators on variations in the 
performance of turbines, and on the different break-down service 
responses from manufacturers. Sinovel and Dongfang were perceived 
poorly, on both counts. In 2011, Sinovel’s orders fell by one-third, and 
then by a further 59 percent in 2012, far more than the market. 
Dongfang, whose service response to breakdowns in 2010 had been 
particularly slow, was hit even harder. Sales fell 64 percent in 2011 and a 
further 51 percent in 2012. Dongfang’s sales then stabilised (Table 26); 
however Sinovel’s kept falling. 																																																								
170 ‘Wind farm development interim rules and regulations,’ NEA, 2011. Unapproved wind farms were 
not eligible for the FIT, or for grid connection. 
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Sinovel created two more problems for itself. In 2011, the firm was 
caught bribing an employee of its American electronic controls supplier 
to steal a copy of its source code.171 And in May 2013, Sinovel came 
under investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), accused of overstating its revenues and profits in 2011 by 10 
percent. Sinovel chairman Han Junliang resigned in March 2013, shortly 
before the investigation was publicly announced. By 2015, Sinovel 
disappeared from the top ten list of Chinese turbine manufacturers, 
while Dongfang retained a domestic market share of 4-5 percent, placing 
it eighth among manufacturers in 2015. 
 
4.4. Stage 3: Manufacturing of current technology; and incremental 
modification of current technology 
The 2011-12 period marked the end of the first phase of a new industrial 
policy approach in China’s energy sector. The opening of competition to 
all firms, government withdrawal from central bargaining for 
technology, and the use of laws and regulations, rather than fiat, to 
frame industrial policy had created new challenges. Open admission to 
the market produced a large and diverse range of entrants, but not all of 
them were, in hindsight, desirable. Sinovel, in particular, combined the 
political inside track of a large state firm with a majority non-state equity 
structure that encouraged what Kroeber (2016:chapter 5) described as a 
Chinese variant on crony capitalism. Sinovel delivered neither the stolid 
manufacturing reliability of the state sector, nor the value-adding 																																																								
171 The US supplier, AMSC, secured a conviction for distribution of trade secrets against the employee, 
Dejan Karabasevic, in court in Austria in September 2011; he was sentenced to one year in jail. Legal 
action in China was unresolved at the time of writing. Michael Riley and Ashlee Vance, ‘Inside the 
Chinese boom in corporate espionage’, Bloomberg, 15 March 2012. 
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flexibility and resourcefulness of the private sector. Dongfang was a 
more traditional, centrally-controlled state firm, but also disappointed 
after a flying start, not least because it failed to compete on service 
aspects of the wind business. 
 
A different state firm now became the number two player to Goldwind, 
following a later entry into the market. United Power was from the 
China Guodian group, one of the ‘big five’ power utilities created under 
a government restructuring in 2002, which had inherited a small number 
of state wind farm assets. Guodian controlled the Longyuan group, 
whose Longyuan Power operated the wind farms, and added more 
capacity through the 2000s and early 2010s to become China’s leading 
wind farm developer. United Power, the turbine manufacturer, was a 
former service joint venture of the Longyuan group with Westinghouse, 
set up in 1994 with a remit to improve performance of China’s fleet of 
aging 200MW thermal turbines. Siemens took over Westinghouse’s 
interest in the business in 1998, but by 2006 there was no more work 
upgrading 200MW units. The Beijing joint venture was dissolved and the 
Chinese side, looking to deploy around 100 trained engineers, started to 
manufacture wind turbines. 172 
																																																								
172 China Guodian Corp., a holding company, was one of the big five power generators created from 
the former State Power Corporation (SPC) in 2002. China Guodian aborbed the Beijing-based 
Longyuan group as part of the same restructuring. Most wind farm assets, which came originally from 
SPC, were held through Longyuan Power. In December 2009, Longyuan Power listed in Hong Kong as 
a dedicated wind farm developer, and by end 2013 accounted for 11.8GW of 17.5GW of installed 
wind farms in China. Other Longyuan group companies included Longwei Power Generation 
Technology Service Co., the 50:50 joint venture with Westinghouse set up in 1994, which was 
restructured and renamed Guodian United Power Technology (United Power) in 2007. In 2010, 
United Power was authorised and funded to set up a State Key Laboratory for Wind Power Equipment 
at its base in Beijing. Sources: United Power web site at 
http://www.gdupc.com.cn/newsContentEN.aspx?cataId=41&id=13334 Accessed 18 January 2017. 
Fang Tiantian, ‘The Past and Present of United Power’ (Lianhe Dongli de qianshi jinsheng), 21st Century 
Business Herald, 24 January 2011.  
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In November 2006, United Power engaged German design house 
Aerodyn to develop a 1.5MW turbine. Rather than manufacture an 
established model, the firms’ engineers worked through a joint 
development arrangement and created a windmill with longer blades 
than was then the norm in China, yielding more power from lower wind 
speeds. The Chinese firm recruited a deputy general manager, Sun 
Lixiang, who worked for six years with Germany’s Nordex, a partner in 
one of the original two wind turbine joint ventures. United Power was 
able to use the Guodian group’s wind farms to test prototypes in 
different climatic conditions; the parent group also provided a captive 
market in the early years of development.  
 
United Power became the most vertically integrated wind turbine 
producer in China, entering blade manufacture from 2007 and making 
gearboxes, generators and control systems. Its first turbine was installed 
in 2008. In 2009 and 2010, United Power became the fourth biggest 
player in the market based almost entirely on sales to its own group. The 
quality of its machines was confirmed in 2010 when one-third of orders 
came from other developers. Thereafter, United Power rose to second 
place (Table 26, above), the majority of its sales consistently outside its 
group.173  
 
In the second phase of wind industry development, United Power 
consolidated its number two position. It was followed in third and fourth 																																																								
173 See: Li Junfeng et al, 2014 China Wind Power Review and Outlook, Beijing: CREIA & GWEC. 
Available at http://www.gwec.net/publications/country-reports/ Accessed 18 January 2017.  Fang 
Tiantian, ‘The Past and Present of United Power’ (Lianhe Dongli de qianshi jinsheng), 21st Century 
Business Herald, 24 January 2011.  
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places by two private sector firms, Mingyang and Envision (Table 27). 
Mingyang, based in Guangdong province, entered the market at the 
same time as United Power, in the second half of 2008, coming from a 
background in low-voltage electrical equipment manufacturing. 
Envision, headquartered in Shanghai, entered the market only in 2012, 
and was started by Chinese former finance and private equity 
professionals who had worked abroad.  
 
Envision represented a new model inasmuch as its founders came from 
outside manufacturing and sought to assemble a globally-integrated 
business from the outset, with key design resources outside China, 
manufacturing in China, and an immediate focus on service aspects in 
the forward part of value chain. Mingyang and Envision are addressed in 
case studies below, following the Goldwind case study.  
 
Goldwind, the earliest entrant in wind turbine manufacturing, secured 
clear market leadership in the second phase of development of the wind 
turbine sector, with an estimated market share of 27 percent in 2016 
(Table 27).174 In the process, Goldwind transitioned from state-owned 
work unit to a firm with diversified ownership and no controlling 
shareholder, and a global design capability split between China and 
Germany. As noted, the opening of the wind sector to all types of firm 
produced a broad array of contenders, from pure state to pure private, 
with many variants in between. Among the top four turbine makers, 
with more than half the Chinese market between them, private 
																																																								
174 Market share data for 2016 were not confirmed at the time of writing. 
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shareholder interests were in the ascendancy by 2015; only United 
Power could be described as a traditional state firm. 
 
Table 27. Market-leading Chinese wind turbine manufacturers since 
2014. MW of annual installations and () rank   
 Goldwind Goldwind 
China 
market 
share 
United 
Power 
Mingyang Envision 
2014 4434 (1) 19% 2582 (2) 2058 (3) 1962 (4) 
2015 7749 (1) 25% 3065 (2) 2510 (3) 2510 (4) 
2016 6363 (1) 27% 1908 (4) 1959 (3) 2003 (2) 
Source: CWEA 
 
The second phase of manufacturing development was characterised by 
the production of wind turbines close to the global technological frontier 
and by more competition through differentiation and incremental 
innovation. As noted, state-owned United Power led in the most 
important area of early hardware differentiation, entering the market in 
2008 with a 1.5MW turbine driven by 82m diameter blades when the 
largest blade sets in use in China were 77m. Low wind-speed turbines 
were popular not in the wind base areas identified by NDRC planners -- 
regions that were constrained by power distribution limitations -- but in 
central and southern China. In 2009, Mingyang and Envision began to 
mould 1.5MW turbine blade sets with, respectively, 83m and 87m 
diameters.175 Other manufacturers followed the trend. By 2011, 
Goldwind modified its 1.5MW turbines to work at ‘ultra-low’ wind 
speeds with 93m diameter blades sets (Wang et al., 2012). By 2013, 																																																								
175 China Mingyang Wind Power form 20-F 2010, filed with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission 11 April 2011. W13, 23 October 2014. 
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United Power’s ultra-low wind turbines were deploying 97m blade 
sets.176  
 
United Power set the pace in the hardware area of competition -- larger 
blade sets, and turbines and generators adjusted to work with them. A 
main board member at Goldwind noted that the ‘cut-in’ wind speed for 
leading Chinese turbine makers fell from 9 metres per second in the 
mid-2000s to 5 metres per second in 2013. ‘Bigger blades,’ he observed, 
‘operating at slower wind speeds, made the market larger.’ 177  However, 
as reflected in the analytical framework of this thesis, as time went on 
competition through turbine and blade size was only one aspect of 
broader competition. Service provision, project management skills and 
asset-light structures became increasingly important. In these 
dimensions, state-owned United Power was less able to compete 
successfully. The shape of evolving competition in the second stage of 
development becomes clearer as we examine the case studies. 
 
Three case studies 
 
4.5. Case study: Goldwind 
In line with empirical regularities set out in Chapter 1, Goldwind showed 
that technological learning is cumulative. The firm was the earliest 
learner in the wind turbine sub-sector and built up manufacturing 
capabilities step by step to a point where it was able to digest and 																																																								
176 The trend continued with longer blade sets fitted to larger turbines. In 2014, Goldwind marketed a 
2MW turbine with 115m blades. For further details of the development of low wind-speed turbines in 
China, see pp6-7 of Li Junfeng, 2014 China Wind Power Review and Outlook, available at 
http://www.gwec.net/publications/country-reports/ Accessed 16 January 2017. 
177 W1, 27 May 2013. 
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commercialise a non-mainstream wind turbine technology – Direct Drive 
Permanent Magnet (DDPM) electricity generation -- that marked out its 
superior manufacturing credentials. In the long run, however, the 
extension of Goldwind’s competitive advantage was not so much 
through its narrow manufacturing capabilities as through its 
development of dynamic capabilities when the firm moved to systems 
integration in manufacturing, combined with a quest for high-margin, 
downstream activities that delivered Chandlerian economies of 
throughput (Chandler, 1977) to its assembly plants. Goldwind made and 
implemented these entrepreneurial, strategic choices earlier and faster 
than other Chinese companies. 
 
Goldwind grew out of Xinjiang Wind Energy Co. (XWEC), a state research 
work unit created in 1986 in Urumqi, Xinjiang. XWEC was a vehicle to 
receive, operate, test and study imported wind turbines. The first two 
turbines were imported from Denmark in late 1986. In 1989, a US$3.2m 
grant from the Danish government paid for 13 more turbines, forming 
the then largest wind farm in China.178  
 
More turbines were added through the 1990s. It appears that XWEC 
employees, including current Goldwind chairman Wu Gang, then in his 
late 20s, learned a great deal from this experience. They worked 
alongside Danish (and later other) engineers to set up the turbines and, 
by the time the first turbine assembly was undertaken in China, they 
acquired a decade’s experience of siting, maintaining and repairing 
turbines.  																																																								
178  Xinhua 2 October 2010. Available at http://www.china.org.cn/environment/2010-
10/02/content_21055057.htm Accessed 3 February 2017. 
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In 1996, the Xinjiang provincial branch of MOST provided XWEC with a 
grant to support the local assembly and component localisation of 
600kW turbines, then a globally mature but still popular product. XWEC 
leaders decided to license a design from German turbine manufacturer 
Jacobs Energie. Goldwind was incorporated as a manufacturing company 
in 1998. After some calamitous early mechanical failures and breakages, 
Goldwind slowly mastered the wind turbine assembly process.179 From 
1998 through 2001, the firm assembled between two and nine 600kW 
turbines a year. Component inputs were around one-third localised by 
value at the end of the period (Lewis, 2012:123pp). 
 
In 2001, Goldwind signed a licence for a 750kW wind turbine with 
REpower, now merged with Jacobs Energie. Goldwind interviewees 
recounted that a first substantial, purpose-built factory was opened in 
Urumqi in 2002, with capacity to assemble up to 200 wind turbines per 
annum. Production increased to 25 600kW turbines in 2002, and 40 
turbines in 2003, when the first 750kW units were assembled.180 
 
In 2003, the NEA tendered the first two, 100MW wind farm concession 
projects. A senior executive noted that, at this point, Goldwind’s 
domestic competition consisted of the two fractious and unsuccessful 
joint ventures sponsored by the NDRC, and Windey, a Zhejiang province-
based firm that grew out of a wind turbine research unit set up by that 																																																								
179 Wu Gang said in 2009: ‘Whole blades dropped off... The main shafts broke. It was really very 
dangerous.’ Evan Osnos, ‘Letter from China: Green Giant’, The New Yorker, 21 December 2009. 
180 W1, 27 May 2013; W5, 12 December 2012; W6 1 August 2012; Goldwind annual reports, various 
years. 
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province’s government.181 Goldwind was the most capable domestic 
player, and was granted the tender for one of the two farms, in Huilai 
county, Guangdong province. Goldwind’s Urumqi production increased 
further in 2004, and in 2005 hit the full capacity of its original facility, 
with 200 turbines manufactured. The local content of the turbines was 
around half by value.182  
 
An early thirst to move towards incremental manufacturing innovation  
While the learning process with mature, geared wind turbine technology 
supplied by REpower was ongoing, Goldwind management actively 
engaged with other developers of technologies with a near-term 
possibility of commercialisation. In particular, in the period immediately 
prior to the launch of China’s first concession projects, Goldwind 
developed a relationship with a spin-off firm from the Wind Energy 
Research Group of Germany’s Saarland University of Applied Sciences. 
The firm, Vensys, was working on a non-mainstream but promising 
technology: Direct Drive Permanent Magnet (DDPM) wind turbines.  
 
The attraction of DDPM was that, like other direct drive technologies, it 
dispensed with the gearbox and other friction-creating mechanical 
components that increased servicing requirements or led to outright 
mechanical failure. In Germany, Enercon won the largest share of the 
national market with direct drive technology based around a large, 
																																																								
181 Windey, called Yunda (ª©) in Chinese´ began to produce 200kW turbines in 1997 and 
subsequently also licensed REpower’s 750kW model. The firm is based in Hangzhou and in 2015 
ranked the 9th Chinese producer by volume; it has always been state-owned. 
182 Data provided by Goldwind show that output was 40MW in 2004 and 132MW in 2005; most 
turbines produced in these years were the 600kW model. W1, 27 May 2013. 
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annular generator.183 The Enercon turbines, however, were the heaviest 
in each power class and hence relatively expensive to build and install. 
Globally, at the start of the 2000s, direct drive turbines accounted for 
less than one-tenth of the turbine market. A generator based on 
permanent magnets could potentially deliver all the benefits of direct 
drive while being much lighter. 
 
The problem with DDPM, which was first conceptualised and researched 
in Europe in the early 1980s, was the high cost of the magnets. These 
required so-called ‘rare earth’ materials such as Neodymium, of which 
there was little production.184 From 1990, when researchers at the 
University of Saarland began to develop DDPM prototypes, however, the 
cost of rare earth materials fell. The reason was vastly expanded rare 
earth mining in China, whose share of global production increased from 
27 percent in 1990 to nearly 95 percent in 2010 (Tse, 2011). Between 
1995 and 2005, prices of rare earths used in magnets dropped by a 
factor of ten (Mueller and Polinder, 2013).  
 
This was the context in which Wu Gang and Goldwind recognised that 
DDPM technology, first worked on by Danish engineers at Vestas and 
Bonus in the 1980s, could now be profitably exploited. When Vensys 
was established in 2000, its engineers had tested a 600kW DDPM wind 
turbine for several years; in 2000-2, Vensys developed a 1.2MW 																																																								
183 The annular generator was connected directly to the rotor hub in the Enercon system. The 
rotations of the generator were far slower than in a geared turbine, which reduced wear and tear. 
The annular generator required a large ring, accommodated in the widest part of the distinctive 
Enercon tear-drop nacelle. In a permanent magnet generator there was no direct connection to the 
rotor hub.  For a detailed comparison of the two main direct drive technologies, see Bang et al. 
(2008). 
184 The term is misleading in that rare earth elements are not particularly rare (Chen, 2011). 
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prototype. A manager engaged in strategic planning stated it was this 
model that, in 2003, Goldwind licensed for development and 
commercial production.185 
 
The risk was a calculated but considerable one, observed a main board 
director at Goldwind. The firm produced mature technology licensed 
from a substantial European manufacturer, REpower. Vensys was a 
group of academic researchers who span off a small design firm and had 
no experience in manufacturing. Goldwind needed to be confident it 
could test and commercialise a raw design concept for a new type of 
turbine-generator set.186  
  
Goldwind installed its first DDPM 1.2MW turbine two years after signing 
the Vensys licence, in 2005. The firm then moved on to jointly develop a 
1.5MW DDPM turbine with Vensys, which began commercial production 
in 2008. Throughout this period, Goldwind maintained its licensing 
relationship with REpower for geared turbines, which were the firm’s 
source of cash flow and profits as China’s concession programme 
expanded. In 2006, however, when Goldwind sought to sign an 
additional licence with REpower for a 1MW turbine, the German firm 
declined. REpower had decided to enter the China market directly and 
did not wish to compete against licensed versions of its larger turbines. 
Later the same year, REpower was taken over by the fast-growing Indian 
turbine maker Suzlon, which had even greater ambitions in China.187 At 																																																								
185 W5, 12 December 2012. Vensys CEO Jurgen Rinck and Director responsible for production Stefan 
Gross were both former researchers from the Wind Energy Research Group. 
186 W1, 27 May 2013. 
187 W4, 24 October 2014. REpower entered China only to withdraw in 2011 after losses. Subsequently 
the firm’s China CEO, Wolfgang Jussen, and several other key employees, joined Goldwind. 
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this point, with its 1.2MW DDPM turbine in full production and a 
growing order book for it, and a 1.5MW DDPM turbine nearing 
production, Goldwind decided to go all-in with permanent magnet 
technology. In 2008 the firm bought a 70 percent interest in Vensys for 
Euro41.24m. There were other bidders but, as a senior Goldwind 
manager noted, Goldwind had the deepest working relationship with 
Vensys while Vensys was overwhelmingly dependent on the Chinese 
firm for licensing revenues.188  
 
When Goldwind took control of Vensys, the firm made a technological 
choice that leading multinational manufacturers would follow. In 2009 
Siemens began to develop a DDPM prototype that was quickly 
commercialised. The same year GE acquired Scanwind in Norway in 
order to access DDPM technology (Mueller and Polinder, 2013). 
Whereas direct drive turbines accounted for 12 percent of global wind 
turbine installations in 2008, the share rose to 21 percent in 2011 and in 
2016 was around 30 percent.189 The cost-benefit case for DDPM turbines 
was not overwhelming, but has been strong enough to ensure steady 
market growth both in China and globally.190  
 
Goldwind’s progress through the first stage of manufacturing capability 
building was not quick; this began with the first turbine assembly in 
1998 and continued until Goldwind’s first substantial factory reached full 
capacity utilisation in 2005. The tendering of concession projects from 																																																								
188 W6, 1 August 2012. The interviewee stressed that, apart from Goldwind, Vensys had achieved only 
small licensing deals as an independent firm, including one deal in Brazil.  
189 BTM Consult data. 
190 Goldwind claimed in its marketing materials that DDPM wind turbines offered 20 percent less 
maintenance, 20 percent more reliability, and 3-5 percent more output versus geared machines. 
Goldwind presentation, 17 July 2012. 
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2003, and the large increase in wind turbine demand, accelerated the 
learning process.191 It was a clear case of learning more by doing more, 
familiar from the experience of the thermal power equipment firms.  
 
In Goldwind’s case, however, the learning acceleration that occurred in 
2003-5 not only brought the firm to the beginning of the second stage of 
manufacturing capability building, but also created the path to an 
innovation capacity.192 The licensing relationship for DDPM technology 
with Vensys demanded, and generated, a new level of dynamic 
capabilities required to take prototypes and technical specifications 
from a design house and turn them into commercial wind turbines 
suited to the needs of the different segments of China’s market. A 
further reason for the emergence of an incipient innovation capability 
was that Goldwind began at an early stage to develop dynamic 
capabilities in the management of its value chain.  
 
Manufacturing capability and value chain leverage 
In 2003-4 and in 2007, Goldwind made two strategic business decisions 
that had a defining impact on the firm’s success. The first was to move 
to an asset-light, outsourcing-focused, system integrator (Prencipe et al., 
2003) approach to wind turbine manufacture based on analysis of how 
GE won and implemented the second of the original concession projects 
in 2003. The second decision came in 2007, when Goldwind -- this time 																																																								
191 After the tendering of the first two 100MW wind farms in 2003, 700MW of projects were tendered 
in 2004, 500MW in 2005, 1000MW in 2006 and 950MW in 2007 (Steinhilber, 2016).  
192 As of 2008, when it acquired control of Vensys, Goldwind operated three R&D centres around the 
world: the Vensys design centre at Neunkirchen, Germany; a Chinese government-funded ‘national’ 
research centre close to its original production base in Urumqi; and an electronics and control 
systems research centre in Beijing.  
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influenced by the global and China strategies of Spanish wind turbine 
maker Gamesa -- began to invest its cash flow surplus in wind farm 
development, several years ahead of the competition. The two strategic 
choices were of course related. A manufacturing strategy based on 
outsourcing meant that Goldwind had more cash available for project 
development as compared with its more vertically integrated peers. 
 
GE only entered the wind industry in 2002, through its purchase of 
Enron Wind in the US. Nonetheless, the firm was an aggressive bidder in 
the second of the original Chinese concession tenders in 2003, for a 
100MW farm at Rudong in Jiangsu province. GE brought to the wind 
business what management believed was a disruptive and high-margin 
strategy: to build wind turbines with an asset-light, system-integrator 
approach. GE Wind managers identified leading multinational wind 
turbine firms as unnecessarily vertically integrated, and hence capital 
inefficient, mainly for reasons of historical legacy. In a maturing industry, 
the better strategy was to design wind turbines and assemble them 
almost entirely from outsourced components. China’s 2003-7 concession 
programme provided an opportunity to test this model. 
 
A main board director at Goldwind noted that GE’s interest in China was 
such that the firm partnered with seven different Chinese firms in seven 
different bids for the Rudong 1 concession. In each case the Chinese firm 
was the project developer and GE the turbine supplier. Six of the bids 
were with state-owned enterprises;193 the seventh was with a private 
Chinese firm called Huarui, which earlier profited from hydropower 																																																								
193 W1, 27 May 2013. 
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investments.194 Consistent with the NEA’s policy that the wind sector 
was open to firms of all ownership types, Huarui won. 
 
The NEA demanded 50 percent local content in its first two tenders. GE, 
pursuing the system integrator model, sought to identify and certify the 
largest possible number of domestic Chinese suppliers. The 
multinational had a network of sourcing, service and manufacturing 
operations around China that supported products from gas turbines and 
medical diagnostic devices to white goods and consumer electrics. A 
team of wind turbine engineers at GE’s China Technology Center in 
Shanghai used the network to identify, and upgrade, suppliers using GE’s 
global Six Sigma certification standard. The result was that GE was able 
to assemble a 1.5MW wind turbine in 2004 that comprised almost 90 
percent, by value, domestic Chinese components (Lewis, 2012). 
 
The GE turbine was testament to how far China’s manufacturing 
capability had risen, but also to GE’s sourcing and supplier management 
capability. The Goldwind main board director said no company paid 
closer attention to GE’s achievements in the Rudong 1 concession than 
Goldwind. The firm’s parochial, Xinjiang base meant it had a fraction of 
GE’s knowledge about Chinese outsourcing capabilities. He noted: ‘We 
learned from GE.’195  
 
As Goldwind ramped up production in 2004 and 2005, the firm 
determined to follow GE in using the system integrator approach. Within 																																																								
194 This Huarui is not to be confused with Sinovel, whose Chinese name rendered in Roman letters is 
also Huarui. The Huarui that won the Rudong 1 concession was a forerunner of the firm that became 
solar energy business Hanergy; Rudong 1 was the only wind project it undertook. W1, 27 May 2013. 
195 W1, 27 May 2013. 
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Goldwind, the strategy was termed ‘two ends inside and the middle 
outside’, meaning the firm focused on design at one end and quality 
control, final assembly and service at the other, while outsourcing 
component production (Huo et al., 2012). The strategy set Goldwind 
apart not only from most Chinese turbine manufacturers, but also from 
the European firms they tended to emulate. The director quoted above 
observed: ‘In our peak year [in the 2000s], we went on to produce 
3.7GW of turbines with 4,500 people. At that time, Vestas was doing 5-
6GW with 20,000 people.’ 196 From the time of Goldwind’s IPO in 2007 
until the completion of a major cost-cutting exercise and strategic 
overhaul by Vestas in 2014, the former’s return on assets was 
consistently higher than that of the world’s leading wind turbine 
producer (Table 28, below).197 
 
Table 28. Return on assets, Goldwind and Vestas, 2007-2015. % 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Goldwind 18.87 11.06 13.45 10.66 2.02 0.48 1.29 4.57 5.79 
Vestas 7.32 10.64 9.86 2.31 -2.25 -13.14 -1.3 6.2 8.79 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Goldwind managers were encouraged towards the system integrator 
approach to the supply chain by GE’s example. The main board director 
cited above noted they became interested in forward integration into 
																																																								
196 W1, 27 May 2013. The contrast is perhaps even more striking than indicated. The peak global 
headcount at Vestas was an average 22,926 in 2011, when the Danish company shipped 5.05GW of 
wind turbines. In the early 2010s, Vestas followed GE and Goldwind towards less integrated 
operations, cutting its workforce by one quarter from 2011 to mid-2013.  Email communication from 
William Lim, Global Marketing, Communications and Corporate Relations, Vestas, 12 July 2013. 
197 GE did not break out data for its wind turbine business that would allow for a comparison. 
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wind farm development based on the strategy of Gamesa.198 Since it 
entered the wind business in Europe in 1994, Gamesa’s strategic 
idiosyncrasy was its deployment of capital in wind farm management 
and development as an equity investor. The approach reassured co-
investors and utility operators in a then-nascent industry; it provided an 
investment opportunity with potentially good margins for cash 
generated from manufacturing; and it could be used to smooth demand 
for turbines from Gamesa’s factories through the business cycle. 
 
Gamesa brought the strategy it developed in Spain and Portugal to 
China. In 2005, Gamesa took on a first maintenance contract for a 
concession project, Nanridao in Fujian province, set up a project 
development team, and signed to co-invest in several wind farms with 
Longyuan. Co-investment deals with other utilities followed and by 
August 2010 Gamesa had a wind farm pipeline in China of 3,185MW. In 
terms of turbine deliveries, by the end of 2009 China accounted for 2GW 
of Gamesa’s global accumulated deliveries of 18GW.199  
 
Gamesa’s strong performance compared with most other foreign wind 
turbine makers drew Goldwind’s attention. In 2007, the Chinese firm set 
up a wind farm development subsidiary, and introduced what it termed 
a ‘total solution’ capability offering wind farm services. These moves 
were several years ahead of domestic competitors.  
 																																																								
198 W1, 27 May 2013. 
199 Jorge Calvet, Gamesa Chairman, presentation at Shanghai Expo, 14 September 2010. Slides 
available at http://www.gamesacorp.com/recursos/doc/accionistas-
inversores/presentaciones/english/2010/committed-to-developing-the-wind-industry.pdf Accessed 
28 February 2017. Gamesa China sales in the initial period of market expansion were as follows: 2003: 
24MW; 2004: 71MW: 2005: 231MW; 2006: 237MW; 2007: 498MW; 2008: 498MW; 2009: 479MW. 
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However, where Gamesa combined more vertically-integrated 
manufacturing typical of Europe with forward integration in the value 
chain, Goldwind combined an outsourced manufacturing system with 
forward integration.200 By end 2009 (Table 29), Goldwind had Rmb3bn 
(US$438m) of wind farm assets on its balance sheet. At the same time, 
noted the Goldwind main board director, the firm’s focus on service for 
third-party developers -- also influenced by Gamesa -- enabled it to win 
business from small private investors who lacked power generation 
experience but who had moved into wind farm investment after China 
introduced its first, quite generous national feed-in tariff (FIT) in 2009.201 
 
Full focus on the value chain 
According to a manager engaged in strategic planning, Goldwind 
embraced the system integrator approach to its supply chain and 
entered the wind farm development business as strategies to win at 
manufacturing. It was only when the Chinese turbine market contracted 
in 2011-12, and acute overcapacity (temporarily) drained all margin from 
manufacturing, that management recognised it had laid the foundations 
for the service-oriented strategy it now needed to build up. In this 
period, the interviewee said, management began to distinguish between 
Goldwind’s ‘product chain’ (chanwu lian), which produced wind 
turbines, and its ‘business chain’ (yewu lian), which developed wind 
farms and offered value-added services to connect to and to support 
																																																								
200 The Goldwind wind farm development company set up in 2007 was called Tianrun; Goldwind’s 
separate services division was called Tianyuan. Gamesa’s vertically-integrated manufacturing was 
brought to China; it established wholly-owned subsidiaries to make blades, gear boxes and 
generators, among other components. 
201 W1, 27 May 2013. 
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end-customers. ‘We started thinking more like the IT industry – that we 
needed “architecture expertise” and to be close to customers.’202 
 
Wind farm development expanded rapidly. From Rmb3bn at the end of 
2009, wind farm assets more than quadrupled during the period of 
market slowdown and contraction, to Rmb13.2bn at the end of 2012 
(Table 29). By that point, Goldwind had more than 1GW of its own wind 
farms under construction, boosting utilisation rates at its assembly 
plants.  
 
Table 29: Goldwind manufacturing assets, wind farm assets, wind farm 
capacity under construction. Year-end, 2009-15. 
 Manufacturing 
assets. Rmb 
Wind farm 
assets. Rmb 
Wind farm capacity 
under construction. 
MW* 
2009 12.9bn 3.0bn Na 
2010 26bn 4.8bn 306MW 
2011 29bn 9.0bn 558MW 
2012 27bn 13.2bn 1030MW 
2013 29bn 16.1bn 553MW 
2014 36bn 18.1bn 1500MW 
2015 44bn 27bn 1640MW 
*Capacity attributable to Goldwind. In some years a small amount of aggregate capacity under 
construction was attributable to minority partners; such capacity is not included. 
Sources: Goldwind annual reports 
 
Gains from wind farm disposals and sales of electricity generated by the 
farms became a major component of aggregate profits. In 2012, when 
China’s wind turbine installations contracted by more than a quarter, 
pre-tax profits from disposals of wind farms and electricity exceeded 																																																								
202 W6, 1 August 2012. 
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aggregate pre-tax profits, reflecting a loss on manufacturing operations 
(Table 30). In 2013 and 2014, pre-tax profits from disposals and 
electricity sales were over 40 percent of aggregate profits. The share 
only fell back in 2015 as China’s wind turbine installations recovered to a 
new record of more than 30GW. 
 
Table 30: Goldwind pre-tax gains from disposals* and pre-tax profits 
from electricity sales versus total pre-tax profits, 2012-15. Rmb m 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Pre-tax gains from disposals 290 220 454 174 
Pre-tax profits from electricity 
sales 
22 17 470 290 
Sub-total 312 237 924 464 
Total pre-tax profits 207 506 2109 3247 
Pre-tax profit from disposals 
and electricity sales as % of 
total pre-tax profit 
151% 47% 44% 14% 
* Gains from disposals of subsidiaries, joint ventures and investments, the great majority of which 
were wind farm assets.  
Sources: Goldwind annual reports 
 
At the end of 2015, Goldwind’s retained wind farm assets amounted to 
Rmb27bn (Table 29, above), a sum equivalent to more than 60 percent 
of its manufacturing assets. The earnings from electricity sales at the 
farms were a source of frustration as delays to grid connection and 
curtailment of uptake due to grid system inadequacies reduced receipts. 
In 2014, investments in new grid capacity appeared to be paying off as, 
nationally, curtailment fell, to an average 8 percent of wind turbine 
output; Goldwind reaped record profits from electricity sales (Table 30). 
However, curtailment worsened again in 2015; the NEA reported 
curtailment of 15 percent of wind-generated power. Goldwind retained 
wind farm assets in the belief that the curtailment problem would 
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eventually be resolved, and that this would contribute to higher wind 
farm prices. Even with the curtailment problem, disposals through 2015 
rendered attractive returns. 
 
Curtailment encouraged Goldwind to experiment with off-grid projects, 
building capabilities that co-evolved with its changed operating 
environment (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). The firm established 
demonstration wind power heating projects in Inner Mongolia and 
Hebei province. In Jiangsu province, Goldwind set up a wind-powered 
desalination plant for sea water. In Jilin province, Goldwind established a 
demonstration project for wind-powered production of hydrogen, which 
variously could be mixed with China’s (largely imported) natural gas 
supplies, used in industrial production processes, or deployed for 
hydrogen-based fuel cells in vehicles. In 2015, Goldwind was approved 
to construct a first, 200MW commercial wind-powered hydrogen plant 
in Jilin, a substantial project.  
 
Goldwind continued to add service capabilities to support third party 
purchasers of its turbines. These included wind resource assessment and 
project design; financing consultancy; engineering, purchase and 
construction (EPC) services; wind farm management; grid connectivity 
management; and overall project and investment management. 
Revenues attributable to new services offerings rose faster than those 
from wind turbine sales – by 3.3 times from 2012 to 2015 compared 
with 2.8 times respectively (Table 31). However, such services were still 
only 4 percent of total company revenues in 2015. Vestas, the global 
industry leader, derived 14 percent of revenues from services that year. 
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Goldwind management noted that substantial numbers of Chinese 
turbines began to exit their warranty periods in 2012-13, making paid 
maintenance of turbines a new industry in China relative to Europe. It 
was also argued that two cuts in China’s feed-in tariff scheduled for 2016 
and 2018 would focus developers more closely on operations and 
maintenance (O&M) services that optimised turbine performance.203 
 
Table 31: Goldwind revenues from manufacturing versus third-party 
services (excluding wind farm development), 2012-15. Rmb bn 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Manufacturing 10.6 11.2 17.6 29.8 
Services 0.39 0.59 0.65 1.3 
Sources: Goldwind annual reports 
 
Yet-to-be-disputed dominance 
Goldwind’s dynamic capabilities, reflected in its system integrator 
approach, its forward focus in the value chain, its expanding wind farm 
development unit, and its efforts to provide value-added services to 
third-party developers, were the background to consistent market share 
gains in 2012-16. By 2016, Goldwind’s 27 percent wind turbine market 
share in China exceeded that of its next three competitors combined 
(Table 27).  
 
																																																								
203 Note that the service income comparison with Vestas is not a precise one since Goldwind’s 
services revenue does not include services revenues that result from its wind farm development 
activities (which Vestas does not have). Cuts to wind power feed-in tariffs in 2016 and 2018 were 
announced by the NDRC on 22 December 2015; depending on the wind category region, the effect is 
to reduce purchase prices by up to 15 percent. Data from Goldwind and Vestas annual reports, 
various years.  
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The firm’s exports – 189MW in 2015 and an accumulated 864MW at the 
end of 2015 – were still modest, but they far exceeded the exports of 
any other Chinese wind turbine manufacturer and included sales to both 
developed and developing countries.204 In 2016, Goldwind acquired a 
new, 160MW development project in Texas, and contracted to deliver 
the first 32.5MW of a potential 1,870MW project in Wyoming.205 The 
fact that Goldwind built and operated successful wind farm projects in 
Australia and the United States, and the certification of its turbines by 
global quality benchmarking agencies like DNV-GL and TÜV Nord, 
suggested it had the potential to expand into international markets 
more aggressively.206 
 
Overall, Goldwind’s success derived from a combination of a 
conservative, step-by-step approach to building manufacturing 
capabilities and its bolder strategic choices that reflected growing 
dynamic capabilities. In the manufacturing dimension, in the 2000s 
Goldwind trailed well behind its peers in terms of the average size of the 
turbines the firm produced as it moved cautiously from 600KW to 
750KW to 1.2MW to 1.5MW units (Table 32). There was no rush to 
match competitors that entered the market directly with 1.5MW 
turbines, in line with the NDRC’s bigger-is-better metric. Goldwind’s 
calculated manufacturing risk was instead to produce DDPM turbines, 
hedged by continuing to manufacture geared turbines until the new 																																																								
204 Goldwind accounted for more than half of the total cumulative wind turbine exports by Chinese 
firms. Goldwind annual report 2015, p27. Major export destinations were Australia, the United States, 
South Africa, and countries in south-east Asia and Latin America. 
205 The Texas investment was the Rattlesnake Wind Project; it was expected to expand to 300MW in a 
second phase. The Wyoming development was being developed by Viridis Eolia, with which Goldwind 
signed an agreement to supply up to 1,870MW of turbines in November 2016. 
206 For example, in 2014 Goldwind sold most of its interest in a 165.5MW Australian wind farm, Gullen 
Range, for Rmb1,855m and a pre-tax profit of Rmb333m. Goldwind annual report 2015. 
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technology was proven. The bolder strategic risks were the embrace of 
an asset-light, system integrator manufacturing strategy and the move 
into wind farm development. Senior Goldwind interviewees stressed 
that it was these early, integrated choices that assured Goldwind 
unmatched value-chain leverage when the market slowed and 
consolidated, before beginning to grow again.207  
 
Table 32. Wind turbine sales by units, rated output, and rated output 
per turbine. Goldwind, Sinovel, United Power, 2008-12. 
 Goldwind Sinovel United Power 
 Units  Rated 
output 
(MW 
Output 
per 
turbine 
(MW) 
Units  Rated 
output 
(MW 
Output 
per 
turbine 
(MW) 
Units  Rated 
output 
(MW 
Output 
per 
turbine 
(MW) 
2008 1246 1132 0.91 935 1403 1.5 16 24 1.5 
2009 2355 2722 1.2 2307 3495 1.5 512 768 1.5 
2010 2648 3736 1.4 2903 4396 1.5 1623 2435 1.5 
2011 2370 3200 1.4 1831 2939 1.6 1876 2847 1.5 
2012 1600 2522 1.6 699 1203 1.7 1302 2029 1.6 
Source: CWEA 
 
Dynamic capabilities were reflected in superior profitability. Like 
Gamesa, whose forward integration into wind farm development the 
firm copied, Goldwind posted higher gross margins than Vestas in the 
period after 2011. Indeed, Goldwind’s net margins were superior to 
those of both Gamesa and Vestas. Goldwind’s gross and net margins 
moved far ahead of those of the only other listed, top-four Chinese wind 
turbine maker, Mingyang (Table 33). 
																																																								
207 W1, 27 May 2013; W5, 12 December 2012; W6, 1 August 2012.  
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Table 33. Gross and net margins, Goldwind, Vestas, Gamesa, 
Mingyang, 2011-15. 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Goldwind gross margin 16.6 15.4 21.2 27 26.5 
Vestas gross margin 12.4 11 14.7 17 17.9 
Gamesa gross margin 23.4 31.5 40.5 29.9 29.3 
Ming Yang gross margin 18 12.8 9.2 13.9 16.2 
Goldwind net margin 4.7 1.4 3.5 10.3 9.5 
Vestas net margin -2.84 -13.35 -1.35 5.67 8.13 
Gamesa net margin 1.69 -24.75 1.93 3.23 4.86 
Ming Yang net margin 5.3 -9.7 -17.7 6.1 2.4 
Source: Morningstar data 
 
In terms of scale, Goldwind’s revenues in 2015 were US$4.6bn 
compared to Vestas’ US$9.3bn and Gamesa’s US$4.6bn and Mingyang’s 
US$1.05bn.208 In 2016, Siemens agreed to merge its wind turbine unit 
with Gamesa; that year the combined business would have been slightly 
smaller than Goldwind’s in volume terms, but larger in revenue terms. 
The merger made Vestas, GE Wind, Goldwind and Siemens-Gamesa the 
big four global players.209 Goldwind is the only Chinese wind turbine 
company with an R&D budget comparable with those of the other big 
four firms. In 2014 and 2015, Goldwind spent, respectively, 2.4 and 2.1 
percent of revenues on R&D, compared with 3.1 and 2.5 percent at 
Vestas. 
 
  																																																								
208 Conversions to US dollars at average 2015 exchange rates, US$1:Rmb6.48 and US$1:Euro1.11. 
209 According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Vestas sold 8.7GW of wind turbines in 2016, GE 
6.5GW, Goldwind 6.5GW, and Gamesa and Siemens combined sold 6.0GW. 
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4.6. Case study: Mingyang 
Mingyang Wind Power, a private firm headquartered in Guangdong 
province, was the strategic opposite of Goldwind – focused on winning 
through manufacturing technology alone and late, and less effective, in 
pursuing forward integration and value chain leverage.   
 
Mingyang grew out of an electrical components and switchgear business 
established by Zhang Chuanwei in Zhongshan in 1993. Like several other 
Chinese entrants into the wind turbine business, Zhang contracted with 
German firm Aerodyn to license designs, in April 2006.210 Zhang sought a 
full range of necessary technologies, including turbines, blades, towers 
and electronic control systems. His original firm, Mingyang Electrical, did 
not state publicly what upfront licence fees were paid to Aerodyn; 
however, when the licences for a 1.5MW turbine and its blades were 
transferred to the firm that became Mingyang Wind Power in 2008, the 
valuation was Rmb25.5m (US$3.7m). The upfront charges for the 
licences were in addition to minimum annual consultancy fees and 
royalties on each wind turbine and blade-set sold.211 
 
Mingyang delivered its first wind turbines in May 2008. A senior 
manager described how the firm’s manufacturing was more vertically 
integrated than Goldwind’s, but less so than United Power’s. Mingyang 
manufactured all of its own blades from 2009, and put together gearbox 
sub-assemblies instead of buying finished units.212 Some sense of 																																																								
210 Aerodyn’s China clients included: CSIC Haizhuang (joint development); Dongfang (joint 
development); United Power (licence); Hewind (joint development); Mingyang (joint development); 
Shanghai/Sewind (joint development). 
211 Mingyang annual report 2010. 
212 W8, 7 June 2013. 
	 207	
Mingyang’s more integrated manufacturing process versus Goldwind’s 
was revealed in their 2015 balance sheets, where the firms reported 
almost identical inventories, despite Goldwind’s more than three times 
greater wind turbine sales.213 Mingyang gained a reputation for 
relatively reliable machines combined with aggressive pricing, becoming 
one of China’s top four suppliers (Tables 26, 27, above). The company 
was among the first to meet demand for longer bladed turbines suitable 
for southern markets. 
 
What set Mingyang apart from other Chinese companies which licensed 
mature technology from Aerodyn was that the firm also invested to 
license Aerodyn technology that was in the initial design stage. This was 
not the same risk as taken by Goldwind in 2004 to license a 1.2MW 
DDPM turbine from Vensys. In the Goldwind case, Vensys tested and 
made commercial sales of a 600KW DDPM turbine in the late 1990s.214 
Mingyang agreed to pay Euro19m, beginning in July 2008, for China 
rights to a technology for which Aerodyn had not yet tested a 
prototype.215 The technology in question, ‘Super Compact Drive’ (SCD), 
was an attempt to combine a two-stage gear system with a permanent 
magnet generator to produce a turbine that was smaller, lighter and 
more efficient than anything on the market.216 
 																																																								
213 Goldwind and Mingyang’s inventory values at the end of 2015 were Rmb3.04bn and Rmb3.05bn 
respectively. Their turbine sales in 2015 were 7,749MW and 2,510MW, respectively. 
214 The Vensys 600KW prototype was tested from 1995 and found an early commercial partner in 
Germany. The 1.2MW prototype was in development from 1999, four years before Goldwind licensed 
it. 
215 The licence fee was Euro7m for a 2.5/3MW SCD turbine and Euro12m for a 6MW turbine; if the 
technology worked it would be most valuable for larger turbines, particularly those installed offshore. 
The fees were paid in installments. 
216 For an outline of SCD technology, see http://www.aerodyn-engineering.com/scd-
technology/vision/ Accessed 10 March 2017. 
	 208	
Mingyang’s licences also required royalty fees with minimum payments 
per MW, and unpublished, non-refundable minimum annual payments 
when commercial production began (Table 34). Aerodyn’s first SCD 
prototype was completed in 2010, when two versions were installed in 
China. A 6MW prototype began development in 2010. At this point, 
Mingyang set up SCD production lines in Zhongshan and Tianjin, with 
combined annual capacity of 400 2.5/3MW turbines.217  
 
Table 34. Aerodyn royalties for SCD turbines. 
 Share of 
sales price 
Minimum royalty payment 
First 100 units 2%  > Euro16,000 per MW 
Next 400 units 1.5% > Euro8,000 per MW 
Next 500 units 1% > Euro4,000 per MW 
Next 1000 units 0.5% > Euro2,000 per MW 
Source: Mingyang annual report 2010 
 
Despite trials of several SCD prototypes in China, by the end of 2015 
Mingyang had not put one into commercial production. It became clear 
that the cost of SCD technology would not be economic for any but the 
largest turbines. Mingyang continued to suggest that a long-delayed 
6MW SCD prototype would secure sales in the offshore market, though 
none materialised.218 At the start of 2016, the company’s exclusivity 
rights to technology for 2.5/3MW SCD turbines in China expired.219 
																																																								
217 ‘China Mingyang Wind Power Group Ltd, 2010 Q4 and Full Year Earnings Presentation’, March 
2011. Mingyang reported that it expected full commercial production to begin in Q2 2011. 
218 The 6.0/6.5MW SCD prototype that began development in 2010 was not completed until 2014 and 
only underwent testing in China in 2015. Mingyang was sufficiently invested in the belief that SCD 
would allow it to capture a large offshore market that by 2013, when the author visited, it had moved 
its Zhongshan production facilities to a shorefront location. W8, 7 June 2013. 
219 Mingyang annual report 2015. 
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Mingyang’s strategy to break through the global technology frontier via 
its relationship with Aerodyn was a bust. Moreover, the outlays of cash 
and management time on the Aerodyn relationship undermined efforts 
to build internal technology acquisition capabilities. In 2009, Mingyang 
signed a research and cooperation agreement with the Technical 
University of Denmark (DTU) and opened an R&D subsidiary in 
Denmark’s wind turbine capital, Aalborg. But the subsidiary peaked at 
only 4 employees. By 2014, a Mingyang technical specialist described 
how there was one, Chinese employee conducting liaison work, mostly 
with suppliers.220 In 2012, Mingyang opened what it called a ‘US R&D 
centre’ at North Carolina State University in Raleigh with plans to recruit 
10 employees. The operation remained a shell.221 
 
While Mingyang waited for the manufacturing technology magic bullet 
of SCD to arrive, the firm did not integrate forward in its value chain or 
develop new services to bring it closer to customers. Only in late 2011, 
as the Chinese wind turbine market contracted, did Mingyang enter its 
first wind farm development projects. It chose a joint venture, build-
operate-transfer (BOT) model in which local governments and state 
firms contracted to buy Mingyang equity in joint ventures at specified 
times after wind farms were operational. Prior to this, the joint ventures 
were not required to make payments to Mingyang based on electricity 
sales. As curtailment of wind power worsened and wind farm revenues 																																																								
220 W10, 2 July 2014. The interviewee described the Danish office as ‘standing by’ because of ‘financial 
issues’. Mingyang was still involved in a research project with DTU for control systems for low-speed 
wind turbines. 
221 See http://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1124469/chinese-firm-bets-r-d-us-market 
Accessed 10 March 2017. An interviewee at Mingyang stated that the ‘centre’ did not become an 
active R&D operation. W8, 7 June 2013. 
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fell short of expectations, most of Mingyang’s partners were unable or 
unwilling to meet their contractual obligations to buy Mingyang’s shares. 
After several years of booking revenues from its seven joint ventures as 
receivables, in 2015 Mingyang began to record impairment charges.222 
From 2014, the firm scrapped the joint venture model and switched to a 
wind farm investment model similar to Goldwind’s. 
 
By the end of 2015, Mingyang was developing and operating a fraction 
of wind farm capacity relative to turbine production capacity that 
Goldwind boasted. 223 The firm had around 600MW of capacity spread 
across its joint ventures and more recent investments. Goldwind, which 
manufactured just over three times more turbines than Mingyang in 
2015, reported a cumulative 3,290MW of developed wind farms on its 
books and a further 1,747MW of wind farms under construction – a 
combined total eight times that of Mingyang.224 
 
Similarly, Mingyang’s service revenues were relatively much smaller 
than those of Goldwind, and growing more slowly. In 2015, service 
revenue of Rmb118m at Mingyang amounted to 1.7 percent of total 
revenues, compared with service revenue of Rmb1.3bn, or 4 percent of 
revenue, at Goldwind. Service revenues at Mingyang increased 1.8 times 																																																								
222 In 2015 Mingyang recorded an impairment charge of Rmb46.5m across its seven joint ventures, 
and did not record a further Rmb12m of revenue it was owed, due to ‘operating results... below our 
expectation’. Annual report 2015, pp84. 
223 Mingyang carried enormous manufacturing overcapacity. At a peak in 2013, the firm’s factories 
were capable of making 3,396 wind turbines per year; less than one-third that number were actually 
produced. A lack of effective forward integration meant a lack of throughput optimisation, per 
Chandler (1977). Annual report 2015, pp51. 
224 Mingyang’s seven joint venture projects involved a combined total of approximately 350MW of 
capacity. The firm’s Jieyuan wind farm investment subsidiary had five projects under development 
involving a combined 250MW capacity. Mingyang annual report 2015, p21, p42. Goldwind’s 
cumulative 3,290MW of developed wind farms at the end of 2015 comprised 3,044MW domestic and 
246MW international. Goldwind annual report 2015, p30. 
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in 2015 compared with 2012, versus 3.3 times at Goldwind (Table 35; 
compare Table 31, above). 
 
Table 35: Mingyang revenues from manufacturing versus services 
operating segments, 2012-15. Rmb m 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Manufacturing 2775 2754 5775 6678 
Services 67 91 97 118 
Sources: Mingyang annual reports 
 
Overall, Mingyang’s narrow focus on manufacturing technology meant 
that it was poorly placed to compete after 2011 when higher margins 
depended on wind farm development capabilities and value-added 
services that both wooed and supported manufacturing customers. 
When the Chinese turbine installation market recovered in 2014-15, 
Mingyang’s margins remained depressed, while those of Goldwind hit 
new highs (Table 33). The divergence in fortunes was further reflected in 
return on assets and return on equity at the two firms across the 2011-
15 period (Table 36). Mingyang paid the price for focusing on a 
competitive advantage based entirely on manufacturing technology. 
 
Table 36. Return on assets and return on equity, Goldwind versus Ming 
Yang, 2011-15. 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Goldwind return on assets 2.0 0.5 1.3 4.6 5.8 
Ming Yang return on assets 3.1 -2.5 -4.3 3.0 1.6 
Goldwind return on equity 4.6 1.2 3.3 13.0 18.1 
Ming Yang return on equity 8.1 -7.7 -15.4 11.1 6.0 
Source: Morningstar data 
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4.7. Case study: Envision 
Envision Energy was, along with Mingyang and United Power, another 
2008 entrant to the Chinese wind industry, but one that disrupted the 
sector as an outsider and exhibited striking dynamic capabilities. The 
firm took the system integration approach pursued by Goldwind to a 
new level, combining aggressive outsourcing with lean production and 
logistics techniques imported from the automotive sector. Envision grew 
more slowly than Mingyang or United Power (Table 37), refusing to open 
the multiple manufacturing sites demanded by local governments as the 
price of support for local wind farm developments. Instead, Envision 
aggressively integrated forward into software services to both support 
its own hardware sales and to win service business through the 
optimisation of existing installed wind turbines, in China and overseas. 
Envision did not invest in wind farm development in China, but rather in 
wind farm assets in Latin America and, latterly, Europe. By end 2016, 
Envision was a partner in overseas wind farms totalling 1.5GW.  
 
Main board directors described how Envision was founded in 2007 by 
entrepreneurs who studied and worked overseas in financial services. 
CEO Zhang Lei was a former energy analyst at French oil company Total 
and a trader in structured financial products at Barclays’ energy division 
in London. Felix Zhang Xuyu, responsible for international operations, 
worked in energy trading and invested in renewables firms at 
investment banks and at a hedge fund in Toronto and London. 225  																																																								
225 W13, 23 October 2014, W15, 30 June 2016. 
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In 2005-6, prior to starting the business, the founders researched the 
Chinese wind industry, concluding that local content requirements for 
foreign wind turbine manufacturers and the first rounds of concession 
projects already created an almost complete domestic supply chain. The 
modular nature of much of the supply chain meant they could pursue a 
system integrator approach. A 1.5MW turbine was designed through 
recruitment of experienced technical personnel, rather than paying for 
licences. In 2007, Envision hired two key, ethnic Chinese engineers from 
GE Wind in China, as well as a retired manager from Toyota expert in 
lean production techniques.  
 
Envision interviewees described how a small team worked out of the 
metal casting factory of Zhang Lei’s parents in Jiangyin, Jiangsu province 
and, supported by engineers from the casting business, completed a 
prototype in April 2008. This was installed at a Longyuan wind farm. 
After several months’ operation, the performance of the turbine was 
such that Longyuan ordered 33 of them for a farm in Gansu province.226  
 
The total expenditure to fund the initial team and produce the 
prototype was given as Rmb10m (US$1.4m), considerably less than firms 
taking the licensing route were paying and with no ongoing royalty 
obligations.227 Klagge et al. (2012) reported that a venture capital firm 
connected with Longyuan subsequently invested in Envision. A European 
																																																								
226 W11, 2 July 2014, W15, 30 June 2016, W16, 21 July 2016. 
227 ‘Zhang Lei: a paranoid ex-Barclays financial engineer of energy takes on the wind’ (Zhang Lei: yige 
pianzhi de qian bakelai jinrong gongchengshi ni feng er shang), Global Entrepreneur (Huanqiu qiyejia), 
11 January 2011. 
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new energy investment fund, Swiss Re’s European Clean Energy Fund, 
was another early investor.228 
 
Envision’s initial development was based entirely on contracts with 
Longyuan. The firm received and delivered three 50MW orders in 2008 
and 2009, for wind farms in Fujian and Hainan, in addition to the first 
one in Gansu. The first 100 turbines were assembled by a team of only 
20 people, including more specialists recruited from the automotive 
sector. Zhang Lei claimed that using Envision’s system integrator, lean 
production approach, 20 people could put together 250 turbines per 
year.229 The order from southernmost Hainan province led Envision to 
work with large blade, slow speed turbines from an early stage, honing a 
capability that defined each of the most successful Chinese firms as 
curtailment increased in high wind speed areas in the north.230 
 
Table 37. Goldwind, United Power, Mingyang, Envision, annual wind 
turbine installations, 2008-16. MW 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Goldwind 1132 2722 3736 3200 2522 3750 4434 7749 6363 
United 
Power 
24 768 1643 2847 2029 1488 2582 3065 1908 
Mingyang 146 749 1050 1178 1134 1286 2058 2510 1959 
Envision 13 137 250 348 544 1128 1962 2510 2003 
Source: CWEA 
 																																																								
228 Interviewees declined to confirm the Longyuan investment. The Swiss Re fund, which raised 
US$329m in 2007, was publicly acknowledged as an investor at the time, but with no further details.  
229 Ada Qin, ‘Vision of windpower’ (Fengneng yuanjing), Forbes China, October 2009. 
230 In 2009 Envision became the first Chinese firm to deliver 87m diameter turbine sets. W12, 23 
October 2014. 
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An Envision technical director observed that the former GE wind 
engineers and other technical personnel recruited in China not only 
developed a 1.5MW turbine that was scaled up to 1.6MW and 1.8MW, 
but also subsequently created a 2MW platform. These two platforms 
accounted for the vast majority of Envision sales through 2016.231 As 
noted, however, unlike at Mingyang and United Power, Envision 
management did not rush to maximise production capacity (Table 37, 
above).  
 
Instead, Envision settled on a strategy of steady manufacturing growth 
and, from 2010, a drive to differentiate itself through software 
capabilities including monitoring and control applications; performance 
analytics and turbine optimisation programs; operations and 
maintenance data that supported ‘predictive maintenance’ before 
breakages occurred; investment management tools; and more. Data was 
derived not only from wind turbines, but also from sensors introduced 
to monitor other physical phenomena. The aims were to bolster Envision 
turbine sales, to add new service revenue streams from those sales, and 
to profit from the large Chinese and worldwide stock of installed 
turbines whose financial return could be improved. It was a natural 
focus for disruptive entrepreneurs from a different business sector, 
financial services (Jacobides and Winter, 2005). 
 
Between 2010 and 2013, Envision opened software development 
operations in Shanghai, in Nanjing (where China’s key State Grid 
research institute is located), and in Houston, Texas, a global centre of 																																																								
231 W11, 2 July 2014. 
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energy trading and investment as well as energy-related software 
development. By 2013, when the firm launched its Wind Operating 
System (WindOS), 100 of its 600 employees worked in software 
development.  
 
Strikingly, it was Envision’s US subsidiary, where key software design 
occurred, that secured the first clients of WindOS. In 2013, Atlantic 
Power contracted to use the system for a 300MW wind farm in 
Oklahoma, and Pattern Energy puts its entire wind portfolio, then 
1.04GW, on the platform.232 Chinese clients including China Guangdong 
Nuclear Power (CGN) followed. In 2015, a platform for solar farms was 
introduced; the solar and wind platforms were subsequently combined 
and rebranded EnOS. In 2016 in Europe, where Envision’s software 
business expanded much more slowly than in the US, the firm bought 
the number two European renewables data management firm, 
Bazefield, based in Norway.233 
 
By 2016, Envision claimed to have 50GW of renewable energy resources 
under management on its EnOS platform, including 7GW acquired with 
Bazefield. The firm stated that it employed 400 software engineers, 
around one-third of its workforce. However, no financial details for the 
software business were released. CEO Zhang Lei said only that total 
revenues in 2015 at unlisted Envision were ‘about US$2 billion’ 
																																																								
232 The Atlantic Power wind farm in Oklahoma was called Canadian Hills. In 2014-15, Envision’s US 
subsidiary reported that it added clients including Duke Energy and EverPower. The US subsidiary’s 
Chief Software Architect was Tony Chen, a graduate of Tsinghua and former IBM employee. 
233 W12, 23 October 2014; W15, 30 June 2016. Envision management stated that the solar platform, 
introduced in 2015, was employed at 120 sites in 15 provinces in China by late 2016. The acquisition 
price for Bazefield was not revealed. 
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(Rmb13.5bn).234 If correct, this figure meant that Envision’s total 
revenues per kilowatt of wind turbines installed in 2015 were one-third 
higher than Goldwind’s, and almost double Mingyang’s (Table 38), 
implying substantial software revenues. A senior Envision software 
manager said of Zhang Lei in 2014: ‘He is betting the company on doing 
software.’235 
 
Table 38. Total revenues per reported kilowatt of installed wind 
turbines. Goldwind, Mingyang, Envision, 2015. Rmb per kw  
Goldwind 3,852 
Mingyang 2,708 
Envision* 5,163 
Source: CWEA, company reports and announcements, author calculations 
* No audited financial statements. Revenues as stated to Reuters, 27 September 2016. 
 
In the period when Envision built up its software development capability 
in the US and China, the firm also established a ‘Global Turbine 
Innovation Centre’ in Denmark. The objectives were to provide cutting-
edge technical support to optimise wind turbines developed in China, to 
design new offshore models, and to design larger onshore platforms for 
the Chinese and global markets. Envision built up the centre by 
recruiting Anders Rebsdorf, who had previously developed a Danish 
design office for Gamesa. A technical director stated that the Envision 
Innovation Centre opened in 2010, employed 20 people after a year and 
																																																								
234 Christoph Steitz, ‘Envision Energy to spend US$1.1bn on European expansion: CEO’, Reuters, 27 
September 2016. The China Daily reported that Envision revenues in 2015 were Rmb16bn, without 
citing a source. ‘Smart vision at the core of company’s leading role in energy internet sector, China 
Daily, 28 October 2016. See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/jiangsu/wuxi/2016-
10/28/content_27208053_2.htm Accessed 17 March 2017.  
235 W14, 24 October 2014. 
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35 by 2014.236 In November 2015, Envision opened a ‘Global Blade 
Innovation Centre’ in Boulder, Colorado, close to the US National Wind 
Technology Centre; by mid 2016 there were 12 employees, led by a 
former Siemens executive. 
 
Envision’s international wind farm development strategy began in 2014 
with the first of two small projects in Chile.237 Following an energy sector 
deregulation initiative in Mexico, in 2015 Envision purchased a 
controlling interest in a 600MW pipeline of projects from Mexican wind 
farm developer Vive Energia. The first two projects, totalling 160MW, 
began construction on the Yucutan pensinsula in 2016.238 That year, 
Envision also secured the largest share of Argentina’s first national wind 
project auction, involving 185MW across four projects. By the end of 
2016, Envision claimed to have a 1GW pipeline of projects in Latin 
America.239 
 
In July 2015, Envision bought a small, 25MW wind farm project in 
Sweden to be used as a European demonstration site for its larger 
platform onshore turbines designed in Denmark. Envision’s stated 
intention was to become a ‘top five’ wind turbine supplier in Europe, the 
world’s most competitive market.240 A new sales and project 
management office was opened in Hamburg. In December, Envision’s 																																																								
236 W11, 2 July 2014. 
237 The two projects totalled 22MW. 
238 See http://www.viveenergia.com/ Accessed 21 March 2017. And Mao Pengfei, ‘China, Mexico to 
partner on wind farms’, China Daily, 9 May 2016, available at 
http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-05/09/content_25144579.htm Accessed 21 March 2017. 
239 See http://www.envision-energy.com/2016/10/13/envision-energy-leading-quest-unlock-
argentina-wind/ Accessed 21 March 2017. 
240 Andrew Lee, ‘Envision’s plan to conquer Europe’, Recharge, 6 October 2015. In late 2016 it was 
reported that the Swedish wind farm near Eskilstuna was delayed by an environmental challenge to 
its planning application. Envision aimed to showcase its 2.3MW and 3.0MW onshore turbines. 
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European team made a first substantial investment when it bought over 
a 453MW pipeline of wind projects in north-east France from Velocita 
Energy.241 Zhang Lei said he expected Envision to invest Euro1 billion in 
Europe over three to five years.242 
 
Even more than its US and European software development businesses, 
which were combined with a software business in China, Envision’s 
substantial investments in wind farm development in Latin America and 
Europe reflected a ‘born global’ (Knight and Cavusgil, 2004, Cavusgil and 
Knight, 2009, Zhou et al., 2007) strategy that was markedly more 
aggressive than Goldwind’s international expansion. Main board 
directors referred several times in interviews to Envision as a ‘human 
resource-driven’ company, arguing that Chinese management talent had 
reached a level where it could be combined with foreign talent in a new 
type of cosmopolitan, though ultimately Chinese, enterprise. Envision’s 
early recruitment of Chinese personnel, interviewees noted, hired only 
those with experience at multinationals, including GE, Vestas, Siemens, 
IBM, Ford, GM, Boeing, McKinsey and investment banks and hedge 
funds.243 Senior management believed that successful ethnic Chinese 
employees at multinationals often sought greater meaning in their 
careers and that Envision could offer that.244 In addition, said a senior 
																																																								
241 See http://www.velocitaenergy.com/about-us/history.html Accessed 21 March 2017. By mid-2016 
there were some 20 employees at Envision’s Hamburg project management office. W16, 21 July 2016. 
242 Christoph Steitz, ‘Envision Energy to spend US$1.1bn on European expansion: CEO’, Reuters, 27 
September 2016. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-windpower-envision-
idUSKCN11X1MV Accessed 21 March 2017. 
243 W12, 23 October 2014; W13, 23 October 2014; W15, 30 June 2016. 
Interviewees also referred to a Harvard Business Review article about talent-led firm-building that 
briefly discussed Envision (Ready et al., 2014). 
244 An early hire of Zhang Lei recalls he was asked directly about his dreams: ‘He asked me “What is 
your dream?” The boss in China doesn’t ask you that question. He just asks you about your 
capabilities.’ W16, 21 July 2016. 
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manager for strategy, the firm self-consciously pursued the ‘Huawei’ 
model, offering equity participation to all senior management while 
stating it had no plans for an IPO.245 
 
Without financial data, and particularly margin and profit data, however, 
it is impossible to judge how successful Envision is. A strategy of lean 
production in China, an emphasis on software, and R&D centres in key 
technology hubs around the world saw the firm rise to second place by 
installations among Chinese firms in 2016. However, this was partly due 
to a substantial fall in sales by United Power, while Envision was not far 
ahead of Mingyang, and Goldwind retained three times Envision’s 
market share in China (Table 37, above). Where Envision appeared to 
lead all Chinese firms was on turbine output per employee (Table 39). 
An interviewee at the firm’s Jiangyin production base noted that the 
Supplier Quality Engineer (SQE) team that manages suppliers is one of 
the largest groups at the factory: ‘The key is to make suppliers do as 
much as possible,’ he said.246 
 
  
																																																								
245 ‘The model is Huawei.’ W12, 23 October 2014. It should be noted that while Huawei is commonly 
perceived in China to offer senior employees equity participation, what they actually receive is profit 
sharing. Envision, by contrast, granted equity to senior employees. 
246 W16, 21 July 2016. 
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Table 39. Wind turbine installations per employee. Goldwind, 
Mingyang, Envision, 2015. MW 
 Turbine 
installations. MW 
Employees Turbine 
installations per 
employee. MW 
Goldwind 7,749 6,526 1.19 
Mingyang 2,510 4,379 0.57 
Envision* 2,510 1,200 2.09 
Source: CWEA, company reports and announcements, author calculations 
* No audited financial statements. 
 
Goldwind management acknowledged that Envision had outpaced it in 
developing software capabilities. Goldwind reacted to Envision’s 
software product launches in 2013-14 by licensing an off-the-shelf 
platform from HP. However, one senior Goldwind manager conceded in 
late 2014 that the product was inferior to Envision’s and would need 
considerable customisation. Nonetheless, the same Goldwind manager 
asserted that having by far the biggest installed wind turbine base 
among Chinese firms gave Goldwind a big advantage, because 
competition in software and services would be partly determined by 
who had a deeper well of accumulated data to work with. ‘They are 
cutting-edge, but we are on the same track with 16 years’ experience,’ 
he said. ‘We are capitalising our history, getting data from 10,000 
machines.’247 
 
4.8. Discussion 
Within the analytical framework of this thesis, the Chinese 
developmental state continued in the wind turbine sub-sector to 
support the acquisition of manufacturing capabilities. The acceleration 																																																								
247 W4, 24 October 2014.  
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in the pace of manufacturing capability development was far quicker 
than it had been in the thermal equipment sector because firms built on 
a much-expanded economy-wide foundation of capabilities. The state 
also enhanced its contribution to the process. 
 
The developmental state performed its core role by maintaining a close 
focus on product evolution. The integration of component supply chains 
was ensured by the application of local content rules. Technical progress 
was benchmarked, albeit crudely, by progress in turbine sizes. Turbine 
quality was upheld by centralising all subsidised wind farm approvals 
such that local governments could not favour lower quality products 
from local firms.  
 
Additionally, the developmental state expanded and refined institutional 
and policy inputs that supported the technology learning process. 
Publicly-funded S&T and R&D programmes were enlarged, institutional 
linkages between firms and universities and research institutes were 
improved, and new state- and outsourced-research capabilities were 
employed to support the industrial planning process. New state-
sponsored industry associations were promoted in order to facilitate 
communication between government and decentralised firms. Overall, 
support for manufacturing capability acquisition became multi-layered 
compared with the early learning period in the thermal sub-sector. 
 
The critical differential contribution from the developmental state in the 
wind sub-sector, however, was that it created conditions for a transition 
to a competitive environment in which the dominant firms were those 
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that exhibited the strongest dynamic capabilities, reflected in strategic 
business choices. Three policy changes informed this transition: the 
opening of competition to firms of all ownership types, the devolution of 
all technology bargaining to the firm level, and the use of laws and 
regulations rather than government fiat to establish the industry 
operating environment. 
 
The transition to a competitive environment in which firm-level dynamic 
capabilities had greater room to develop brought some unwanted, but 
temporary, side effects, notably the bidding up of technology licensing 
fees. However, what proved more enduring, and more important, was 
the blossoming of technological and strategic variation at the firm level. 
Product prices in the wind sub-sector were reduced below international 
levels, but this was accompanied in the most successful firms by the 
emergence of strategic competitive advantages. Notable examples from 
the case studies include the systems integration, project development 
and software capabilities of Goldwind and Envision. 
 
Consistent with the theoretical framework of vertical scope that is highly 
dynamic in high-technology firms (Jacobides and Winter, 2005), the 
most successful wind turbine companies were ones that rapidly adjusted 
their vertical scope in the light of rapidly evolving industry conditions. As 
in the global high technology sector, the pace of change in China’s wind 
sub-sector was relentlessly quick, with the FDC developmental state 
driving very rapid acquisition of manufacturing capabilities. Goldwind 
and Envision, the most successful firms, were the ones that most 
dynamically adjusted to this change, disintegrating their production 
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chains as outsourcing possibilities emerged and becoming the most 
capable systems integrators. A combination of dynamic capabilities 
manifested in strategic initiatives such as forward integration into high-
margin service activities, and asset-light business structures associated 
with systems integration, enabled Goldwind, and probably Envision 
(audited financial data were not available), to match the profit margins 
of leading multinational peers, something that no firm achieved in the 
thermal sub-sector. 
 
Evidence in the thermal sub-sector suggested that state ownership of 
firms inhibited the development of dynamic capabilities. Evidence in the 
wind sub-sector broadly supported this finding. State firms in the wind 
sub-sector were as quick as private firms to build manufacturing 
capabilities, typified by the cases of Dongfang and United Power. 
However, firms that remained state-owned did not exhibit the dynamic 
capabilities associated with the most successful private firms. 
 
The Goldwind case study suggested that while state ownership typically 
might not be conducive to the growth of dynamic capabilities, there are 
conditions under which the correlation is more nuanced. Not only was 
Goldwind’s origin as a state-owned research unit associated with 
impressive early learning of manufacturing capabilities, but the firm 
made some bold strategic decisions in this period. These included the 
2003 licensing of DDPM technology from Vensys, and the 2004-5 move 
to a systems-integrator manufacturing model. The explanation for these 
early dynamic strategic moves under state ownership may be that the 
original work unit, XWEC, was established as an entirely new operation 
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in 1986, becoming in turn a new state manufacturing company in 1998. 
As a result, there were no legacy structures and interests that created 
path dependencies for Goldwind while Wu Gang, the firm’s visionary 
chairman, rose to lead the firm through meritocratic selection based on 
his track record of entrepreneurship. In such special circumstances, 
levels of entrepreneurship and dynamic capabilities not encountered in 
other state firms were apparent at Goldwind in its state-owned 
incarnation. 
 
Goldwind’s privatisation, involving IPOs in Shenzhen in 2007 and Hong 
Kong in 2010, was the background to the firm’s service-oriented forward 
integration, the growth of its export activity, and its large domestic 
market-share gains after 2012. This was also the period in which 
Goldwind matched or exceeded the profit margins of leading 
multinational peers. Through privatisation, Goldwind acquired a 
diversified investor base with no majority shareholder, although the firm 
still has strong indirect links to the state.248 
 
The case study of Envision, according to the theoretical framework of 
this thesis, represents a new stage in China’s development. As posited 
by Jacobides and Winter (2005), the growth and diffusion of capabilities 
in an industry and the vertical disintegration of production tasks 
eventually opens the way for disruption by firms entering the market 
from other sectors. In the case of Envision, entrepreneurs from the 																																																								
248 Goldwind’s largest investor as of 2016 was another ‘new’ state enterprise, China Three Gorges 
Corp. (CTG), established in the 1990s to operate the world’s largest hydropower facility. CGT invested 
in wind farms in China and overseas from 2007, the same year that Goldwind established its wind 
farm subsidiary, and became a strategic investor in Goldwind, holding 43 percent of equity at the end 
of 2015. Anbang Insurance Group was the second largest shareholder, with 15 percent. 
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financial services sector disruptively entered the wind turbine industry 
with a new focus on complementary software. The case study showed 
both the extent to which industry-wide manufacturing capabilities had 
reached a level where they alone could not provide clear competitive 
advantage and the growth of entrepreneurial talent in China to a point 
where a new firm, defined by its dynamic capabilities and without any 
manufacturing history, could take a leadership position in an unfamiliar 
industrial sector. It was, of course, the developmental state that had 
opened up the policy space that allowed this to occur.  
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Chapter 5 
Solar power: the private sector sets off without national government 
 
5.1. Background 
At the industrial policy planning level, the Chinese developmental state’s 
treatment of the nascent solar sector in the early 2000s appeared to be 
fundamentally different from its approach to wind turbines. National 
government made a clear decision to support domestic demand for wind 
turbines, but not for crystalline silicon photovoltaics, principally because 
unit costs for wind power equipment were much lower and because the 
perceived risk of technological disruption in photovoltaics was higher.  
 
When the tendering of wind farm concessions began in 2003 there was 
no equivalent policy for solar farms. The result was that, until central 
government policy changed in the late 2000s, the photovoltaic industry 
developed based on export demand alone.249 The photovoltaics sub-
sector therefore should, in respect of the analytical framework of this 
thesis, have provided a test of firms’ capacity to develop manufacturing 
and dynamic capabilities in the absence of national industrial policy 
support on both the supply side and the demand side. 
 
In practice, however, the development of the photovoltaics sector was 
accompanied by heavy support on the supply side. First, despite the 
absence of NDRC/NEA backing for the solar sector, local governments 
provided significant subsidies for the development of photovoltaics 
firms. This support included equity investment, free or cheap land, 																																																								
249 The NDRC’s 2006 Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan for Renewable Energy set a 2020 
target for installed wind capacity of 30GW, compared with a target of 1.8GW for photovoltaics. 
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infrastructure, subsidised utilities, and more. Second, after Chinese solar 
firms listed on US stock markets in the mid-2000s, state-owned 
commercial banks lent aggressively to photovoltaics firms, even though 
this was not in line with national industrial policy. Third, the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST), whose policy choices were poorly 
integrated with those of other national bureaucracies, unilaterally 
pursued efforts to promote domestic manufacturing of high-purity 
crystalline silicon, the feedstock for that part of the photovoltaics sub-
sector. The result was that MOST helped unblock the key bottleneck in 
terms of manufacturing capabilities. 
 
National industrial policy denied photovoltaics demand-side support in 
the form of a subsidised market. However, despite the NDRC’s early 
intentions, supply-side support for the sector was enormous. When the 
world’s solar industry went into recession in 2011-12, the supply-side 
support from local governments and state banks was so great that it was 
difficult for national government not to step in to create subsidised 
domestic demand for photovoltaics and prevent Chinese firms going 
bankrupt. Fortunately for central government planners, by the end of 
the 2000s the photovoltaic firms reduced their unit costs by more than 
wind turbine manufacturers, bringing the per unit capital equipment 
cost of solar power from four times that of wind in 2005 to twice as 
much in 2010 (Table 40). 
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Table 40. Prices of Chinese-made wind turbines versus solar modules, 
in China, 2005-2010. Rmb/KWp  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
WTG 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,500 6,000 5,000 
Solar 
module 
36,000 35,500 37,000 30,000 16,000 10,000 
Source: WTG prices from CWEA, solar module prices averaged from annual reports of case study firms 
 
The NEA reacted to massively reduced photovoltaic unit prices, and a 
crisis of overcapacity and falling export demand after 2009, with a two-
phase policy to subsidise and develop a domestic solar market similar to 
that pursued in the wind sub-sector. Where the wind industry was 
offered an annual quota of concession projects from 2003, there were 
two rounds of concession projects for photovoltaics producers, 
beginning in 2009. And where the wind market moved to development 
under a quota-free, geographic zone-based feed-in tariff (FIT) in 2009, 
this occurred for photovoltaics from July 2011 (Zhang et al., 2013, Liu 
and Shiroyama, 2013).250  
 
Table 41. Growth of the domestic Chinese photovoltaic market, 2008-
16. Annual installations, MW 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
40 160 500 2,600 5,000 12,900 10,600 15,100 34,500 
Source: IEA 
 
The creation of a substantial, rapidly growing domestic market (Table 
41), however, did not have the same qualitative impact, or the same 																																																								
250 The main solar concession programme, named Golden Sun, began in July 2009. It continued after 
the launch of the solar FIT and took its last applications in March 2013.  
	 230	
timeframe for impact, on the competitive landscape of photovoltaic 
firms as it had on that of wind turbine firms. One reason was that the 
value chain structure of the photovoltaic business was different to the 
wind business. Barriers to entry in the three middle segments (Figure 7) 
of the photovoltaic chain – wafers, cells, and modules – were low, and 
successively lower. Much of the production technology for wafers, cells 
and modules was embedded in manufacturing equipment. As a result, 
the capacity of wafer, cell, and module manufacturers to differentiate 
their products was significantly less than it was for wind turbine makers. 
 
The creation of a domestic market ought to have allowed the best 
manufacturers to differentiate themselves through dynamic capabilities 
reflected in forward integration into solar farm development and 
services. In the United States, the most successful photovoltaics 
manufacturer, First Solar, swiftly refocused its business in the late 2000s 
on project development as module prices fell. The number two US solar 
panel manufacturer, Sunpower, followed a similar strategy. Within 
China, however, the forward segments of the solar value chain 
contained greater, albeit ultimately transient, obstacles to profitable 
development. There were two main impediments. 
 
The first was that the market for utility-scale solar projects was highly 
fragmented and dominated by locally- rather than nationally-tendered 
projects. This echoed the situation in the early years of the domestic 
wind market, when many projects were locally authorised and driven by 
local vested interests; the NDRC only brought the situation under control 
in 2011, mandating that all wind projects must receive central 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The photovoltaic value chain (multi-crystalline) 
Polysilicon Wafers Cells Modules Systems 
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government approvals.251 In the solar sector, however, the problem was 
more egregious and compounded by the fact that subsidy payments, 
which were a relatively larger part of developers’ revenues than in the 
wind business, were subject to greater payment delays. A locally-driven, 
sometimes chaotic utility business characterised by much-delayed 
subsidy payments was not an easy market in which to build a 
differentiated, large-scale, high-margin firm.252 The utility solar 
environment began to change in 2015-2016, with the NDRC moving to 
centralise control and approvals and to encourage projects of higher 
technical standards via its Top Runner programme. However, market 
maturation required time. 
 
A second obstacle to profitable forward integration and differentiation 
in the solar sector was that China faced high barriers to the 
development of a distributed generation (DG) market. DG solar projects 
are ones that are normally connected to the grid, but in which electricity 
is used close to where it is produced, whether by individual or multiple 
households or by commercial entities. In this respect, solar divides into 
two markets where wind power is a single, utility-scale market.  
 
In developed countries, DG accounted for the bulk of installations soon 
after solar deployment began.253 However, in China, issues ranging from 
divided ownership of roof spaces and legal system immaturity; 																																																								
251 Prior to 2011, projects under 50MW were licensed at the provincial level. The requirement for 
national approval in order to obtain FIT subsidies, as a senior manager at Goldwind noted, raised 
concentration by putting local government-favoured firms out of business. W4, 24 October 2014. 
252 China’s big five utilities, with the exception of State Power Investment Corporation, were reluctant 
to invest in solar farms for many years, preferring to concentrate their renewables projects in wind. 
253 According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), at the end of 2016, DG accounted for 54 
percent of installed global photovoltaics; 86 percent in Japan, 74 percent in Germany, 42 percent in 
the United States, and 9.2 percent in China. 
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unfamiliarity of financial institutions with DG projects and unwillingness 
to lend to them; absence of ‘net-metering’ technology that typically 
manages DG system connections to the grid; and general grid company 
resistance, all combined to impede the growth of the DG market (Zhang 
et al., 2015). Despite numerous regulatory adjustments designed to 
promote DG projects, the NEA reported that in 2016 they constituted 
only 12.25 percent of that year’s solar installations. The DG market 
tripled in China in 2016 – from 1.39GW in 2015 to 4.23GW -- but the low 
base of growth meant that large-scale manufacturers were just 
beginning to experience an environment in which they might 
differentiate themselves through their DG strategies. 
 
Initially weak central government management of the utility scale solar 
tendering process, and slow development of DG solar power, meant that 
mid-stream photovoltaics firms were unable to emulate US peers by 
creating high-margin, forward-integrated project development 
businesses. Instead, China’s dominant multi-crystalline silicon producer, 
GCL, became the largest and most profitable solar company, using its 
sector-beating cashflows to expand opportunistically into every segment 
of the value chain. At the time of writing, Longi Green Energy was 
attempting to follow a similar strategy based on the world’s largest scale 
production of mono-crystalline silicon.  
  
It remained to be seen whether the silicon producers would dominate 
once forward, service-oriented parts of the solar value chain matured. 
From the perspective of the analytical framework of this thesis, the key 
point is that the developmental state has not yet created necessary 
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conditions in the photovoltaics sub-sector for a transition away from 
competition based on manufacturing capabilities. The evidence has 
implications for the improvement of industrial policymaking that are 
discussed at the end of this chapter and in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2. Stage 1: Search without central government consensus 
China’s first S&T programmes focused on solar cells began in the 1970s 
alongside incipient satellite, and broader space, programmes (Fraas and 
Partain, 2010). In the 1980s and 1990s, research programmes expanded 
as solar power was deployed for rural off-grid use as part of anti-poverty 
work and for specialist functions such as power for remote weather 
monitoring stations and military communications. Some of the funding 
for anti-poverty solar installations came from foreign aid and from the 
World Bank’s Global Environment Fund (Li et al., 2007).  More than 30 
universities and research institutes were involved in solar R&D by the 
end of the 1990s. Funding was thinly spread and technological standards 
were generally well behind the global frontier.  
Officially, MOST was responsible for the solar research strategy. 
However, as with the wind turbine sector in the search stage, multiple 
other agencies, including the State Economic and Trade Commission 
(SETC) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), pursued their own 
agendas. The difference was that whereas in wind all government 
agencies were working with the same fundamental technology, in the 
solar sector multiple competing technologies – including sub-categories 
of crystalline silicon, thin-film and concentrating solar -- were under 
consideration (Fraas and Partain, 2010). A 1999 report by Tsinghua 
researchers observed: ‘Because so many government agencies 
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participate in the policy making and implementation, there exist many 
problems under such an inefficient multi-institution management 
system for developing Chinese PV industry.’(Dai et al., 1999). 
The Chinese market for photovoltaic modules at the end of the 1990s 
was 2MW per year and most modules were manufactured domestically 
(Dai et al., 1999). In the late 1970s, three state-owned semi-conductor 
plants had been converted to production of photovoltaic cells; in the 
1980s three more state enterprises began production of different types 
of cell; all used imported production lines. The six state enterprises had 
a combined installed manufacturing capacity of 5MW a year, but 
produced less than half this volume (Marigo, 2007). Most output in the 
late 1990s comprised mono-crystalline silicon cells.254 Mono-crystalline 
cells render higher solar conversion rates; however, when 
predominantly private-sector, export-oriented investment in 
photovoltaics took off in China in the 2000s, it focused on multi-
crystalline silicon cells with slightly lower conversion rates, but 
production costs that were lower still (Li et al., 2007, Dai et al., 1999).255  
 
As the export-oriented photovoltaic industry grew through the 2000s, 
China’s S&T solar research budget was increased, but remained widely 
distributed across many technologies. Photovoltaics research was 
included in MOST’s 863 and 973 programmes beginning in the 10th Five-
Year Plan (2001-5) (Fraas and Partain, 2010). Marigo (2007) estimated 																																																								
254 Of the six production units, four manufactured mono-crystalline cells, one multi-crystalline cells 
and one amorphous silicon cells.  
255 Both China’s manufacturing and much of its photovoltaic research were out of kilter with the 
incipient commercial dominance of multi-crystalline silicon cells in the late 1990s. When researchers 
from Tsinghua asked 10 Chinese solar experts which technology would dominate the future in a 1999 
report, five said mono-crystalline, three said amorphous silicon, and only two said multi-crystalline 
(Dai et al, 1999). 
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that in this period MOST invested Rmb50-60m in photovoltaics, or about 
one-quarter of public sector R&D investment in Germany in a single 
year, 2004. It was estimated that in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-10) 
MOST funding for photovoltaic research increased to Rmb210m (Huo 
and Zhang, 2012).  
 
When the private sector photovoltaic industry took off in the 2000s, it 
was difficult to observe connections with China’s historic national 
research programmes. The most advanced technical capabilities in the 
early development of the country’s solar industry were supplied by 
entrepreneurs who had studied, researched and worked in photovoltaic 
science overseas.256 Other successful early solar entrepreneurs had little 
technical training, but a practical understanding of the solar business 
from involvement with China’s 1990s rural anti-poverty investments in 
photovoltaics (following section).  
 
The exception to the rule of no connections between national S&T 
programmes and industry development was the area where S&T efforts 
and import substitution strategy had greater focus: production of high 
purity crystalline silicon feedstock. China had a long history of crystalline 
silicon production because of the material’s strategic importance to the 
semiconductor industry, including for military applications. However, in 
the early 2000s Chinese technology was energy inefficient and sub-scale, 
leading to high-cost output. In 2006, China had only 400 tonnes of 
capacity, and produced 300 tonnes (Li et al., 2007). Through the 1990s, 																																																								
256 In the sense that Chinese governments after 1978 encouraged promising students to study abroad 
as part of national capability building, and then sought to lure them back, this phenomenon can be 
viewed as a sub-set of broad S&T policy (Zweig, 2002); but it was also distinct from activities under 
the domestic S&T budget discussed here. 
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the waste material from this production – whose primary focus was the 
electronics industry -- was enough to satisfy the raw material needs of 
photovoltaic cell production of around 2MW per annum. However, as 
private sector investment took off in the early 2000s, increasing 
aggregate output of cells to 50MW in 2004 and 200MW in 2005 (Table 
42), almost all feedstock was imported. MOST therefore focused China’s 
long-established silicon research infrastructure on updating crystalline 
silicon production technology. 
 
Table 42. Chinese photovoltaic cell production, 2004-2017 (forecast). 
MW and share of global output 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 
output. 
MW 
50 200 370 1,100 2,600 4,700 9,000 
Share of 
global 
output. % 
4 11 15 27 33 38 43 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017F 
China 
output. 
MW 
17,000 20,000 23,000 29,000 37,000 48,000 50,000 
Share of 
global 
output. % 
57 58 55 59 63 62 60 
Source: (Jäger-Waldau, 2017). 
 
The key vehicle for the research, included in the 10th Five-Year Plan 
(2001-5), was the Emei Semiconductor Research Institute of China’s 
General Research Institute for Non-Ferrous Metals (GRINM), located at 
Leshan in Sichuan province.257 The aim was for Emei to ingest 
																																																								
257 Emei was a ‘third line’ unit set up in rural Sichuan that began silicon research in 1957. In the 1960s, 
after the Sino-Soviet split, researchers opened a small crystalline silicon production line. Emei 
continued as a combined research and production facility. 
	 237	
contemporary best practice in ‘Siemens process’ technology (developed 
by the German firm in the 1960s and still the dominant production 
method) and then diffuse the learning to domestic silicon producers 
(Huo and Zhang, 2012). The project also included the localisation of 
technology for furnaces used to cast multi-crystalline silicon ingots 
(Fraas and Partain, 2010).  
According to De la Tour et al. (2011), analysis of 2006 and 2007 patent 
applications related to silicon technology showed that the MOST 
campaign led to China receiving 36 percent of worldwide innovation 
patents in those years, compared with 17 percent or less in other 
segments of the solar value chain. The vast majority of silicon patents 
were filed by state research agencies; the authors described MOST’s 
approach as ‘a massive domestic effort to break a technological lock in a 
strategic segment where the Chinese industry is still dependent on a 
small number of foreign suppliers’ (De La Tour et al., 2011).258 
In 2007, the NDRC endorsed the push on crystalline silicon technology by 
approving and publishing the notice ‘Major Projects on the 
Industrialisation of High-Purity Silicon Material Technology’ (Zhou et al., 
2016). This conveyed official support for firm-level entry into 
manufacturing and for state bank credit supporting that production. 
MOST was already working with two state-owned companies to expand 
production of multi-crystalline silicon using updated technology. The 
first was Luoyang China Silicon in Henan province, one of two existing 
small-scale (300 tonne) crystalline silicon producers; the second was 
Leshan Xinguang Silicon, a new, green-field, state-owned producer 																																																								
258 Despite the large number of silicon-related innovation patent filings, official data only showed 
MOST making silicon technology research grants of Rmb20m in 2006-10 (Huo and Zhang, 2012). 
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established by state sector investors in the Sichuan city where the Emei 
research institute was located.259  
In 2005, Luoyang China Silicon began construction of a new 1,000-tonne 
per annum facility, and Leshan Xinguang Silicon a 1,260 tonne facility. 
Xinguang completed first, beginning production in February 2007, while 
Luoyang China Silicon’s added capacity became operational in the 
second half of 2007. Other Chinese firms supported by MOST began to 
manufacture 500kg multi-crystalline ingot furnaces (Fraas and Partain, 
2010).260 
In terms of the analytical framework of this thesis, the continuing 
importance of the developmental state’s role in supporting the 
acquisition of manufacturing capabilities was demonstrated clearly. 
However, state-owned manufacturers were not, ultimately, the major 
beneficiaries of this programme. Spiralling crystalline silicon prices in 
2005-7 attracted both state-owned and private sector firms to invest in 
the sub-sector and the winner in this competition was an uninvited 
private sector entrant.261  
																																																								
259 The controlling shareholders of Leshan Xinguang Silicon were a Sichuan province state enterprise, 
Sichuan Chantou, and a Hebei province state enterprise, Baoding Tianwei, that was in turn an early 
investor in Yingli (see below). The Sichuan provincial government aimed to leverage MOST’s 
crystalline silicon upgrading drive to make the province the world’s leading manufacturer of multi-
crystalline silicon. In addition to the Xinguang project, in 2006 centrally-controlled, Sichuan-based big 
three thermal power equipment firm Dongfang acquired Emei’s 200 tonne per annum manufacturing 
operation, announcing a Rmb4bn investment to expand capacity. However, Dongfang and Emei were 
slow to deliver, not completing an expansion project until 2009 and missing out on much of a spike in 
silicon feedstock prices. 
260 High-purity crystalline feedstock is all initially purified as multi-crystalline material. This feedstock 
is then either melted and block cast to produce multi-crystalline ingots that are sliced into multi-
crystalline solar wafers; or the feedstock is extruded, using the more costly Czochralski process, to 
become the highest purity mono-crystalline ingots, which are sliced either as solar wafers or for use in 
the electronics industry. 261	In 2001-3 the price of solar grade crystalline silicon feedstock had been US$25/kg; it surpassed 
US$100/kg in 2005, and US$200/kg in 2006. As of 2006, there were seven silicon projects under 
construction in China and eight more seeking state approvals (Li et al., 2007:17).	
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Jiangsu province-based GCL acquired manufacturing capabilities for 
silicon feedstock in part by poaching a key technical manager from 
MOST-supported Leshan Xinguang Silicon, who brought with him 
blueprints. GCL was sued for this, but a court sanction did not impede 
the development of its silicon business (see case study). Instead, GCL 
constructed and ramped up production at a pace that state firms could 
not match. GCL built its initial production line in only 15 months, 
opening in late 2007 at the same time as Luoyang China Silicon, despite 
the state firm having begun construction a year earlier. As occurred in 
the wind sub-sector, private firms brought to bear competitive weapons 
beyond narrow manufacturing capabilities – in this case economies of 
speed. 
 
5.3. Stage 2: Manufacturing of mature technology without central 
government support 
As noted, the earliest successful entrepreneurs in the cell and module 
part of the value chain had one of two origins. The first group were 
returnee technical specialists with training and working experience in 
photovoltaics in economically advanced countries. The most important 
connection was with the photovoltaics department of the University of 
New South Wales (UNSW) in Australia, from which a number of Chinese 
graduates involved in starting businesses in China hailed.262  
 
																																																								
262 https://www.engineering.unsw.edu.au/energy-engineering/what-we-do/about-the-school/arc-
photovoltaics-centre-of-excellence Accessed 5 June 2017. UNSW was the first university to offer a 
dedicated undergraduate degree in photovoltaics, although most Chinese students were post-
graduates. 
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Best-known of these was Shi Zhengrong, who founded Suntech in Wuxi, 
Jiangsu province, in 2001. A main board director at Suntech described 
how Shi completed a doctorate at UNSW supervised by the university’s 
leading photovoltaics scholar, Martin Green, and went on to work for 
Green’s thin-film photovoltaics firm, Pacific Solar.263 Shi’s contemporary 
at UNSW, Zhao Jianhua, established photovoltaics business Sunergy in 
Nanjing, Jiangsu province, in 2004 (Zhou et al., 2016).264 Other Chinese 
graduates of UNSW worked in senior positions for these and other 
Chinese start-ups.  
 
A senior manager at Canadian Solar explained how founder Shawn Qu, 
whose main manufacturing site was established in Suzhou, Jiangsu 
province, completed a doctorate in materials science at the University of 
Toronto in 1995. He worked for the photovoltaics subsidiaries of the 
Ontario electric utility and of private-sector Automation Tooling Systems 
(ATS) before returning to China to set up Canadian Solar in 2001.265  
 
The prominent entrepreneurial role of returnee technical specialists 
occurred in a period in the 2000s when the Organisation Department of 
the CPC led a campaign to woo more Chinese students with foreign 
doctorates to return to China to start businesses (Zweig and Wang, 
2013). Jiangsu province, which became the national centre of 
photovoltaic investment, was a regional frontrunner in this campaign 
																																																								
263 S1, 11 December 2012. Shi lived and studied in Australia from 1987-2001. The interviewee stated 
that Shi obtained 15 patents while at UNSW. Martin Green’s Pacific Solar, founded in 1995, operated 
on research grants in the late 1990s rather than commercial revenues.  
264 Zhao continued to work at UNSW’s Centre of Excellence for Advanced Silicon Photovoltaics and 
Photonics as deputy director until 2006. 
265 S2, 15 October 2013. The ATS subsidiary where Qu worked was Photowatt International S.A. 
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under the leadership of Party Secretary Li Yuanchao.266 Cities such as 
Wuxi co-funded business start-ups by returnees such as Suntech’s Shi 
Zhengrong. When Li launched China’s national ‘1,000 Talents’ 
programme as head of the CPC’s Organisation Department in 2008, with 
the aim of luring back 2,000 foreign doctorate holders over five to ten 
years, Canadian Solar’s Shawn Qu was in the first batch announced 
(albeit he had already been settled back in China for several years).267 It 
is difficult to assess how important official efforts to bring back Chinese 
photovoltaic specialists were, given that people like Shi Zhengrong and 
Shawn Qu were already interested in returning. What was more 
important was the provision of credit and subsidy.  
 
Local government support for photovoltaic start-ups was also made 
available to non-returnee entrepreneurs without the same technical 
accomplishments. This was the second category of early photovoltaic 
entrepreneurs. Trina, founded by Gao Jifan in Changzhou, Jiangsu 
province, in December 1997, was a photovoltaic business launched three 
years before Suntech and Canadian Solar to undertake trading and 
installation work related to China’s small-scale, rural, mostly off-grid 
projects. Yingli, founded by ex-army officer Miao Liansheng in the 
garrison town of Baoding in Hebei province in 1998, sprang from a long-
time trading business that progressed from cosmetics to neon lighting to 
photovoltaic products.268  Miao entered discussions with the Hebei 
branch of MOST and the Baoding city government in 1998 with the aim 																																																								
266 Li was Deputy Party Secretary of Jiangsu 2001-2 and Party Secretary 2002-7. 
267 S2, 15 October 2013.  The interviewee said that the practical impact of the status for Canadian 
Solar was that it facilitated applications for MOST R&D grants. Separately, Zhang Lei of Envision was 
also included on the 1,000 Talents roster when setting up his Jiangsu-based firm (Chapter 4). 
268 Miao Liansheng came across solar lighting on a business trip to Japan in the late 1990s (Gallagher, 
2014); at the time Japanese firms dominated the photovoltaics industry. 
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of securing funding for a first, demonstration photovoltaic module 
production line, but the project did not go ahead (Gallagher, 2014). 
Yingli eventually started module production in 2003, the year after 
returnee-led firms Suntech and Canadian Solar. Trina followed in 2004. 
 
Support from local governments was what united the returnee and local 
entrepreneur firms. Suntech interviewees explained how Wuxi led the 
way after founder Shi Zhengrong circulated a 200-page business plan for 
a 3MW cell and module manufacturing line among several local 
governments in 2001. Wuxi, which already supported a number of 
returnee-led businesses, offered to invest US$6m -- sourced from a mix 
of local government funds and state-connected firms in the city and 
province -- for a 75 percent stake. Shi himself was allowed to contribute 
most of his equity in the form of technological know-how. Wuxi also 
provided land for the business at below market cost, and initial free 
office space.269 Suntech opened its first production line in 2002, 
manufacturing 2MW of modules that year and 8MW in 2003 (Ahrens, 
2013). Germany, where solar subsidies were introduced in 2000 and 
increased in 2004, became Suntech’s dominant market.270 In 2004, 
Suntech quadrupled its output to 35MW. 
 
																																																								
269 There were seven shareholders in the business, including a provincial-level state venture capital 
fund, a city-level state venture capital fund, and local state-controlled white goods firm Little Swan. 
Shi Zhengrong’s nominal US$2m investment for a 25 percent stake comprised only US$400,000 cash. 
Moreover. Shi was able to earn a further 5 percent stake in the business through sweat equity. S1, 11 
December 2012; S3, 11 December 2012. 
270 Germany’s revised solar tariff of 2004 guaranteed prices as high as US$0.60 per KW-hour for 
photovoltaic power when retail prices for thermal electricity were around US$0.12. See Schwartz, 
Evan, ‘The German Experiment’, MIT Technology Review, June 22, 2010. Available at http:// 
www.technologyreview.com/review/419464/the-german-experiment/. Accessed 9 May 2017. Italy 
and Spain followed Germany in introducing similar subsidies. 
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At this point, a new component was added to China’s evolving private 
sector template for photovoltaic manufacturing. Shi Zhengrong 
negotiated with Goldman Sachs to obtain US$80m bridging finance that 
allowed him to buy out the Wuxi investors and purchase capital 
equipment for expansion, as well as raw material inventory, such that 
Suntech could undertake an offshore IPO. This in turn repaid the 
bridging finance.  
 
A Suntech executive stated that it was not easy to convince the investors 
organised by the Wuxi government to sell their equity, but in April 2005 
they did so.271 Production capacity was rapidly increased in 2005, with 
82MW of modules shipped that year. In December 2005, Goldman led 
the Suntech IPO on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), raising 
US$396m (Table 43). 
 
A pattern was established. A Yingli interviewee explained how, in Hebei 
province, Miao Liansheng tapped one of Baoding’s key state enterprises, 
electrical transformer maker Tianwei Baobian, to invest in Yingli’s solar 
manufacturing business in 2002. Local government provided additional 
support, including free land.272 Miao then obtained private equity 
investment, and bridging finance secured against his own shares, to pay 
for expansion, while reducing Tianwei Baobian’s 51 percent controlling 
stake to, successively, 49 percent, 46 percent, and 38 percent.273 Further 
investment in wafer production lines and silicon inventory formed the 																																																								
271 S3, 11 December 2012. 
272 S4, 8 August 2011. 
273 A banker who worked with Miao noted that he could not raise bank loans to support expansion 
because Chinese state banks required physical assets as collateral. This was the bottleneck that 
foreign providers of private equity and bridging loans overcame. S5, 7 October 2014.  
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basis for necessary sales forecasts for an NYSE IPO in June 2007, which 
raised US$319m and diluted Tianwei Baobian’ interest to 26 percent.  
 
Like Shi Zhengrong, Miao tapped city-level state interests for start-up 
capital which put him in a minority shareholding position; but he 
secured majority control prior to listing, and control thereafter. 274 Yingli 
expanded aggressively from 2005, anticipating that increased German 
subsidies would create a market for its output and developing wafer, cell 
and module production lines. By 2009, Yingli was the world’s fifth 
biggest photovoltaics firm, and Suntech the second (Table 44).  
 
Table 43. Chinese photovoltaic firm IPOs and follow-on equity issues, 
2005-11. US$m 
 Market IPO date Gross funds 
raised in 
IPO 
Follow-on 
equity issues 
through 2011 
Total equity 
funds 
raised 
Suntech NYSE Dec’ 2005 $396m 1 $673m 
Canadian 
Solar 
NASDAQ Nov’ 2006 $116m 1 $219m 
Trina NYSE Dec’ 2006 $98m 3 $543m 
LDK NYSE May 2007 $469m 2 $833m 
JA Solar NASDAQ June 2007 $225m 1 $491m 
Yingli NYSE June 2007 $319m 1  $546m 
GCL HKSE Nov 2007 $151m 2 $1,335m 
Renesola NYSE Jan 2008 $130m 2 $388m 
Jinko NYSE May 2010 $64m 1 $190 
Totals -- -- $1,968 14 $5,218 
Sources: company public documents, author calculations 
 																																																								
274 Tianwei Baobian was Miao’s proposed partner for the 1998 prototype photovoltaic line which 
never went ahead. An interviewee at Yingli said that Miao’s working relationship with Tianwei 
Baobian was extremely complex and he was able to make use of some of the state firm’s 
manufacturing assets without paying for them; S4, 8 August 2011. After raising loans to buy Tianwei 
shares in Yingli, Miao controlled 60 percent of the firm’s equity immediately prior to listing; Shi 
Zhengrong secured loans to hold 54 percent of Suntech equity prior to listing. Yingli’s main private 
equity investments came from Inspiration Partners, in September 2006, and the Temasek investment 
arm of the Singapore government, in December 2006. Data from Yingli’s and Suntech’s SEC 20-F 
filings and F-1 Registration statements. 
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Table 44. Top 10 global photovolatic firms by module shipments, 2006-
12. Chinese firms in bold 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
1 Sharp Sharp Q-Cells First Solar Suntech  Suntech Yingli 
2 Q-Cells Q-Cells Suntech Suntech First Solar First Solar First Solar 
3 Kyocera Suntech Sharp Sharp Sharp Yingli Suntech 
4 Suntech Kyocera First Solar Q-Cells Yingli Trina Trina 
5 Sanyo First Solar Kyocera Yingli Trina Canadian Canadian  
6 Mitubishi Motech Motech JA Solar Canadian Sharp Sharp 
7 Schott Sanyo Sanyo Trina Hanwha Sunpower Jinko 
8 Motech SolarWorld Sunpower Sunpower Kyocera Jinko JA Solar 
9 BP Mitsubishi JA Solar Kyocera Sunpower Hanwha Sunpower 
10 Sunpower Sunpower BP/Mitsubishi Motech SolarWorld Kyocera Hanwha 
Sources: PV Tech web site; Solarbuzz web site. 
 
The most extreme case of local government support was for Peng 
Xiaofeng’s LDK. Peng, like Envision’s Zhang Lei, was from an already 
wealthy business family. He initially determined to base his solar 
business in Suzhou. However, in 2005 the government of Xinyu city, in 
inland Jiangxi province, offered a degree of support so great that Peng 
decided to build a facility 500km from the coast.275 A private equity 
financier to Peng described how the support provided by Xinyu included 
free land; construction of certain factory buildings at local government 
expense; a three-year free lease of one factory unit; construction of 
supporting infrastructure such as roads; rebates on utility costs including 
electricity; tax holidays and exemptions; loan guarantees from the Xinyu 
government and provincial government-controlled investment firms; 
guarantees that labour required by LDK would be readily available; and 
construction of a new polytechnic institute in Xinyu that specialised in 
																																																								
275 Jiangxi was the original home of the Peng family; however, its substantial business interests, in 
latex glove manufacturing and real estate, were in Fujian province. 
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solar technology and graduated 2,000 students per year.276 When the 
European Union (EU) launched anti-dumping investigations against 
Chinese solar firms in 2012, LDK was assessed to have benefitted more 
than any other investigated firm from land-related subsidies, while no 
other investigated firm was found to have received electricity rebates.277 
 
Peng Xiaofeng used Xinyu’s vast non-cash subsidies to concentrate his 
family’s investment funds, and state bank credit, on the imported 
machinery for a specialist solar ingot-casting and wafer-cutting business 
located upstream from most early Chinese solar investment. LDK listed 
on the NYSE in June 2007, after only four quarters of production, raising 
US$469m, the largest photovoltaic IPO (Table 43, above).278 The funds 
raised, plus two follow-on equity issues, bond issues and bank debt, 
were deployed to enter silicon feedstock production, and later cell and 
module manufacturing. LDK thereby covered every segment of the solar 
manufacturing value chain. Peng claimed to a business partner who was 
interviewed that the Xinyu government pressed him to expand faster 
than he did, requesting simultaneous development of six square 
kilometres of production facilities.279 After listing, LDK was required to 																																																								
276 S5, 7 October 2014; S6, 26 September 2013; China Economic Weekly (Zhongguo jingji zhoukan), 31 
July 2012, available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20120731/002712710715.shtml Accessed 10 
May 2017. One interviewee who worked closely with Peng estimated that Xinyu city and provincial 
loan guarantees were extended to one-third of LDK’s eventual Rmb30 billion of debt. The interviewee 
said the electricity subsidy alone was worth Rmb100-120m per year, with LDK paying a rate in the 
mid-20s of Chinese cents per kwh, versus a commercial rate around Rmb0.40. 
277 The EU investigation determined that LDK’s receipt of cheap and free land use rights was 
equivalent to an ad valorem subsidy of 4.28 percent to the ex-factory price of its goods, while Xinyu’s 
electricity rebates were equivalent to a subsidy of 2.45 percent. See Council Implementing Regulation 
(EU) No1239/2013, 2 December 2013, in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
278 LDK’s temporary competitive advantage was that the firm had ordered almost the entire available 
supply of silicon ingot saws for cutting solar wafers from the only two manufacturers then in 
existence: Meyer-Burger and HCT (subsequently acquired by Applied Materials of the US), both in 
Switzerland. The firm’s F-1 Registration statements showed it had 27 wafering saws in operation, 40 
on order from Meyer Burger, and 170 on order from HCT. 
279 S5, 7 October 2014. 
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identify all ongoing local and national cash grants and subsidies in its 
annual financial statements and these, like its non-cash local 
government subsidies, reflected the largest scale support relative to 
revenues of any of the major Chinese photovoltaics firms  (Table 45).  
 
Table 45: Revenues versus cash grants and subsidies reported in annual 
financial statements, selected Chinese photovoltaics firms, 2007-12. 
Rmb m 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Suntech revenues 9,347 13,132 11,472 18,856 19,804 NR 
Suntech cash grants 
and subsidies 
11.8 15.0 4.7 7.8 12.6 NR 
Yingli revenues 4,059 7,553 7,255 12,500 14,678 11,392 
Yingli cash grants and 
subsidies 
NR NR 23.7 102.5 125.6 214.0 
LDK revenues 3,632 11,220 7,439 16,305 13,581 5,376 
LDK cash grants and 
subsidies 
24.0 134.3 182.4 36.5 212.1 26.4 
Canadian Solar 
revenues 
2,099 4,813 4,275 9,717 11,952 8,067 
Canadian Solar cash 
grants and subsidies 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
GCL revenues 1,845 3,693 4,337 16,241 21,159 18,120 
GCL grants and 
subsidies 
42.7 60.5 93.2 253.8 162.2 231.8 
NR: not reported 
Sources: company reports 
 
The final component in the photovoltaic boom was that, in the wake of 
six successful US IPOs between December 2005 and June 2007 (Table 
43), China’s state-owned commercial banks lent aggressively to 
photovoltaics firms. This was despite the solar sector not yet being 
identified as an NDRC industrial policy target. Four state banks -- China 
Merchants Bank, Everbright Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) and Bank of China – were particularly aggressive in lending 
and underwriting bond issues after their headquarters marked 
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photovoltaics as a sector for credit growth. LDK’s Peng Xiaofeng told the 
private equity counterparty cited above that ‘banks were so desperate 
to see him that he had to pick between them’.280 In effect, local 
government support, short-term foreign bridging finance for offshore 
IPOs, and Chinese commercial bank lending short-circuited the NDRC’s 
industrial policy prioritisation process. Four Chinese firms were among 
the world’s top ten producers of solar modules by 2009, a number that 
rose to six three years later (Table 44, above). 
 
Unplugging the bottleneck 
The value-chain bottleneck for the Chinese solar industry through the 
mid-2000s was the supply of silicon feedstock, whose price increased 
from a historic average US$25-30/kg in the 1990s and early 2000s to a 
peak of US$450/kg in 2008 (Paulson, 2014). As noted, the pricing 
tempted many firms to enter the market. However, while it was not 
difficult to produce energy-intensive solar-grade silicon at high prices, it 
was difficult to produce at anything near the long-run historical price 
achieved by multinationals. The spike in prices from 2008 before they 
declined to US$30/kg by end 2011, and a new low of US$17/kg in late 
2012, created a competitive environment in which economies of speed 
were the critical variant.  
 
GCL (see case study) was the Chinese firm that added capacity faster 
than multinationals and drove down production costs faster than the fall 
in unit prices when new capacity at the multinationals came on line. 
Other Chinese firms were unable to do this. 																																																								
280 S5, 7 October 2014. 
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LDK, which announced it would enter crystalline silicon feedstock 
production following its 2007 IPO, hired foreign project managers to 
plan, and US engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) firm 
Fluor to build, its plant.281 Construction time, and the ramping up of 
production, were too slow. Silicon spot prices were already falling 
precipitously when LDK’s 10,000 tonne per annum line opened in 2009. 
A senior technical specialist at LDK stated that the firm’s cost of 
production reached a lowest level of $30/kg in 2012, while the market 
price fell more than 50 percent further. LDK invested over US$1bn in 
silicon feedstock operations and lost money on all but the earliest 
batches it produced.282  
 
Yingli’s performance was relatively worse, but on a smaller investment. 
The firm constructed a 3,000 tonne per annum facility that cost 
US$400m and opened in 2011. The plant never produced more than 
1,000 tonnes of silicon in a year because of high production costs and 
quality problems. At the time of a visit in July 2012, a manager stated 
that the plant’s 500kg reactors were yielding only 300kg of silicon; the 
cash production cost was stated as US$40/kg, versus a market price 
already under US$20/kg.283 As with LDK’s facility, Yingli’s was shut down 
when it became clear it would never produce at under US$20/kg.  
 																																																								
281 LDK consultants included the former CEO of Norwegian silicon manufacturer REC, Goran Bye, who 
in turn brought in a team of foreign technicians. Peng Xiaofeng already used a team of foreigners led 
by Nick Sarno, a former manager at US MEMC Electronic Materials, to establish LDK’s ingot casting 
and wafering operations. S6, 26 September 2013. 
282 S6, 26 September 2013. 
283 S7, 16 July 2012. Yingli purchased the highest purity crystalline silicon manufacturing line in China 
but could not ingest the advanced technology. 
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At Suntech, a senior manager estimated the firm lost in excess of 
US$250m through failed minority investments in crystalline silicon 
manufacturers in 2006-8, designed to secure raw material supplies when 
these were scarce. Suntech, like Yingli, locked itself into long-term 
supply contracts of up to 10 years with third-party producers, never 
imagining that prices would fall far below the contracted ones.284  
 
Failed silicon investments dealt a mortal blow to many large Chinese 
photovoltaic firms. Nonetheless, the extraordinary success of GCL, and 
the ability of a few other Chinese silicon manufacturers to reduce costs 
close to market levels, enabled the downstream sectors of the 
photovoltaics industry to continue to drive down module prices.  
 
Interviewees noted that a major contributor to the cost reductions was 
production equipment prices that declined in every solar segment, from 
silicon feedstock, through ingot casting and wafer slicing, to cells and 
modules. In silicon feedstock production, the LDK technical specialist 
cited above observed that capital expenditure per kilo of silicon 
feedstock capacity in China declined from US$90 in 2007 to US$40-45 in 
2013; in other words, the cost of a 10,000 tonne per annum facility such 
as LDK built fell from around US$1bn to less than half that in six years.285 
Lower costs were partly related to the use of larger reactors and Chinese 
firms’ gradual mastery of a new, modified chemical process. The 																																																								
284 S8, 24 September 2012. Suntech made investments in active and planned crystalline Silicon 
producers Asia Silicon, Shunda Holdings, Xi’an Longji, Hoku Scientific and Nitol Solar. The first three 
were China-based producers; Hoku was a consortium of Chinese investors with a silicon project in the 
United States; Nitol was a Russian firm. 
285 S6, 26 September 2013. A 2013 report by CLSA found that Chinese silicon plant construction costs 
had fallen to around one-third of what multinationals spent in developed countries in 2010 (Yonts, 
2013).  
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overarching theme, said the LDK technical specialist, was that every 
piece of manufacturing equipment localised by Chinese suppliers was at 
least 30 percent cheaper than recent world prices.286 
 
In 2006, furnaces for creating multi-crystalline ingots from silicon 
feedstock were still imported (Li et al., 2007). By 2008, they were 
localised and Chinese equipment firms like Jinggong, in Zhejiang 
province, began to develop furnaces larger, as well as cheaper, than 
those manufactured in developed countries. Chinese multi-wire saws for 
wafer cutting were available by 2008 and quality improved quickly.287 In 
solar cell production, Chinese firms reverse engineered diffusion 
furnaces, plasma etchers, sintering ovens and semi-automatic screen 
printers (Fraas and Partain, 2010). Plasma Enhanced Chemical Vapour 
Deposition (PECVD) equipment, wet-etching benches and fully 
automatic screen printers followed.  
 
The impact on specialist foreign equipment firms, including Europe’s 
Meyer Burger and Centrotherm, whose businesses boomed in the mid-
2000s, was consistent: share prices fell by more than four-fifths as China 
localised equipment manufacturing.288 The photovoltaics equipment 
experience was consistent with a general trend in China in the 2000s 																																																								
286 S6, 26 September 2013. The new chemical process was energy-saving hydrochlorination, rather 
than the older direct chlorination process. For a technical discussion, see 
http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2010/05/advancements-in-the.html Accessed 12 
May 2017. GCL was the first Chinese company to master hydrochlorination. S9, 16 August 2010. 
287 Yingli, for example, reported that it was buying Jinggong furnaces in 2011 at a price 30 percent 
below that of its previous supplier, GT Advanced Technologies of the US, as well as Chinese-made 
wire cutters. S4, 8 August 2011. 
288 Applied Materials of the US, which made acquisitions of firms including Swiss wire saw maker HCT 
Shaping Systems (US$475m in 2007) and Italy’s Baccini screen printer manufacturer (US$330m in 
2008), reversed course and began a gradual exit from the photovoltaics business as Chinese 
equipment vendors came on line. The Chinese leader in fully automatic screen printing, one of the 
last core technologies to be localised, was Wujiang Maxwell Technologies, based in Suzhou. 
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whereby purchases of foreign equipment, which accounted for the 
majority of Chinese spending on technology in the 1990s, were only one-
tenth of technology expenditure by the end of the 2000s (Watanabe, 
2014:chapter8). 
 
Falling production equipment prices exacerbated the problem of low 
barriers to entry in the photovoltaics sector for all but silicon 
manufacturers. The strongest Chinese brand, Suntech, enjoyed 
technological leadership, manifested in slightly higher solar conversion 
rates for its cells. However, noted a manager responsible for strategic 
planning, the firm could never convert this into a pricing premium of 
more than 5 percent over other Chinese manufacturers.289  
 
In line with the analytical framework of this thesis, manufacturing 
capabilities alone could not secure clear competitive leadership. 
Dynamic capabilities recommended forward integration into project 
development to achieve higher margins. This is what manufacturers in 
the United States pursued from the mid-2000s: as photovoltaic unit 
prices fell precipitously, market leaders First Solar and SunPower moved 
into utility solar, and subsequently distributed solar, project 
development. SunPower also started a successful residential leasing 
business. First Solar’s revenues from project development were 5 
percent those of its component sales in 2009; in 2011, they were one-
third; and in 2013, project revenues were almost twice as much as 
module sales. The overwhelming majority of the projects were in the 
																																																								
289 S8, 24 September 2012. 
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United States.290 Chinese firms, however, had to try to replicate this 
strategy in foreign markets, since there was no Chinese solar market to 
speak of. 
 
The impulse to dynamic capabilities was certainly present among the 
leading Chinese firms. They tried to develop offshore downstream 
businesses. Suntech established regional business development hubs for 
the Americas and Europe as early as 2007, with headquarters in San 
Francisco and Geneva. In 2008, the firm committed Euro258m to a 
Global Solar Fund (GSF), initially focused on project development in 
Europe. In the US in 2008, the company formed a joint venture to 
develop solar projects, and purchased a California-based solar EPC firm. 
In 2010, Suntech invested in a trial residential solar leasing business in 
the US.291 However, the complexity of developing offshore installation 
businesses without any domestic experience, the challenge of managing 
far-flung international teams, inadequate cash flows to see overseas 
businesses through to maturation, and a large-scale alleged fraud at 
Suntech’s GSF all contributed to a failure to move directly to 
international forward integration (see case study). 
  
LDK failed with a similar strategy. The firm entered a 2009 joint venture 
with German photovoltaics manufacturer Q-Cells to develop solar 
																																																								
290 First Solar reported revenues in two segments: components and systems. The former covered 
module sales to third parties while systems included modules used in projects developed by the firm. 
Revenues in 2009, 2011, 2013 were, respectively, US$1,965, US$2,068, US$1,174 for components and 
US$101m, US$698m, US$2,136m for systems. In 2011, when First Solar had 2,082MW of projects 
under development, only 100MW were outside the United States. Company annual reports. 
291 The joint venture, Gemini Solar Development, was formed with MMA Renewable Ventures. The 
EPC was EI Solutions, renamed Suntech Energy Solutions. The residential leasing business was 
BriteLease. Company public documents; S3, 11 December 2012; S10, 5 June 2013. 
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projects, but pulled back after a first, loss-making project in Germany.292 
In 2011, LDK acquired a US EPC, Solar Power Inc., but could not develop 
a profitable downstream business in the US. Even GCL, with its large 
cash flows from silicon sales, struggled to build an overseas installation 
business after entering a US joint venture with SolarReserve in 2010. 
GCL sold down most of its US project pipeline when silicon prices hit 
record lows in 2012-13. The one Chinese firm that was able to move 
directly to build up a substantial sustained overseas development 
business was Canadian Solar. However, even this was a relatively much 
smaller part of its business than was the case with First Solar and 
Sunpower in the US. Canadian Solar’s revenue from project 
development and services was never more than half its total revenue 
(see case study).  
 
Chinese solar firms’ inability to develop profitable project development 
businesses overseas did not become an existential problem through 
2011 because module exports continued to grow strongly. Exports rose 
through the global financial crisis in 2008-9, jumped with the opening of 
new subsidised markets in Europe and the US in 2010, and established a 
peak value of US$35.8bn in 2011 (Table 46). Moreover, from 2010 
China’s key policy bank, China Development Bank (CDB), began to lend 
aggressively to photovoltaics firms. By 2011, it was reported that CDB 
had US$7bn of credit outstanding to the sector.293 Zhang et al. (2014) 
reported that CDB’s decision to commit to the solar sector was 
connected to its involvement in preparatory work for the State Council’s 																																																								
292 S6, 26 September 2013. 
293 Wayne Ma, ‘Chinese solar approach faces test’, Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2013. Separately, an 
interviewee at Suntech stated that 2010 was the first time that competitor LDK received funding from 
CDB. S11, 15 May 2013. 
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October 2010 ‘Decision on Accelerating the Development of Strategic 
Emerging Industries’, which identified photovoltaics as part of a ‘new 
energy’ emerging industry. Whatever CDB’s motivation, it was out of 
kilter with policy at the NDRC and NEA, which began to develop new 
solar subsidy programmes much more tentatively. Beginning in 2009, 
the NEA was party with other ministries to the Solar Roofs programme, 
the Golden Sun Demonstration programme and a small number of other 
utility-scale projects (Huo and Zhang, 2012). The aggregate subsidies 
funded only a few hundred megawatts of installations in 2009-10.  
 
Table 46. Exports of photovoltaics products, 2008-2016. US$ bn 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
4.4 13.7 30.5 35.8 23.3 12.3 14.4 15.5 14 
Sources: Chinese customs data (Zhao et al., 2015) 
 
The year 2011 proved a turning point. The latest surge of bank credit, 
led by CDB, made possible exponential capacity expansion accompanied 
by rapidly falling profit margins as production ran far ahead of demand 
(Table 47). For its part, the NEA maintained a measured transition to 
larger domestic solar subsidies. The Golden Sun programme was 
switched to a fixed tariff arrangement and expanded. In July 2011, the 
NEA introduced a first national feed-in tariff for other solar projects. 
 
China’s domestic market expanded, from 0.5GW in 2010 to 2.6GW in 
2011 (Table 41, above). However, this was far from enough to absorb 
output from module manufacturing capacity, estimated to have 
increased from 9GW per annum in 2009 to 55-70GW in 2011; 55GW was 
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1.5 times global demand in the latter year.294 Prices spiralled down and 
photovoltaics firms in China and overseas started to lose money. In the 
US and Europe, solar manufacturers lobbied for anti-dumping tariffs on 
Chinese imports. The US Department of Commerce started an 
investigation in October 2011, leading to a provisional minimum import 
tariff of 31 percent from May 2012. The EC introduced a provisional 
minimum import tariff of 37 percent from June 2013.  
 
Table 47. Gross margins of selected photovoltaics firms, 2006-15. % 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Suntech* 24.9 20.3 17.8 20 18.7 12.3 na na na na 
Yingli 23.84 23.57 23.4 23.63 33.22 16.69 -3.24 10.87 17.31 11.91 
Trina 26.24 22.41 19.77 28.06 31.46 16.24 4.41 12.29 16.87 18.67 
Canadian 18.09 18.85 10.07 12.38 15.3 9.6 6.98 16.66 19.62 16.63 
GCL na 19.65 72.55 30.15 36.87 33.19 7.83 11.91 23.12 26.54 
First Solar 40.19 49.88 54.43 50.56 46.22 35.13 25.32 26.12 24.33 25.69 
Sunpower 21.3 19.1 24.3 18.6 23 9.5 10.2 19.6 20.6 15.5 
na: not available 
*Suntech’s last filing of 20-F annual accounts was 2011; the firm declared bankruptcy in March 2013. 
Sources: company reports 
 
Against this background, Chinese exports of photovoltaic products 
decreased by about half in 2012, and by more in 2013, before stabilising 
(Table 46, above). The government was left with a simple choice: either 
subsidise a much larger domestic market or accept widespread 
bankruptcies and related state bank losses. By early 2012, the ten largest 
Chinese photovoltaic firms reported combined debts of US$17.5bn.295  
 
Fortunately, the remarkable reduction in ex-factory solar module unit 
prices – from approximately US$4/W in 2007 to US$1.3/W in 2011 																																																								
294 The higher module manufacturing estimate was from Nomura. See Bruce Einhorn, ‘The fall of 
China’s solar power king’, Bloomberg, 6 March 2013. Available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-06/the-fall-of-chinas-solar-power-king Accessed 
16 May 2017. A lower estimate of 55GW is given by Zhang et al (2014). 
295 Wayne Ma, ‘Chinese solar approach faces test’, Wall Street Journal, 6 March 2013. 
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(Table 48) – made the government’s choice relatively easy. In the course 
of 2012, the NEA’s target for installed solar generating capacity in 2015, 
which was 5GW as of 2011, increased to 10GW at the start of the year, 
15GW in May, and 21GW in time for the 12th Five-Year Plan for 
Renewable Energy Development in China, published on 1 January 2013 
(Liu and Shiroyama, 2013). A GCL interviewee said that, privately, NDRC 
officials told Chinese solar firms in late summer 2012 that 30-40GW per 
annum was possible by 2015, which was what occurred (Table 41).296  
 
Table 48. Ex-factory module prices in China, 2007-15. US$ per watt 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
3.75 4.23 2.13 1.8 1.34 0.77 0.67 0.67 0.58 0.51 
Source: Canadian Solar 
 
Despite the government’s actions, a number of bankruptcies could not 
be avoided because of the scale of over-capacity. The first was Suntech, 
in March 2013. Notably, Suntech was less indebted than LDK and Yingli. 
However, state banks removed support after founder Shi Zhengrong 
refused to provide personal guarantees for the firm’s debts. The 
requirement for heavily indebted entrepreneurs to pledge personal, and 
often family, assets is a common state bank requirement in China to 
attempt to reduce the moral hazard that accompanies industrial policy-
determined lending. According to one interviewee familiar with the 
matter, Shi first refused to provide personal guarantees to CDB in June 
2012, and subsequently repeated the refusal with other banks.297  
 																																																								
296 S8, 24 September 2012. 
297 S12, 16 May 2013. The refusal to provide the personal guarantees demanded by the banks in turn 
undermined the Wuxi city government’s support for Suntech, according to the interviewee.  
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At LDK, Peng Xiaofeng pledged both personal and family assets, with 
banks locking down his family’s bank accounts, according to a financier 
who worked with him. In return, the interviewee explained, CDB led a 
group of 20 creditors which rolled over outstanding loans and interest 
each quarter beginning February 2012; CDB even extended a new, 
Rmb440m (US$71m) loan in January 2013 in an effort to upgrade LDK’s 
silicon feedstock manufacturing operation. All efforts failed, and 
different LDK units entered bankruptcy in 2014 and 2015, with net 
liabilities around US$2.7bn; Chinese banks lost about 80 percent of their 
loans.298 Yingli, whose founder Miao Liansheng pledged personal assets 
to state banks, was also kept alive by a creditor group led by CDB.  
 
5.4. Stage 3: Manufacturing of current technology, and incremental 
modification of current technology, with government support 
As in the wind industry, the basis for a substantial domestic solar market 
was the introduction of a feed-in tariff (FIT), in July 2011. In the wind 
industry, however, the NEA made only one major change to its 
management of the subsidy regime after the wind FIT was launched in 
2009, when the approval of all wind farm projects was centralised from 
mid-2011.299 In the solar sector, the subsidy regime underwent a 
number of major changes, reflecting a more challenging NEA task to 
frame a regime that could lead to concentration and reward those firms 
exhibiting dynamic capabilities. 
 
The initial expansion of the domestic market in 2011 and 2012 (Table 49) 
was based on a uniform FIT, which led to a rush of investment in 																																																								
298 The new CDB loan to LDK was for hydrochlorination equipment. S5, 7 October 2014. 
299 ‘Wind farm development interim rules and regulations,’ NEA, 2011. 
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western provinces with good solar resources and low land costs. This 
worsened curtailment problems, already plaguing wind farms in these 
areas, due to inadequate distribution infrastructure (Wang et al., 2016). 
The NDRC and NEA therefore coordinated a series of regulatory changes 
through 2012 and 2013 that sought an even balance between utility-
scale projects and DG projects that create less stress for electricity 
infrastructure (Zhang et al., 2014). In addition, the uniform FIT was 
changed to a three-zone FIT that paid lower tariffs in western provinces 
with higher rates of curtailment. A DG tariff paid on both electricity 
consumed by a project’s developer and on surplus electricity sold to the 
grid was added.300 
 
Table 49. China’s photovoltaic market, and distributed generation 
component, 2008-16. MW 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Total 40 160 500 2,600 5,000 12,900 10,600 15,100 34,500 
- of which 
DG 
     800 2,050 1,390 4,230 
Source: NEA 
 
Despite the changes, DG project development increased slowly. In 2014, 
the NEA targeted 8GW of DG installation, but only 2.1GW was 
completed. Local electricity grid offices resisted connecting DG projects, 
banks were unwilling to finance them, and rights to roof space in shared 																																																								
300 The three-zone utility-scale FIT was made up of two components: the local rate for thermal electric 
power, paid by the grid, and the balance, paid by the Ministry of Finance from its Renewable Energy 
Development Fund. The DG tariff was a uniform tariff of Rmb0.42/KWh from its inception in 2013, on 
all electricity self-consumed and on surplus electricity sold to the grid; in addition, a DG project owner 
received the local wholesale rate for thermal electric power for electricity supplied to the grid. Several 
provinces, led by Zhejiang, started to offer additional provincial subsidies around Rmb0.1/KWh for DG 
projects from 2012.  
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accommodation were unclear and difficult to assert legally (Zhang et al., 
2015). These problems could not be quickly addressed. In September 
2014, the NEA raised the upper limit for DG projects from 6MW to 
20MW and allowed developers to sell all output to the grid at an 
alternative, higher tariff. However, DG installations in 2015 fell to 
1.4GW. The figure increased to 4.2GW in 2016, but only in the context of 
record overall solar installations of 34.5GW. 
 
The NEA focused promotion efforts on several dozen DG demonstration 
zones around the country, in which half of all roofs were targeted to 
carry solar installations, and more than 80 percent on new buildings. 
Through 2017, the main DG tariff was maintained at its 2013 level while 
the utility scale FIT, which began at a unified Rmb1.15/KWh in 2011, was 
steadily reduced (Table 50). The NEA aim was to increase the DG share 
of total installations to 45 percent by 2020. However, China had yet to 
develop the financing and leasing firms for DG projects that facilitated 
rapid expansion in countries like the US.301  
 
Table 50. Wind utility-scale, solar utility-scale, solar distributed tariffs, 
2017. Rmb/KWh* 
Wind FIT category 1 0.4 Solar FIT region 1 0.65 
Wind FIT category 2 0.45 Solar FIT region 2 0.75 
Wind FIT category 3 0.49 Solar FIT region 3 0.85 
Wind FIT category 4 0.57 Solar DG tariff** 0.42 
*Geographic categories/zones for wind and solar were not the same and hence not directly 
comparable, but they broadly reflected the most/least favourable wind and solar resource locations. 
** In addition to the local thermal electricity tariff when power is supplied to the grid. The average 
local thermal tariff in China in 2017 was around Rmb0.38. 
Source: NEA data 
 
																																																								
301 In the US, leasing firms like SolarCity, Vivint and Verengo accounted for two-thirds of residential 
solar installations by 2013-14, before their market shares began to decline. 
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The NEA also experimented with new policies in the utility-scale market 
to reward firms with the best products and services, rather than the 
lowest prices. In 2015, the NEA introduced a quota programme called 
Top Runner that required minimum solar conversion rates. After 
completing 1GW of demonstration projects, Top Runner expanded to 
5.5GW of utility-scale projects in 2016. The programme was designed to 
favour the largest manufacturers using the latest technology. The 
programme’s introduction coincided with the stabilisation of the group 
of largest Chinese photovoltaics firms (see below). However, the 
analytical framework of this thesis suggested that an industrial policy 
based narrowly on manufacturing capabilities reflected in solar 
conversion rates -- recalling the NEA’s earlier focus on turbine size in the 
wind sector -- would not be enough to hone truly world-class firms. 
 
Overall, curtailment and late payment of subsidies remained major 
problems through 2016, increasing investment risk and driving down 
rates of return. Low utilisation and curtailment in Xinjiang and Gansu 
reduced project internal rates of return to around 5 percent – below the 
cost of Chinese bank credit. This was before delayed FIT subsidy 
payments by the Ministry of Finance, which commonly took 1-3 years to 
remit, further increased investors’ effective cost of capital (Yeung et al., 
2016, Shen, 2016).302 The NEA hoped that the completion of a series of 
ultra-high voltage (UHV) power lines between remote wind- and solar-
intensive regions and more populous areas would relieve the 
curtailment problem; UHV lines with annual transmission capacity up to 																																																								
302 As of 2015, Rmb20-30bn of solar FIT subsidy payments were more than one year overdue. The 
renewable energy surcharge on all electricity consumption, which funds the FIT subsidies for 
renewables, increased from Rmb0.2 cents per KWh in 2006 to Rmb 1.9 cents in December 2015, but 
remained insufficient. 
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53GW were due to be completed in 2017.303 In the meantime, the NEA 
in 2016 introduced guarantees of minimum hours of wind and solar 
output that must be purchased by utilities; it was not clear if these could 
be enforced.304  
 
As of 2017, the best Chinese solar firms could not differentiate 
themselves clearly and capture significantly higher margins by forward 
integration in the domestic market. Nonetheless, as the NEA scrambled 
to adjust its DG policy mix, built out the Top Runner programme, and 
experimented with utilisation guarantees, a group of six photovoltaics 
firms started to bed down as the industry’s vanguard. Four of these 
firms were the largest surviving mid-stream producers of wafers, cells, 
and modules: Jinko, Trina, Canadian Solar and JA Solar. Notably, all of 
the big six firms began to cut costs by outsourcing cell and module 
production to smaller, weaker manufacturers; in 2016, outsourcing 
accounted for more than one-third of big-six module production.305 Only 
the strongest firms could afford the outlays to support constant 
technology upgrades to raise cell conversion rates, while a trailing group 
of producers became either their captive suppliers, and/or own-brand 
manufacturers of lower-margin products.  
 
The other two firms among the big six were the fully integrated 
producers of silicon, wafers, cells and modules. GCL was the first firm to 
follow this strategy as it progressed, opportunistically, from silicon to 																																																								
303 The first UHV line, between Gansu and Hunan provinces, opened in 2015; two more followed in 
2016; eight were due for completion in 2017. 
304 Announced 31 May 2016, the guarantees were significantly higher than actual utilisation rates 
recorded in 2015. 
305 See PV Tech, 31 January 2017, at https://www.pv-tech.org/editors-blog/top-10-solar-module-
suppliers-in-2016 Accessed 5 June 2017. 
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wafers to cell and module production. More recently, Longi Green 
Energy, which further refined multi-crystalline feedstock into the highest 
purity mono-crystalline ingots at unparalleled scale, replicated GCL’s 
strategy. Among the big six Chinese firms, only Longi was not among the 
world’s top 10 module producers in 2016 (Table 51); it was expected to 
be so in 2017. 
 
Table 51. Largest solar module manufacturers by output, 2016. 
(Chinese firms in bold)  
Rank Company 
1 Jinko 
2 Trina 
3 Canadian Solar 
4 Hanwha Q-Cells (ROK) 
5 JA Solar 
6 GCL 
7 First Solar (US) 
8 Yingli 
9 Talesun 
10 Risen 
Source: PV-Tech & Solar Media, January 2017. 
 
Although it was sometimes slow to do so, once the NEA came to terms 
with the idiosyncrasies of the solar business the agency was tenacious in 
pursuing strategies to increase concentration and reduce subsidies to 
weaker firms. In line with the analytical framework of this thesis, the 
solar sub-sector, like the thermal and wind sub-sectors, highlighted that 
effective industrial policy could not be limited to narrow manufacturing 
capability development. Policy needed to facilitate a transition to 
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competition through firms’ strategic dynamic capabilities. What became 
clear in the photovoltaics sub-sector, however, was that this required 
sufficient maturity in domestic product markets. When market maturity 
was insufficient, there were no quick remedies.  
 
Three case studies: 
 
5.5. Case study: Suntech 
Among Chinese photovoltaics firms, Suntech was the leader in 
manufacturing technology and it was the first firm to complete private 
equity fund raising and an IPO, and hence the leader in scaling up 
production. Despite these advantages, Suntech was also the first 
Chinese solar firm to file for bankruptcy, in March 2013. 
 
Suntech’s founder, chairman and CEO Shi Zhengrong, was the most 
technologically accomplished leader of any of the wind and solar case 
study firms. Shi was a research colleague of photovoltaic industry 
founding father Martin Green, and named on 15 patents while living in 
Australia (Vietor, 2011). He recruited other accomplished scientists to 
Suntech, including Stuart Wenham, a former colleague at UNSW and 
Pacific Solar, who helped design the first production lines and in 2005 
joined as Chief Technology Officer. 
 
Leadership in manufacturing technology, however, only gave Suntech a 
small competitive advantage. As a senior manager responsible for 
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strategy noted, in 2012 Suntech achieved unit prices just 3-5 percent 
higher than competitors.306  
 
This small premium was more than offset by Suntech’s poor strategic 
choices. Unlike Goldwind and Envision in the wind sector, Suntech did 
not restrict itself to investment in ready-to-market technologies, such as 
Goldwind’s commercialisation of DDPM, or Envision’s investments in 
software. Suntech made large investments in a Japanese developer of 
thin-film and built-in photovoltaic (BIPV) products, and a German 
developer of thin-film technology. Neither Japan’s MSK, nor Germany’s 
CSG Solar, possessed products which were commercially proven. 
Suntech attempted to leapfrog in manufacturing capabilities. The 
manager cited above said the strategy led to combined write-offs in BIPV 
and thin-film activities in excess of US$200m.307 
 
Suntech’s first mover role in raising finance also offered it potential 
competitive advantage. Shi accessed private equity finance in 2004, 
completed a US$396m IPO in December 2005, sold US$1,075m in bonds 
in 2007 and 2008 and completed a US$277m follow-on equity issue in 
2009.308 This flow of low-cost equity and debt allowed Suntech to 
increase cell and module capacity from 6.4MW in 2003 to 363MW in 
2007 and 1,540MW in 2010, at which point it was the largest solar firm 
in the world. Revenues rose from US$13.9m in 2003 to US$1.35bn in 
2007 and US$2.9bn in 2010.  																																																								
306 S3, 11 December 2012; S11, 15 May 2013. 
307 Suntech’s last 20-F report, for 2011, recorded accumulated write-downs of US$126m against MSK, 
and a US$14.1m write-down against CSG, which declared bankruptcy in 2011. A Suntech interviewee 
stated that total thin-film losses, across CSG and production facilities the firm set up in China, were 
around US$100m. S8, 24 September 2012. 
308 The bonds were sold in tranches of US$500m in February 2007 and US$575m in March 2008. 
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Investment choices beyond basic capacity expansion, however, were 
deeply flawed. In addition to losses on unproven technologies, Suntech 
miscalculated badly during the industry’s silicon feedstock shortage of 
2004-08. Shi did not consider that Chinese firms might cut the 
production cost of silicon feedstock. As noted earlier, Suntech lost 
around US$250m in minority investments in silicon producers 
undertaken to ensure supplies when feedstock was scarce. Most of the 
firms were bankrupted when GCL mastered hydrochlorination 
technology and combined this with unprecedented economies of scale 
(see case study). Shi not only backed the wrong firms, he locked Suntech 
into expensive long-term, fixed-price contracts in the belief that China 
could not become a low-cost silicon producer. The largest contract was a 
US$6bn, 10-year ‘take or pay’ agreement with US-based MEMC 
Electronic Materials in July 2006; in 2011, Suntech compensated MEMC 
US$120m to terminate the agreement.309 
 
Despite the missteps, Suntech carried less debt than peers LDK and 
Yingli, and might have survived if its early strategic move into project 
development had been successful. A comparison with the leading multi-
crystalline photovoltaic firm in the US, SunPower, shows that Suntech’s 
operating margins in 2009-10 were superior to the American firm’s. 
More important, because Suntech integrated forward into international 
project development before any other Chinese manufacturer, beginning 
2006-7, the firm was able to report net margins higher than operating 
margins in 2010 as it booked US$251m of investment gains from solar 																																																								
309 Recorded in Suntech’s 2011 20-F statement. 
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projects (Table 52).310 SunPower began to book gains the same year 
from its move into domestic US project development work and leasing. 
The difference was that Suntech’s early moves into project development 
in Japan, the US and Europe stretched its management capabilities too 
far, too soon. 
 
Table 52. Suntech, SunPower and First Solar operating and net 
margins, 2008-2015. % 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Suntech operating 
margin* 9.5 10.3 6.8 -20.5 na na na na 
Suntech net 
margin* 4.6 5.1 8.2 -32.4 na na na na 
SunPower 
operating margin 10.7 4.1 6.3 -22.5 -11.9 6.3 8.3 -13.1 
SunPower net 
margin 6.4 2.2 8.05 -26.1 -14.6 3.8 8.1 -11.9 
*2011 was the last year that Suntech filed annual financial statements. 
Sources: company financial statements 
 
Although Suntech’s US$300m acquisition of MSK Corp. in Japan in 2006 
was principally motivated by technology targets, it also brought a 
national distribution network and the basis for a growing residential and 
commercial solar installation business. However, the integration of MSK, 
including the cultural challenges of Chinese and Japanese workforces 
operating together, was fraught. Suntech was unable to develop a 
downstream business in Japan and had to write off the MSK investment 
(Li, 2013). 
In the US, Suntech’s 2008 move into project development via its Gemini 
Solar Development joint venture encountered complaints from domestic 
developers which it supplied with modules that Suntech was creating 																																																								
310 Suntech 20-F, 2010. The figure is shown under ‘equity in net earnings of affiliates’ and relates to 
investment profits on projects of the Global Solar Fund. Suntech reported that it shipped US$313m of 
modules to its own projects in 2009 and 2010. 
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‘channel conflict’ – in other words, that Suntech was competing with 
them. The firms threatened to buy their modules from other suppliers. 
Although the notion of channel conflict would disappear as more 
manufacturers entered the project development business, a Suntech 
manager stated that at this early stage the firm was sufficiently 
concerned to scale back its US ambitions.311  
In Europe, there were fewer objections from developers. However, 
Suntech was unable to find an equity partner for its Global Solar Fund 
(GSF) project business. The former Spain sales manager of Suntech, 
Javier Romero, raised 10 percent of the equity for GSF, Shi Zhengrong 
invested 10 percent personally, and Suntech held 80 percent, much 
more than balance sheet prudence recommended. GSF was then 
undermined by two problems. First, GSF was indicted over a series of 
solar farm investments in southern Italy, accused of circumventing 
requisite project approvals.312 Second, German government bonds 
pledged by GSF manager Romero as collateral for a Euro560m loan from 
China Development Bank for Italian projects turned out to be fake. 
Suntech alleged that Romero defrauded GSF and launched legal 
proceedings, which were never concluded.313  
																																																								
311 S3, 11 December 2012. 
312 The 20MW of projects were located in the province of Puglia. The main accusations were that GSF 
managers illegally declared five larger projects as a series of 1MW projects in order to qualify for 
expedited approval, and that construction work was declared finished before it was in order to secure 
full government subsidies. See Steve Scherer and Stephen Jewkes, ‘China's fraud-hit Suntech strikes 
more trouble in Italy’, Reuters, 29 August 2012. 
313 The German bonds were pledged by GSF to Suntech, which in turn guaranteed the CDB loan. When 
the bonds were shown to be fake, Suntech had to restate its balance sheet to show increased net 
liabilities. The further result of the legal action was that Suntech’s interest in GSF became unsaleable 
when it tried to raise funds to make a US$541m bond repayment due in March 2013. Ibid. Also, S3, 11 
December 2012; S8, 24 September 2012; S10, 5 June 2013. 
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The demise of Suntech was a murky affair. It was not explained why 
management thought Javier Romero would be able to borrow hundreds 
of millions of euros of bonds for use as a guarantee with Suntech, or why 
it took two years to realise the bonds were fake. Separately, Shi 
Zhengrong was accused of profiting unfairly, and misleading 
shareholders, over transactions involving Suntech’s investments in 
silicon feedstock and other businesses.314  
Nonetheless, it is indisputable that Suntech was the leader in China in 
recognising the need to develop downstream project management 
capabilities in order raise margins as solar manufacturing oversupply 
increased. This was the impulse to dynamic capabilities. The challenges 
of building project origination and execution capabilities overseas 
without experience in China, however, proved too much for what was 
then China’s leading photovoltaics firm. 
 
5.6. Case study: Canadian Solar 
Canadian Solar was the most successful Chinese photovoltaic firm in 
working around the constraint of not having a domestic Chinese market 
in which to hone downstream skills. It launched directly into 
international project development and, like Envision, with some success. 
However, Canadian Solar could not make project development as large a 
share of its business as US rivals, and did not participate in more 
innovative businesses like residential leasing in foreign markets.  
 
																																																								
314 Angus Grigg, ‘Shi flew too close to the sun’, The Australian Financial Review, 28 March 2013. 
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A senior Canadian Solar manager described how, in 2001, founder 
Shawn Qu was working for the solar subsidiary of Automation Tooling 
Systems (ATS) in Canada. ATS was approached by Volkswagen’s China 
unit with a request for photovoltaic chargers to maintain battery levels 
in stored Jetta model cars, which experienced higher than normal idle 
leakage when held for delivery in factory car parks. The Canadian firm 
was uninterested in the order, however Qu convinced management to 
back him in setting up a small China manufacturing line with Volkswagen 
as its anchor customer. Locating its earliest production in Changsu in 
Jiangsu province, the Chinese name the business took was a homonym 
of ATS (a te si / ®p ), although always known as Canadian Solar in 
English. After US$3m turnover in 2002, the firm was paid a further 
US$4m by Volkswagen in 2003, as well as US$5m for a home lighting 
products sold to China’s government-subsidised rural off-grid market.315 
 
In 2004, Canadian Solar began to export to Germany. In 2005, as exports 
grew, Qu secured US$13m venture capital investment in Hong Kong and 
Japan, allowing Canadian Solar to expand capacity and position itself for 
a November 2006 Nasdaq IPO, raising US$116m. The following years 
were characterised by steady expansion and clear decisions to neither 
invest in silicon feedstock production, nor enter long-term contracts for 
silicon supplies in what Qu regarded as a temporary bubble. In 2007-9, 
Canadian’s gross margins were depressed compared with its peers 
(Table 48) as it paid high spot prices for silicon feedstock. However, 
when prices fell, the firm prospered. Based on steady expansion and a 
																																																								
315 S2, 15 October 2013. ATS provided used solar cell and module production equipment to Canadian 
Solar and subsequently exchanged this for equity.  
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narrow focus on cell and module production, by 2010 Canadian Solar 
was a global Top 10 photovoltaic supplier (Table 45). 
 
The Canadian Solar manager described how, in 2009, as silicon, wafer, 
cell and module prices fell, Qu set up a solar project development team. 
In doing so he focused on the only non-Chinese market he knew: 
Canada. This coincided with the government of Ontario’s decision to 
build utility-scale solar plants. Emphasising the ‘Canadian’ side of its 
identity, Canadian Solar won a series of tenders, in some cases assisted 
by its ability to secure CDB loans.316 Canadian Solar also started an EPC 
business in Canada in 2010 and entered a majority-controlled joint 
venture with Canada’s largest existing solar project developer, 
SkyPower, in April 2012. From Canada, Qu expanded into the US. By 
2013, the Canadian Solar interviewee noted, the firm had an 800MW 
pipeline of north American projects.317  The approach was considerably 
more conservative than Suntech’s near-simultaneous efforts to build 
businesses in Japan, the US and Europe – all places in which Shi 
Zhengrong had never lived. 
 
Table 53. Canadian Solar cumulative solar plant completions, 2012-
2017. MW 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017E 
81 262 628 1,196 2,536 3,586 
Source: company reports 
 
Canadian Solar could not, however, build a project development 
business as fast or as profitably as the leading US firm, First Solar, in the 																																																								
316 For example, CDB helped to finance a group of nine solar projects, totalling 76MW, developed by 
Canadian Solar and sold to Canadian energy company TransCanada in 2012 and 2013. 
317 S2, 15 October 2013. 
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United States. By 2013, First Solar was constructing more than 1GW of 
solar plants each year. In March 2015, Canadian Solar bought Sharp’s US 
solar project business, Recurrent Energy, for US$261m and continued to 
expand into new markets, including the UK, Japan and Brazil. By the end 
of 2016, Canadian Solar completed more than 2.5GW of solar plants and 
had another 2GW in late-stage development.318 
 
Table 54. Canadian Solar and First Solar: project development and 
other service revenues as a share of total revenues, 2013-2015. 
 2013 2014 2015 
First Solar 65% 67% 61% 
Canadian Solar 22% 44% 31% 
Source: company reports 
 
The challenge for Canadian Solar, as for other manufacturers engaged in 
project development, was that the market became increasingly 
crowded. Utility firms with lower costs of capital entered, and margins 
fell. Canadian Solar’s gross margins for EPC and project development 
reduced from 27.8 per cent in 2013 to 23.2 percent in 2014 and 20.5 
percent in 2015. Nonetheless, the firm re-committed to its project 
development strategy, becoming an owner-operator of some projects 
and a seller of others. At the end of 2016, Canadian Solar held 1,196MW 
of solar projects as an independent power producer (IPP), a portfolio it 
valued at US$1.6bn.319 The firm was unique among Chinese 
photovoltaics companies in its exposure to international project 
development. 
 
																																																								
318 The 2.5GW of completed plants included those undertaken by Recurrent Energy. 
319 The major components of the portfolio were US (808MW), China (198MW), UK (125MW), and 
Japan (60MW); the Canadian plants had been sold. 
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From 2016, the Canadian Solar manager stated, the slowly maturing 
Chinese project development market became of increasing interest. 
Early experience with Golden Sun projects saw the firm unable to 
connect some projects to the grid, faced by long subsidy payment 
delays, and unable to find buyers.320 In 2016 and early 2017, however, 
Canadian Solar was able to sell almost 100MW of recently completed 
China projects to Shenzhen Energy Group, a private buyer. At the end of 
2016, China became Canadian Solar’s equal biggest project market, 
along with the US, with 400MW under construction in each country. Half 
the projects in China were under the NEA’s Top Runner programme.  
 
Strikingly, Canadian Solar was the most parsimonious of the big Chinese 
firms in R&D spending (Table 55, Table 56). (The firm received no 
Chinese government subsidies to support R&D.) In a sub-sector where 
differentiation and higher margins were particularly difficult to achieve 
through manufacturing capabilities, Canadian Solar concentrated 
strategy on its dynamic capabilities for forward integration into solar 
farm development in international markets. The firm outperformed all 
Chinese peers in this respect. However, it could not, in the absence of 
domestic experience, match international competitors operating in their 
home markets.   
 
  
																																																								
320 S2, 15 October 2013. 
 
	 274	
Table 55. R&D expenditure of China’s four largest mid-stream 
photovoltaics companies, 2015. US$m. Rank by 2015 output in () 
brackets 
Trina (1) Jinko (2) Canadian 
Solar (3) 
JA Solar (4) 
34.1 22.2 17.1 23 
Sources: company reports 
 
Table 56. R&D expenditure of leading Chinese mid-stream 
photovoltaics companies as a share of revenues, 2007-2015. % 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Yingli 0.43 0.76 2.54 1.1 1.94 1.65 2.15 4.44 3.98 
Trina 0.93 0.37 0.64 1 2.15 2.04 1.12 0.97 1.12 
JA Solar 0.16 0.52 1.19 0.54 0.64 1.29 1.23 1.24 1.10 
Jinko 0.01 0.02 0.38 0.68 0.41 1.44 0.93 1.09 0.93 
Canadian 
Solar 0.33 0.26 0.5 0.46 1.04 1 0.71 0.41 0.49 
Sources: company reports 
 
 
5.7. Case Study: GCL Poly 
GCL Poly became the most successful firm in China’s solar industry 
without any photovoltaics experience. The firm used high-speed project 
management and construction techniques to rush through silicon 
feedstock capacity expansions while prices were high, building 
manufacturing capabilities as it did so. Elevated profit margins paid for 
the learning process, which was facilitated by IP acquired illegally from 
MOST’s silicon technology upgrading programme. GCL Poly achieved 
unprecedented scale of production, becoming the world’s largest silicon 
feedstock manufacturer. 
 
GCL was founded by Zhu Gongshan, a native of Yancheng city in Jiangsu 
province. A senior GCL manager explained that Zhu’s father was a 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officer and his first job was in county-
level government in Yancheng. Zhu later worked for a state firm in 
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Shanghai that supplied equipment to power stations. When private 
investment in utilities was permitted in the mid-1990s, Zhu organised an 
investment group for a small, high-efficiency co-generation plant – 
producing both electricity and steam for heating – near Suzhou. The 
project ran out of cash during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-8, until 
Zhu secured Poly (Hong Kong) Investments, a subsidiary of PLA arms 
trading company Poly Group, as a partner. Zhu and Poly (Hong Kong) 
Investments went on to develop 18 power plants. The key, the manager 
stressed, in a period of power shortages in the early 2000s, was to 
obtain approvals for and build the (typically 30MW) plants very fast. 
Working in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces, GCL became a master. The 
business was listed in Hong Kong in 2007; it was named GCL Poly 
because of the connection to the PLA company.321 
 
GCL interviewees told two different stories about Zhu Gongshan’s 
decision to move into the manufacture of silicon feedstock. One was 
that it was officials from the Jiangsu branch of the state grid who 
promoted the idea and co-invested in a private capacity, motivated in 
part by the Jiangsu government’s strategic commitment to make the 
province the centre of the Chinese photovoltaic industry.322 Another 
interviewee insisted it was other Jiangsu-based, mid-stream solar 
entrepreneurs who convinced Zhu to invest in silicon feedstock 
manufacturing, and that the early co-investors were other IPPs and two 																																																								
321 S13, 10 June 2010. Erroneously, it is widely believed that GCL Poly refers to ‘polysilicon’. The 
30MW co-generation power plants were built for around Rmb240m each; the electricity required a 
PPA with the provincial grid; the steam was sold privately to commercial users. The interviewee 
stated that managers from local grid companies were also brought in as minority investors to 
expedite the development process.  
322 S13, 10 June 2010. The interviewee said that managers from the Jiangsu grid invested in the silicon 
project until they were bought out in 2008. 
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downstream solar firms.323 Whatever the truth, interviewees concurred 
that GCL spent much of 2005 researching the silicon manufacturing 
business and in March 2006 Zhu incorporated Jiangsu Zhongneng as his 
investment vehicle. 
  
A technical specialist at GCL said that Zhu’s approach to the technology 
learning curve was to build a small, 1,500 tonne per annum production 
line first (costing around US$200m), and build it fast. With silicon 
feedstock prices rising, international suppliers like Germany’s Wacker 
Chemie and Hemlock in the US would add capacity; but it would take 
two to three years. The key was to get ahead of them. Zhu’s project 
team initially sourced the reactors in which crystalline silicon is grown on 
rods from MSA, a German firm, by identifying the Munich-based 
company as the supplier to Wacker.324 Equipment for the purification of 
trichlorosilane (TCS), which is pumped into the reactors, was sourced in 
China. The purification process was well below the quality standard 
multinationals achieved, but good enough for the contemporary solar 
industry.325  
 
In order to acquire chemical process experience, GCL recruited Gan Jufu, 
an engineer who had helped set up a new silicon feedstock production 
line at Leshan Xinguang Silicon in Sichuan province, one of the two state-
owned firms supported by MOST in 2004-6. Jiangsu Zhongneng was 
subsequently sued for intellectual property theft, but not before the 																																																								
323 S14, 16 October 2013. This interviewee said that two provincial IPPs and JA Solar and Solarfun 
were early equity investors. He said that Zhu also knew the founders of Canadian Solar, Trina, 
Suntech, and Yingli before entering the silicon business. 
324 S15, 6 August 2010. 
325 S16, 31 July 2010. 
	 277	
firm began to master the production process with the help of Gan, who 
was alleged in court to have brought 30 megabytes of technical 
information and blueprints with him. Gan was handed a five-year prison 
sentence in 2008. Jiangsu Zhongneng and GCL, assiduously defended by 
the Jiangsu provincial government, faced no sanctions. 326  
 
Jiangsu Zhongneng manufactured its first multi-crystalline silicon in 
September 2007 and began commercial production in October, just six 
months after Xinguang. A technical specialist at the firm said the unit 
cost was initially three times that of multinational competitors, at 
around US$85/kg. However, the spot price of solar silicon feedstock was 
US$380/kg.327 A second 1,500-tonne production line was already half-
built. 
 
Compared with other Chinese investors, noted another technical 
manager at GCL, Zhu Gongshan took an additional technological risk. He 
was the only investor to use hydrochlorination in the chemical process, 
an incremental, but significant modification of the 50-year-old Siemens 
process that was becoming popular with global chemicals companies.328 
Hydrochlorination cut out one energy-intensive, and hence expensive, 
																																																								
326 According to Chinese press reports, Gan Jufu was recruited to a shell company, Shanghai Sichuang 
Energy, not directly to Jiangsu Zhongneng. The most detailed press report was in Sichuan’s Leshan 
Daily, 23 March 2008. In 2007 and 2008, there was a series of high level meetings between the 
Sichuan and Jiangsu provincial governments concerning the case; the meetings were reported in the 
F-1 filing for a NYSE listing of Jiangsu Zhongneng, submitted to the SEC 18 July 2008, that was 
abandoned during the global financial crisis. An interviewee at GCL would only say of the case: ‘Now 
we do everything ourselves.’ S18, 16 October 2013. 
327 S15, 6 August 2010. 
328 An interviewee closely involved with hydrochlorination at GCL explained that while the 
modification was relatively new, the hydrochlorination process itself was long established and ‘largely 
not patent protected’. GCL hired specialist personnel from Chinese universities to support its core 
project team in implementing the hydrochlorination. S17, 16 August 2010. 
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step in the traditional manufacturing process; it could save as much as 
US$7/kg in production cost.329 The downside was that hydrochlorination 
had a smaller global base of experience; it required greater pressure, 
and therefore increased safety risks and monitoring requirements. Zhu 
Gongshan’s team implemented hydrochlorination successfully. With the 
core, contemporary chemical process mastered – albeit at a high unit 
cost – in late 2007 Jiangsu Zhongneng began to construct a third, much 
larger 15,000-tonne per annum line. It underwent test production in 
December 2008.  
 
A consultant to several Chinese silicon feedstock producers stated that 
operational experience was the key competitive advantage in terms of 
manufacturing capabilities. Jiangsu Zhongneng, which was absorbed into 
the listed GCL business in June 2009, began to build operational 
experience before its Chinese competitors. The firm also acquired 
deeper experience because, unlike firms like LDK and Yingli, it did not 
outsource plant construction (LDK to US EPC contractor Fluor, Yingli to 
South Korean contractors). GCL used its power station project team to 
design, procure and construct its production lines, sometimes sourcing 
imported equipment and sometimes Chinese equipment. It was only in 
2009, after GCL conquered the basic production process and brought 
production costs down to US$45/kg that it built a substantial team of 
foreign consultants in order to incrementally improve rather than 
establish its production.330 
 																																																								
329 S6, 26 September 2013. 
330 S6, 26 September 2013. A GCL executive said that in 2008-9 the firm used headhunters in the US to 
find key consultants/foreign employees as well as hiring specialist from equipment suppliers. S18, 16 
October 2013. 
	 279	
In 2009, GCL hired Russ Hamilton, formerly a senior executive at 
Norway’s Renewable Energy Corporation (REC), as Chief Technical 
Officer, and around 20 other foreign technical specialists. GCL 
interviewees described how this team contracted with equipment maker 
GT Solar in the US for a programme to improve GCL’s hydrochlorination 
performance, and purchased larger reactors for further expansion, as 
well as the first imported trichlorosilane (TCS) purification equipment 
used by GCL, from the US firm.331 The quality of GCL’s silicon feedstock 
output improved and production costs fell below levels achieved by 
other Chinese firms. A major vote of confidence and support came in 
December 2009 when China Investment Corp., the country’s sovereign 
wealth fund, bought 20 percent of GCL for US$710m. By the end of 
2010, the firm stated that its cost of production was US$28/kg, 
compared with US$25/kg at cost leaders Wacker and Hemlock. GCL 
produced 16,000 tonnes of silicon feedstock in 2010, more than half the 
total output in China.332 
 
By mid-2012, GCL increased manufacturing capacity to 65,000 tonnes. 
As in other manufacturing businesses in China, as GCL added capacity 
the capital cost of that capacity declined rapidly. Where a silicon 
feedstock production line required almost US$100/kg when GCL first 
invested in 2006, the price was US$45/kg by 2012.333 Nonetheless, 
plummeting silicon prices in 2012 saw GCL post a substantial loss as the 
firm’s capacity to cut production costs failed to keep pace with spot 
prices in a market awash with overcapacity (Table 57). In 2013-14 GCL 																																																								
331 S16, 31 July 2010; S17, 16 August 2010; S19, 6 August 2010; S20, 27 July 2010. 
332 GCL Poly quarterly reports, Q3, Q4 2010; S17, 16 August 2010. 
333 S6, 26 September 2013. 
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also failed to scale up low-cost production using a much newer chemical 
process, fluidised bed reactor (FBR) technology.334  
 
GCL entered a period of consolidation, during which costs using the 
traditional Siemens process, with hydrochlorination, were driven down 
to US$12/kg by 2016. In 2016, GCL paid US$150m to acquire assets of 
former US manufacturer MEMC, including a new South Korean FBR joint 
venture with Samsung, as well as related MEMC patents.335 By the end 
of 2016, the firm’s silicon production capacity was 70,000 tonnes per 
annum. 
 
Table 57. Quarterly solar grade silicon feedstock prices, Q1 2011 to Q4 
2013. US$/kg 
Q1 
2011 
Q2 
2011 
Q3 
2011 
Q4 
2011 
Q1 
2012 
Q2 
2012 
Q3 
2012 
Q4 
2012 
Q1 
2013 
Q2 
2013 
Q3 
2013 
Q4 
2013 
70 63 52 37 31 26 22 17 18 17 18 18 
Source: Yonts (2013)  
 
Forward integration 
From 2010, GCL began to manufacture silicon wafers and quickly moved 
to processing almost all its silicon feedstock into wafers. In 2016, wafer 
output reached 17.3GW, with only 9,950 of 69,000 tonnes of silicon 
production sold to third parties. From 2014, GCL also moved 
opportunistically into cell and module production, taking a minority 
interest in and expanding production at in-default Chaori Solar, renamed 																																																								
334 S21, 25 September 2014, and company reports. GCL promised to bring 20,000 tonnes of FBR 
production on line by the end of 2014 with capital cost of US$13/kg and production cost around 
US$10/kg.  
335 MEMC changed its name to SunEdison in 2013; SunEdison filed for bankruptcy protection in April 
2016. 
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GCL System Integration Technology (GCLSIT). In 2016, GCLSIT had annual 
module production capacity of 4GW.336 
 
A senior manager described how, like downstream photovoltaics 
manufacturers, GCL responded to falling cell and module prices from 
2009 by investing in project development. Prior to the investment in 
GCLSIT in 2014, GCL’s strategy was to work at the extreme ends of the 
value chain: as a producer of silicon feedstock and wafers, and as a 
project developer. In 2010, before China had developed a significant 
domestic market, GCL opened a US project development office in San 
Francisco and entered a 50:50 joint venture with diversified US 
developer NRG Energy.337 However, GCL struggled to build a portfolio of 
profitable investments, either directly or through the joint venture. In 
2012, the firm sold out 140MW of US projects it so far developed. Like 
most Chinese firms, GCL failed to leap directly into international project 
development without domestic experience. 
 
From late 2013, GCL refocused on the expanding domestic market. A 
small, loss-making Hong Kong-listed firm, acquired through a reverse 
takeover, became the vehicle for mainland project development. GCL 
New Energy (GCLNE) was 62 percent controlled by GCL Poly. By the first 
quarter of 2015, GCLNE developed or purchased 772MW of projects in 
China. By early 2016, this had expanded to 2.7GW, and by late 2016 
3.5GW. GCLNE became the second biggest Chinese solar developer. The 
business was an early winner of Top Runner tenders. Nonetheless, it 																																																								
336 Chaori Solar was the first Chinese company since 1949 to default on a domestic bond, in March 
2014. GCLSIT is controlled by private interests of Zhu Gongshan’s family, which hold more than 50 
percent of the equity; the firm is listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange. GCL Poly annual report 2016.  
337 S13, 10 June 2010. The joint venture was named Sunora Energy Solutions. 
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remained unclear how successful a business GCLNE was. The firm had 
not sold projects and so margins were unclear. GCLNE targeted 1-1.5GW 
of project sales in 2017. Prior to 2017, the firm’s financial statements 
were those of a highly-indebted business with negative or negligible 
returns (Table 58). 
 
Table 58. GCL New Energy return on assets and debt-equity ratio,  
2014-16. % 
 2014 2015 2016 
Return on assets -1.14 -0.10 0.40 
Net debt/equity 0.68 3.35 3.72 
Sources: company financial statements 
 
The core GCL business, however, had established itself as both world-
scale and comparable to leading multinationals in its profit margins. As 
noted, GCL was the world’s largest silicon feedstock manufacturer from 
2012, a position it retained (Table 59). GCL’s profit margins bounced 
around as the firm grew fast, and temporarily collapsed in 2012-13. But 
overall, GCL’s margins were comparable to those of the number two 
global producer, and the only multinational chemicals firm to publish 
financial results reflecting the performance of a silicon feedstock 
business, Germany’s Wacker (Table 60).338  
 
  
																																																								
338 OCI is a much more diversified business than Wacker, while Hemlock Semiconductor Group 
comprises several joint ventures between Dow Chemical Company, Corning Inc. and Shin-Etsu 
Handotai that do not disclose detailed financial information by product. 
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Table 59. Top four global silicon feedstock producers, 2015. 
Company Country of origin Output (tonnes) 
GCL China 73,000 
Wacker Germany 51,000 
OCI South Korea 44,000 
Hemlock United States 26,000 
Source: IHS Insight 
 
Table 60. GCL and Wacker gross, operating and net margins, 2008-
2015. % 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
GCL gross margin 72.55 30.15 36.87 33.19 7.83 11.91 23.12 26.54 
GCL operating margin 70.13 22.95 29.97 28.71 1.53 7.65 18.47 22.1 
GCL net margin 3.56 -4.04 21.78 16.76 -15.73 -2.6 5.25 11.14 
Wacker gross margin 27.6 22.7 28.4 23.7 17.7 14.8 17.5 21.3 
Wacker operating 
margin 27.64 22.68 28.35 23.68 17.68 14.81 17.49 21.32 
Wacker net margin 10.22 -2 10.33 7.18 2.43 0.06 4.22 4.66 
Sources: company financial statements. 
 
The risk to GCL was that without stronger dynamic capabilities its 
strategy was too easy to replicate. This is what appeared to be 
happening in 2014-16 as a Xi’an-based firm, Longi Green Energy (Longi), 
challenged GCL. Longi massively scaled up the extrusion process that 
creates monocrystalline ingots from silicon feedstock (as opposed to the 
casting process that creates multi-crystalline ingots). This reduced the 
traditional price differential between mono-crystalline wafers with 
higher solar conversion rates and multi-crystalline wafers. In 2016, Longi 
extruded enough mono-crystalline silicon to make 6.4GW of wafers. The 
firm targeted 12GW of capacity by the end of 2017 and 19GW (on par 
with GCL’s multi-crystalline wafer capacity in 2017) in 2019.339  																																																								
339 See https://www.pv-magazine.com/2016/01/29/china-longi-invests-456m-in-3-gw-mono-silicon-
fab-in-ningxia_100022997/ and http://celltech.solarenergyevents.com/2017/04/01/longi-is-the-
fastest-growing-pv-manufacturer-in-the-industry/ Longi accounted for an estimated 42 percent of 
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Like GCL, Longi made opportunistic acquisitions of cell and module 
manufacturing capacity. The global market share of mono-crystalline 
modules increased to 29 percent in 2017.340 Longi’s success was based 
on scale, speed of capacity addition, and cost reduction in 
manufacturing – the GCL formula. GCL’s capacity to defend against 
Longi, however, will depend on its success in adding capabilities in 
forward integration and services. Manufacturing capabilities alone 
provided only fleeting advantage. 
 
5.8. Discussion 
With respect to the analytical framework of this thesis, the photovoltaic 
sub-sector presents a scenario in which the developmental state initially 
determined not to support the building of manufacturing capabilities. 
The developmental state denied demand-side support in the form of a 
subsidised domestic market. However, local governments, a semi-
reformed banking system, and a MOST bureaucracy that was not aligned 
with NDRC objectives, provided considerable supply-side support. In this 
context, an Open National Innovation System (Fu, 2015a, Fu and Zhang, 
2011, Lema and Lema, 2012) allowed private firms, sometimes led by 
returnee technical specialists, to develop considerable scale in the sub-
sector based on export demand.  
 
MOST’s role in unblocking the key technological bottleneck to global 
cost leadership in photovoltaics emphasised the continuing importance 																																																																																																																																																														
global mono-crystalline wafer production in 2016. When GCL bought FBR assets from bankrupt 
SunEdison in 2016, Longi acquired its Malaysian mono wafer cutting operation. Accessed 7 June 2017. 
340 IHS Markit data. 
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of the developmental state in the acquisition of manufacturing 
capabilities. The learning of contemporary global silicon feedstock 
production technology was an archetypal state-led S&T and R&D 
exercise and essential to the development of a complete chain of 
manufacturing capabilities. However, whereas implementation of new 
silicon feedstock production techniques was planned to be implemented 
via state production units, in practice it was a private firm that achieved 
competitive leadership. 
 
GCL proved not only ruthless in obtaining state-developed 
manufacturing IP, but also unbeatable in the economies of speed it 
brought to bear in scaling up silicon feedstock production. The case 
study highlighted that economies of speed in capacity construction are a 
powerful complement to the developmental state’s orchestration of 
manufacturing capabilities. If private firms are better able to deliver 
those economies, then where speed to the commissioning of production 
is an important variable they have a clear advantage over state firms. 
 
With the full range of manufacturing capabilities in place through the 
value chain, the photovoltaics sub-sector experienced similar, large 
reductions in unit costs that occurred in the thermal and wind sub-
sectors. However, despite the developmental state’s replication of the 
same conditions for a transition to competition through entrepreneurial 
dynamic capabilities that existed in the wind sub-sector – openness to 
firms of all ownership types, devolution of technology bargaining to the 
firm level, and an environment regulated by laws not fiat – strategically 
dominant firms did not quickly emerge. Once the benefits of GCL’s 
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economies of speed in plant construction were exhausted, its efforts at 
forward integration and the building of high-margin service businesses 
were no more successful than those of other Chinese firms. 
 
From the perspective of industrial organisation theory, the failure of 
firms defined by advanced dynamic capabilities to emerge in the 
photovoltaics sub-sector could be attributed to lower barriers to entry 
(Porter, 1998 (1980)) versus the wind sub-sector. However, the case 
studies suggested a different interpretation. In the photovoltaics sub-
sector, the transition to a competitive environment defined by dynamic 
capabilities among mid- and down-stream firms appeared to be delayed 
by three factors relating to the status of the domestic market.  
 
The first was the absence of a significant domestic solar market prior to 
the establishment of a feed-in tariff in 2011. Consistent with Linder’s 
(1961) ‘home market hypothesis’, Chinese firms in the photovoltaics 
sub-sector struggled to integrate forwards into solar farm development 
in foreign countries without prior domestic experience. Although 
Canadian Solar made more progress than other Chinese-led firms, it 
could not keep pace with domestic north American firms. The second 
factor was that Chinese industrial planners failed to centralise the 
approval of utility-scale solar farms in the manner they did with wind 
farms, allowing local governments to approve project winners for 
reasons of local protectionism rather than price and quality. The third 
factor was that the retail market for Distributed Generation solar power 
in China was too immature to allow the best firms to differentiate 
themselves by quickly building substantial, high-margin DG businesses in 
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the manner that occurred in developed countries. Each of these factors 
meant that firms with superior strategic capabilities were unable to 
differentiate themselves and dominate the sub-sector. 
 
In the photovoltaics sub-sector, the developmental state has not yet 
created conditions for a transition to competition in which capabilities 
beyond manufacturing skills are paramount. However, the situation is 
changing. The creation of a substantial domestic solar market, moves to 
centralise control of utility-scale projects, and the gradual development 
of conditions for a large-scale DG market, mean that dynamic 
capabilities in adjusting to these opportunities are more likely to define 
a small number of dominant businesses going forward. At the same 
time, the experience in the photovoltaics sector indicates that the 
developmental state should carefully analyse how end-user markets will 
evolve when framing industrial policy. Domestic markets must reward 
firms with dynamic vertical scope and the strongest strategic capabilities 
as part of the transition that produces world-class firms. 
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Chapter 6 
Findings, limitations and scope for further research 
 
An overarching conclusion from the empirics of this thesis is that, in the 
transition from a first stage of development based on the pursuit of 
narrow manufacturing capabilities to a second stage requiring incipient 
dynamic capabilities in China’s electricity-generating equipment sector, 
an advantage for developmental-state capabilities gradually gave way to 
an advantage for entrepreneurial capabilities within the firm. However, 
the adjustment was messy and difficult for the state -- as the key setter 
of institutional arrangements -- to manage.  
 
State policy had to adjust in the electricity-generating equipment sector, 
decentralising economic power to entrepreneurs who competed not just 
in terms of narrow manufacturing capabilities that state industrial policy 
nurtured, but in terms of strategy -- including strategic flexibility, 
marketing, and services. These were dimensions in which NDRC and NEA 
planners were unable to dictate reliable choices from the top, down. 
 As Doner and Ramsay observed in a longitudinal study of Thai industry: 
‘institutions favourable for one stage of economic growth are less 
suitable for a subsequent stage’; the authors referred to the transitional 
challenge of ‘growing into trouble’ (2004:97).  
 
In China, the policies that produced the earliest learning results in the 
thermal sub-sector grew into trouble as the absence of entrepreneurial, 
disruptive, private-sector competition constrained the competitive 
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challenge to multinationals.341 Change was difficult in part because 
history and path dependencies were powerful, in part because changing 
policy created new problems. In the thermal sub-sector, path 
dependency and institutional stasis took hold; traditional activity silos 
were maintained in the value chain and there was no opening to private 
firms. In the wind and photovoltaics sub-sectors, when private and 
hybrid firms were allowed to compete, some hybrid, state-private firms 
found new avenues to abuse state subsidy. In the wind sub-sector, 
Sinovel combined majority private ownership with an apparent inside 
track at the NDRC, access to state manufacturing assets, and access to 
financing channels normally associated with state projects, creating a 
new imbalance between potential private sector gain and state sector 
risk. Similar tendencies were apparent in the solar sector at LDK and 
Yingli.   
 
Nor did the state’s moves in the wind and solar sectors to use laws and 
regulations, rather than fiat, to establish the competitive playing field 
produce a smooth transition to decentralised markets. Part of the 
difficulty was a partially-reformed financial system where banks did not 
extend and price credit in a disinterested fashion even if, as Lardy (2014) 
demonstrated, the aggregate trend was slowly in that direction. In the 
solar sector, a semi-reformed financial system saw foreign private equity 
																																																								
341 At the macro-economic level, the most successful long-run development stories appear to have 
have been ones that involved successful transitions, including the transition away from state-led 
infant-industry policy towards greater reliance on decentralised markets and freer, regulated, 
competition. At least this is the conclusion of empirical studies of slowdown and economic shocks in 
the post-Second World War European economy (Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000, Van Ark et al., 2008, 
Eichengreen, 2008, Krugman, 1994, Hayashi and Prescott, 2002, Aiyar et al., 2013). Too monolithic a 
stress on state-led learning (Amsden, 1989, Chang, 1994), as noted in Chapter 1, missed half the 
longitudinal story of successful development. 
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investors step in with bridging finance for offshore IPOs. State 
commercial banks, taking the IPOs as a signal of firms’ commercial 
viability, then lent recklessly – and outside the NDRC’s industrial policy 
agenda -- to photovoltaics businesses. When the sector faced crisis, 
central government had little choice but to bail out an industry it had 
not targeted for support.  
 
Problems of an only partially market-driven financial system were 
compounded in China by a unique degree of political and fiscal 
decentralisation. Local governments pursued local industrial policies that 
conflicted with national industrial policy. In both the wind and solar 
sectors, the NDRC and the NEA recentralised control over project 
approvals in order to ensure fair competition and keep the objective of 
developing large, concentrated, globally competitive firms on track. 
 
The one unchanging requirement for the state during the transition in 
the state-firm relationship in China’s power equipment industry was the 
need for provision of state-funded R&D support. Indeed, as Amsden and 
Chu (2003) observed in Taiwan, the state’s R&D and S&T support role 
became more important over time. In China, the budgets of 
programmes including 863 and 973, mediated by MOST, increased 
ahead of inflation across the longitudinal research period. Central 
government provided additional grants to support the opening of 
nationally-certified laboratories at favoured large firms. There was 
criticism that the Chinese education system was a drag on innovation 
(Abrami et al., 2014). However, studies of firm-level R&D revealed that 
companies continued to make solid technological progress (OECD, 
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2017). In 2015, China’s public and private R&D expenditure as a share of 
GDP reached 2.1 percent, compared with 4.2 percent in South Korea, 3.3 
percent in Japan, and an OECD average of 2.4 percent (Figure 8).342 
 
Figure 8. R&D expenditure (public and private) as a percentage of GDP. 
China, South Korea, Japan, 1996-2015 
 
Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
 
In sum, the transition from state-led to decentralised capability building 
was not one that typically involved straightforward trade-offs. Instead it 
was a matter of complex processes with multiple strands, of failed 
experiments and tipping points rather than smooth segues, and of 
powerful path dependencies that challenged government capacity to 
manage the shift away from state-led development, even when a clear 
																																																								
342 See http://www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm Accessed 26 June 2017. 
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commitment to this cause was present.343 Infant-industry policies 
worked their magic in China, but they also brought a host of problems 
when the time came to transition to more entrepreneur-led 
development. 
 
Despite the noise and confusion, the case studies in this thesis did point 
to a number of empirical regularities in transitions from developmental 
state-led to entrepreneurial firm-led economic catch-up. These findings 
result from addressing the three research questions set out at the start 
of this dissertation: 1. What have been the common success strategies of 
firms transitioning from learning laggards to being globally competitive? 
2. What have been the most successful developmental state policies that 
have facilitated this transition? 3. How have the most successful firm 
strategies and most successful developmental state policies evolved over 
time? 
 
In particular, five empirical regularities are highlighted in conclusion. The 
first two lend support to the analytical framework employed in this 
thesis. The next two highlight transitional themes from the case studies 																																																								
343 The nature of the Chinese government’s reform policy under the Xi Jinping administration was a 
subject of intense controversy at the time of writing, particularly with respect to ownership reform. 
The reform programme set out by Xi at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, and refined at the 
subsequent Central Committee Third Plenum, promised the transformation of state enterprises into 
state-private enterprises, through investments from three sources: foreign investors, private Chinese 
firms, and employees. Competition was to be increased in oligopoly sectors including energy, 
telecommunications, and certain basic materials. Xi further asserted that China’s ‘managing 
government’ would become a more arm’s length ‘service government’. However, the implications of 
these announcements became ambiguous as Xi and premier Li Keqiang subsequently made speeches 
emphasising the need to strengthen large state enterprises, without referencing ownership reforms. 
Other pronouncements by senior leaders followed this lead. In June 2017, for instance, Xiao Yaqing, 
Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), wrote that 
China must ‘firmly oppose’ both ‘privatisation’ and ‘de-nationalisation’. See Xiao Yaqing, ‘Deepen 
reform of SOE state assets: make strong and excellent enterprises of a major power’ (Shenhua guoqi 
guozi gaige: zuoqiang zuo you daguo you qiye), Study Times (Xuexi Shibao), 16 June 2017. Available in 
Chinese at: http://www.studytimes.cn/zydx/GCFT/2017-06-16/9723.html Accessed 15 June 2017. 
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that point to areas for further research. The fifth offers new evidence 
about a frequently remarked challenge under infant industry policy. 
Each of the empirical regularities has implications for developmental 
state policymaking, which are explored. 
 
6.1. The nurturing of manufacturing capabilities 
The first set of empirical regularities concerns the acquisition of 
manufacturing capabilities in the early, developmental state-led period 
in each industry sub-sector. Three important related points are 
highlighted as follows: 
 
The most successful case study firms absorbed requisite technological 
capabilities for catch-up through a conservative, step-by-step learning 
approach. Attempts to make technological leaps failed. Firms competed 
for a long time through manufacturing scale and cost. 
 
In the thermal sub-sector, step-by-step learning accelerated over three 
decades from a very slow to a very quick pace, peaking under huge 
production volumes in 2003-6, when super-critical and USC technology 
were mastered (Chapter 3:153pp). What was striking was the 
acceleration in the pace of learning once early learning steps had been 
completed. However, it was not possible to omit steps. The one learning 
failure occurred with Shanghai’s 1992 Shidongkou super-critical project, 
after the firm attempted – at the behest of government planners – to 
make a technological leap into what was then an immature technology.  
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In the wind sub-sector, Goldwind demonstrated the merits of small, fast 
learning steps. When subsidies mushroomed, the firm did not rush to 
make bigger, more complex turbines, despite the pressure from NDRC 
technology metrics to do so. Goldwind learned steadily. The risk the firm 
took was with DDPM technology, however the technology was proven, 
and had undergone commercialisation at firms including Enercon and 
Vensys. DDPM technology required modification and scaling to larger 
turbine sizes, challenges that Goldwind was equipped for.  
 
Envision’s conclusions about how to develop manufacturing capabilities 
were strikingly similar to Goldwind’s. The firm entered the market with a 
1.5MW turbine when competitors were already producing larger ones, 
and only gradually scaled up production as it mastered lean 
manufacturing, lean logistics, and system integrator techniques.  
 
In photovoltaics, GCL began with first one, and then a second, small, 
modified-Siemens-process crystalline silicon feedstock production line. 
The firm took on manageable technological challenges, but built new 
capacity extraordinarily fast. GCL was the first company in China to 
introduce hydrochlorination, however the technology was 
internationally well-established, and most IP was out of patent 
protection. Only after building core manufacturing capabilities and 
scaling up to much larger production lines did GCL hire foreign 
technicians to take the learning process further forward. Small, quick, 
incremental learning steps defined GCL’s progress. 
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The leaps in the renewables sector were all failures. Mingyang, in the 
wind sub-sector, licensed technology for Super Compact Drive turbines 
for which there was not yet a prototype; this attempt to jump through 
the technological frontier was a failure. In photovoltaics, China’s most 
technically gifted solar scientist-entrepreneur, Shi Zhengrong, came 
unstuck making large investments in unproven technologies for built-in 
photovoltaics (BIPV) and thin-film photovoltaics. GCL attempted to 
overtake global competition with a leap into FBR technology, albeit after 
the firm established a strong commercial position with mainstream 
technology. The leap was a failure, but by this time GCL had sufficient 
cashflows to persist in trying to commericalise large-scale FBR 
production; to this end it acquired facilities and IP from MEMC. 
 
Yingli and LDK failed to recognise the need to learn, step-by-step, while 
making technological progress. The firms engaged foreign project 
management and EPC contractors to build turnkey silicon feedstock 
plants. They garnered far less technological understanding of the 
production process than GCL. Moreover, the foreign-managed turnkey 
plants were slower to complete than GCL’s production lines, and Yingli 
and LDK were unable to take advantage of the spike in silicon feedstock 
prices to fund their learning processes. Yingli and LDK never recovered 
from this setback; when they did begin silicon production, their levels of 
operational experience and tacit knowledge were far behind GCL. The 
different firm-level approaches to learning are stylised in Figure 1.  
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Figure 9. Manufacturing capabilities: small steps and mature 
technology, versus leaps with unproven technology and the use of 
turnkey plants 
Sub-sector Small, incremental steps with 
mature technologies 
Attempts to leap with uproven 
technologies and reliance on 
turnkey plants 
Thermal Shanghai, Harbin, Dongfang 
Westinghouse sub-critical; 
Japanese super-critical; 
Japanese / Siemens USC 
Shanghai Shidongkou super-
critical with unproven ABB 
technology* 
Wind Goldwind Repower geared 
turbines, Goldwind Vensys 
DDPM 
Envision geared turbines 
Mingyang Aerodyn Super 
Compact Drive* 
Photovoltaics GCL crystalline silicon 
feedstock, Siemens process 
with hydrochlorination 
Suntech BIPV and thin-film* 
GCL Fluidised Bed Reactor 
(FBR)*  
Yingli crystalline silicon 
feedstock, Siemens process ** 
LDK crystalline silicon 
feedstock, Siemens process ** 
* Unproven, non-commercialised technology 
** Turnkey project 
 
The learning experiences at the firm level were reflected in 
complementary empirical regularities in terms of the most successful 
developmental state policies that promoted acquisition of 
manufacturing capabilities. These are summarised as three key points. 
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The most successful developmental state policies: focused on 
conservative, incremental learning steps within the technological 
frontier; coordinated vertical learning structures at the firm level; and, in 
the context of low excludability of imported IP, accelerated the diffusion 
of manufacturing capabilities by ensuring high levels of competition. 
 
Overall, Chinese industrial policy closely respected the step-by-step 
nature of technological learning within the firm. Policy planners set out 
road maps for different electricity-generating equipment sub-sectors, 
and selected targets within the technological frontier. The technological 
conservatism of Chinese planners was apparent in the early 1980s with 
the decision to license mature, established technology in the thermal 
sub-sector. In the cases of Harbin and Dongfang central government, 
and in the case of Shanghai local government, worked closely with firms 
to support vertical learning structures so that the state units acquired a 
complete range of manufacturing capabilities for turbine-generator sets 
and boilers. The most closely attentive, and successful, agency of 
technological development was Shanghai’s local developmental state, 
consistent with Thun’s (2006) findings in the automotive sector. 
 
A risk-minimising approach to technology acquisition was still clearer in 
the renewables sector in the early 2000s with the decision to back the 
wind sub-sector but not the solar sub-sector. The unit price of wind 
power was lower; the risk of technological disruption was minimal; and 
international experience showed that domestic firms enjoyed natural 
advantages over international competitors.  
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Within the wind sub-sector, the state studiously facilitated Goldwind’s 
step-by-step learning throughout the value chain. Goldwind learned 
‘before doing’ (Pisano, 1996) for a decade as a state research unit and 
operator of wind farms when Chinese manufacturing capabilities were 
low. The provincial branch of MOST then provided grants to allow 
Goldwind to integrate backwards into turbine assembly and to support 
component localisation. As manufacturing capabilities increased, the 
NDRC/NEA were attentive to the need to keep technological standards 
rising. In 2011, the agencies recentralised wind farm project approvals to 
prevent local governments from favouring technologically-backward 
local wind turbine manufacturers.  
 
In the photovoltaics sector, which had not been supported by national 
industrial policy, MOST stepped in pragmatically to fill out the sub-sector 
learning chain. MOST organised and funded a programme to import 
mature technology for silicon feedstock that was essential to reduce the 
private sector’s dependency on imported inputs. Similar to the wind 
sub-sector, the NDRC/NEA subsequently intervened to keep technical 
standards steadily rising by introducing the Top Runner programme 
from 2015.  
 
The one occasion in the thesis empirics where China’s planners 
attempted a technological leap was the Shidongkou super-critical plant 
in 1992, at a time when the technology was not yet mature. The 
experience was a chastening one, and the pace of thermal technology 
acquisition slowed beyond what might have been possible with smaller 
learning steps. However, in the wake of Shidongkou’s failure the 
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developmental state redoubled its research and testing work, identified 
Japanese technology that had been proven by 2002, and put the super-
critical programme on a sound footing. 
 
In addition to a successful, conservative approach to technology 
acquisition, the developmental state enforced the non-excludability of 
imported manufacturing technology in the earliest phase of capability 
building in the thermal sub-sector. This approach recognised that 
competition through technological differentiation would not occur for 
many years and instead focused the big three firms on absorbing 
Westinghouse IP that was made available to each of them. When 
technological differentiation did begin to occur in the 2000s, the NDRC 
and NEA paid close attention to structuring demand for electricity such 
that it rewarded the most technologically advanced manufacturers. 
Electricity from super-critical and USC plants was given higher tariffs and 
priority dispatch (Chapter 3:section 3.4.). 
 
In the middle reaches of capability building, the state remained 
ambivalent about IP protection. Not only was GCL not meaningfully 
sanctioned for IP theft in 2006-7, the state endorsed the photovoltaics 
leader with a major equity investment in 2009. In an environment of 
still-weak intellectual property (IP) protection, the diffusion of 
renewables manufacturing capabilities was rapid. The experience was 
consistent with global IP rights history (Peng et al., 2017), and with 
experience in other East Asian FDCs (Chapter 1). 
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The strengthening of China’s IP regime was very gradual, and from a low 
base (Yang, 2003, Chu et al., 2014).344 Only in the 2010s did the 
NDRC/NEA become concerned by the persistence of cost-based, rather 
than technology differentiation-based, competition, which encouraged 
tightening of the IP regime, and greater enforcement (Huang, 2017, Guo, 
2016, Chan and Chao, 2017). In addition, China’s 12th five-year plan 
(2011-15) prioritised ‘indigenous innovation’. With respect to case study 
firms, by the end of the research period Goldwind and Envision required 
IP protection for proprietary technology they developed in DDPM 
turbines and software respectively, while GCL expended large sums 
acquiring patents for FBR technology that the firm would wish to protect 
within China. The case to enforce greater excludability of IP to support 
the best firms was increasing and the Chinese government reacted in a 
pragmatic fashion. 
 
6.2. Competitive limits of manufacturing capabilities and the transition 
to competition through dynamic capabilities 
Beyond the first stage of cost-based competition in each of the case 
study sub-sectors, the competitive dynamic changed because 
manufacturing capabilities alone provided only limited competitive 
advantage. For the best firms, aspiring to global competitiveness, there 
commenced a second stage of competition through dynamic 
capabilities, associated with forward integration. Second-stage 																																																								
344 Technology exports from China took off from the mid-1990s. The majority were exported to other 
developing countries, which was one incentive for the state to increase IP protection, including 
through patents and trademarks. Within China, foreign applicants for invention patents consistently 
exceeded domestic applicants from the 1980s; however, the gap began to narrow from 1995 (Yang, 
2005). As a benchmark of China’s strengthening IP regime from the mid-1990s, the Ginarte-Park index 
of patent rights, measured on a 0-5 scale, increased from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005 (Chu et al., 
2013). For an industry-level empirical review of the shift to a stronger IP regime, see Li (2010). 
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competition was less pronounced in the thermal sub-sector, where the 
entry of new competitors was prohibited; it was clearly present in the 
wind sub-sector, and incipient in the photovoltaics sub-sector, where 
the state placed no limits on market entry. The case studies gave rise to 
a second related group of empirical regularities that are summarised as 
follows: 
 
Manufacturing capabilities alone provided insufficient advantage for 
sustained competitive leadership. In a second stage of competition, the 
most successful firms were characterised by dynamic capabilities, which 
included asset-light systems integration capabilities and product-
complementing services. In contrast to the acquisition of manufacturing 
capabilities, the development of dynamic capabilites rewarded 
entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
 
In the thermal sub-sector, the big three firms were protected by the 
state’s prohibition of private sector investment. In these conditions, the 
firms did not aggressively challenge a traditional sub-division of forward 
segments of the value chain into design work undertaken by state design 
institutes and power plant construction work undertaken by state 
construction firms. This probably explained much of their 
underperformance, in terms of profit margins, relative to multinational 
leaders Siemens and GE, which reported large, high-margin servitisation 
revenues.  
 
Among wind sub-sector case study companies, dynamic capabilities in 
forward parts of the value chain clearly defined the most successful 
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firms. Goldwind made bold, entrepreneurial, early strategic moves into 
asset-light systems integration and wind farm development, contrasting 
with its steady, cumulative approach to harnessing manufacturing 
capabilities. With respect to outsourcing strategy, Goldwind’s headcount 
relative to manufacturing output was markedly lower than that of global 
wind industry leader Vestas. The firm’s wind farm development and 
servitisation strategy was also aggressive. In the low-demand year of 
2012, for example, Goldwind lost money on manufacturing but earned 
overall profits because of its forward integration activities (Chapter 
4:Table 8).  
 
Envision made even more aggressive and entrepreneurial strategic bets 
than Goldwind on forward parts of the value chain. The firm pursued an 
asset-light systems-integrator model from the outset, integrating pools 
of design talent in Denmark and the United States with China-based 
resources. Envision in turn treated manufacturing as a means to the end 
of value-added software and wind farm management. The company 
appeared to reap rewards for these risks, although the impact on its 
bottom line could not reviewed in audited accounts. 
 
Dynamic, forward-focused capabilities set Goldwind and Envision apart 
from Mingyang, which remained narrowly focused on manufacturing 
capabilities. Vain hopes that Aerodyn would deliver a manufacturing 
technology edge left Mingyang as a perennial low-margin producer 
(Chapter 5:Table 11). 
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In the photovoltaics sub-sector, acute competition in middle and 
downstream manufacturing segments created great pressure for firms 
to gain competitive advantage through strategic choices. However, 
opportunities in the domestic market to hone dynamic capabilities were 
constrained by institutional obstacles and solar market immaturity. 
Competitive differentiation was possible in more mature foreign solar 
markets, but firms struggled to integrate forwards overseas without 
prior domestic experience. Suntech’s path-setting strategy to develop 
proprietary solar projects in Europe ended in failure (Chapter 5:section 
5.5). GCL also failed in its bid to launch a solar farm development 
subsidiary in the US. Canadian Solar, by contrast, succeeded with a 
strategy, launched only two years later than Suntech, to enter overseas 
solar farm development. Canadian Solar’s success was almost certainly 
connected to its founder’s long experience of living and working in 
Canada. The firm’s forward strategic focus was accompanied by the 
smallest share of revenues invested in manufacturing R&D of any of the 
large photovoltaics firms (Chapter 5:Table 17). Canadian Solar did not 
seek a competitive edge through manufacturing differentiation, but by 
controlling the channel to end-users for a large part of its manufacturing 
output. 
 
In the mid-stream of the photovoltaics sub-sector, the most successful 
firms in recent years all moved to outsource low value-added module 
assembly. Systems integration across more sections of the value chain 
may follow, particularly as government measures to centralise control of 
solar farm development reward China’s most capital-efficient firms. 
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The case studies showed that the developmental state was the agency 
that created transition conditions for the growth of firms defined by 
dynamic capabilities. Where the developmental state was most 
effective, its policies were characterised by the following empirical 
regularity: 
 
After the development and diffusion of basic catch-up manufacturing 
capabilities, the most successful developmental state policies facilitated 
dynamism in the value chain, including forward integration, outsourcing, 
and systems integration, in order to support the growth of dynamic 
capabilities at the firm level. 
 
In the thermal sub-sector, the Chinese developmental state nurtured 
manufacturing capabilities to great effect, but failed to facilitate 
entrepreneurial strategies of servitisation that characterised industry-
leading multinationals Siemens and GE. Policymakers maintained a 
traditional vertical division of labour between manufacturing firms, 
design institutes and construction companies, leaving the big three 
manufacturers with insufficient operating space in which to fashion 
higher-margin businesses. Profit margins consequently trailed far behind 
those of Siemens and GE. 
 
In the wind sub-sector, by contrast, the state’s admission of firms of all 
ownership types into a new business without legacy vested interests 
created a marketplace in which forward integration was facilitated and a 
firm’s dynamic capabilities became the source of critical competitive 
advantage. Goldwind and Envision distinguished themselves with 
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dynamic capabilities. Both firms pursued aggressive outsourcing, 
forward integration into wind farm development and servitisation. In 
turn, policymakers followed the development of the wind sub-sector 
pragmatically, adjusting regulations and the subsidy system to 
encourage competition based on lifetime turbine performance, which 
encouraged further competition in forward parts of the value chain.  
 
In the photovoltaics sub-sector, the NDRC and NEA failed to foresee the 
forward integration challenges for a technology that the agencies came 
to support belatedly. As a result, competition through dynamic 
capabilities was stymied. Local approval of utility solar farms, local 
subsidies for favoured firms, legal and financing challenges for DG 
projects, and the under-development of net-metering technology, all 
constrained forward integration and servitisation. The NDRC and NEA 
recognised the problems and introduced a range of policies to tackle 
them. Nonetheless, better research and better planning with respect to 
the forward segments of the value chain would have seen 
concentration, and improved margins and cashflows for the best firms, 
arrive more quickly.  
 
Photovoltaics, like the thermal sub-sector, demonstrated that it was not 
enough for planning agencies to plan for manufacturing capabilities 
alone; they needed to consider the entire value chain if infant industry 
policy was to be optimised and subsidy deployed efficiently. The more 
successfully the developmental state facilitates vertical dynamism and 
forward integration at the firm-level once basic production capabilities 
are in place, the more quickly the best firms achieve improved margins 
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that support R&D budgets, permitting them to challenge multinational 
peers through fundamental product innovation. 
 
6.3. Firm ownership as a variable in the acquisition of manufacturing 
versus dynamic capabilities 
The empirics of the thesis revealed a consistent pattern whereby state-
owned firms demonstrated no significant weakness relative to private 
firms in building narrow manufacturing capabilities. Moreover, in the 
earliest stages of capability building, as was the case in other FDCs (see 
Chapter 1), state firms offered advantages when the incipient 
developmental state sought to create vertical learning structures that an 
undeveloped private sector would not otherwise coordinate.  
 
However, in the transition from competition through manufacturing 
capabilities to competition by dynamic capabilities, in each sub-sector 
state ownership became a handicap. Through the 2000s and 2010s, 
private firms (including ones spawned by the state sector) showed 
repeatedly that they were faster, more flexible and more resourceful 
than state units in creating capabilities beyond basic manufacturing 
competence.  
 
This experience echoed Amsden and Chu’s (2003) two-stage heuristic in 
Taiwan where there was a transition from leadership by state 
enterprises pursuing import substitution industrialisation (ISI) to 
leadership by large private sector firms competing through marketing, 
differentiation and incremental innovation. Similarly, the ownership 
issue was found by Cusumano (1985) to have been fundamental to the 
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rise of the asset-light system integrator model in the Japanese 
automotive industry. The growth of outsourcing reflected the plight of 
capital-hungry private firms that were less indulged by state industrial 
policy, and subject to greater competition, compared with firms in 
sectors like electronics, which remained more vertically-integrated and 
less capital-efficient. In the case studies in this thesis, systems 
integration was driven by private firms with less access to state financial 
system credit than publicly-owned competitors.  
 
It has been claimed by some scholars that, by comparison with the 
experiences of the former Soviet Union, China illustrated that firm 
ownership is a less important issue in capability building than most 
economists propose (Naughton, 2010, Kroeber, 2008, Tian and Estrin, 
2008). This thesis suggests that, as China’s development progresses, 
ownership becomes an increasingly significant issue. China’s Leninist 
system facilitated the creation of vertical learning structures through 
which manufacturing capabilities were delivered. However, as China 
sought to develop advanced economic capabilities, state ownership 
became the handicap that orthodox economists argue it almost always is 
(Megginson and Netter, 2001). This is also the conclusion of a recent 
study of China’s IT industry (Fuller, 2016). The empirical regularity from 
the case studies in this thesis is summarised as follows: 
 
In the most successful firms, the development of manufacturing 
capabilities was less sensitive to state versus private ownership than was 
the development of dynamic capabilities. 
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In the thermal sub-sector, state firms raised Chinese manufacturing 
capabilities for coal turbine-generators sets from very low levels in the 
1970s to close to the global frontier in the 2000s. However, the big three 
state firms demonstrated little sensitivity to strategic competitive issues. 
They failed -- unlike private Japanese firms that licensed US and 
European technology -- to recognise the increasing commercial 
importance of LGT technology in a timely manner. They accepted the 
traditional division of labour in forward parts of the value chain, pressing 
only weakly to develop EPC, maintenance, monitoring and optimisation 
services. Nor did the firms seek opportunities in overseas markets to 
develop more forward-integrated business models; they were typically 
one party in the wholesale export of China’s traditional division of 
activities, working with other state firms that handled design and EPC 
aspects of foreign projects. When the wind sub-sector took off, the big 
three failed to compete effectively against private sector entrants, a 
failure that was frequently attributable to poor service capabilities 
(Chapter 4:section 4.3). Only Shanghai, in the offshore niche, built a 
substantial business that endured, and this was based on a Siemens 
technology license.  
 
With respect to pure wind turbine firms, state-owned, vertically-
integrated United Power rose to number two by volume through rapid 
absorption of manufacturing capabilities. The firm led in developing 
capabilities for manufacturing large-blade, low wind-speed turbines. 
However, as the locus of competition moved towards asset-light systems 
integration, complementary services and wind farm management, 
United Power’s competitive position weakened. There was a similar 
	 309	
trajectory for state-owned Dongfang. This was a clear contrast with 
Goldwind, which transitioned from state to private ownership, and 
always-private Envision, which developed far superior dynamic 
capabilities in forward segments of the value chain. 
 
In silicon feedstock production, privately-held GCL overtook MOST-
supported state firms not because it was able to master complex 
chemical production processes where state firms were not, but because 
of its capacity to recognise the need for, and deliver, a break-neck pace 
of capacity construction during a spike in feedstock prices. GCL’s 
greatest advantage was in a narrow, organisational subset of dynamic 
capabilities, not in manufacturing capabilities. 
 
The firm-level experience in terms of ownership in the case studies was 
directly reflected in developmental state policies that recognised that, 
while state ownership was not an impediment to the learning of 
manufacturing capabilities, it did become an impediment to the 
development of dynamic capabilities. Hence, effective state policies 
promoted a transition, summarised as follows:  
 
The most successful developmental state policies facilitated a transition 
from state to private ownership at the firm level in order to support the 
progression from competition based narrowly on manufacturing 
capabilities to competition based on dynamic capabilities. 
 
In the thermal sub-sector, the state’s failure to deliver private sector 
competition appeared to contribute to a sub-sector characterised by 
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limited dynamic capabilities and unable to challenge multinational 
leaders Siemens and GE. Even the strongest firm, Shanghai, showed only 
a weak appetite to disrupt the status quo within the sub-sector.  
 
In the wind sub-sector there was the clearest evidence of differential 
state and private sector firm performance. Unlike Siemens and GE in 
their home markets, none of the big three thermal firms was able to 
dominate the new wind turbine market. A new state sector entrant, 
United Power, acquired manufacturing capabilities quickly. However, no 
state firm could compete with Goldwind, which transitioned from state 
unit to private enterprise, and always-private Envision, when the keys to 
higher margins became asset-light systems integration, forward 
integration and servitisation. If government policy had restricted the 
wind sub-sector to state firms, it is unlikely China could have produced 
companies comparable in profit margin terms with global leaders. 
  
In the photovoltaic sector, the private sector required state industrial 
policy support for the development of manufacturing capabilities when 
MOST intervened to fund a silicon feedstock technology programme. 
That this programme would have been more effective if opened to 
private as well as state firms was clear when GCL stole some of the 
MOST-funded IP and quickly outstripped state competitors to become 
the dominant company in the sub-sector. 
 
The case studies suggested that state ownership was not an obstacle to 
the development of manufacturing capabilities and that state units were 
sometimes an efficient means to enter new businesses – including with 
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the inception of Suntech and Goldwind. However, as businesses 
developed and the need for flexible, entrepreneurial strategic leadership 
increased, the case for a transition to private ownership became 
powerful. This did not guarantee success, as the Suntech case 
demonstrated, but it did facilitate it, as in the case of Goldwind.  
 
6.4. Centralised versus firm-level technology bargaining as a variable in 
the acquisition of dynamic capabilities 
The empirics of the thesis showed how, in the early 1980s, centralised 
bargaining was extremely successful in the thermal sub-sector in 
minimising technology costs. In the late 1990s and 2000s, China 
continued to centrally bargain deals in which monopsony purchasing of 
technology was reported to be a powerful cost-saving tool, whether in 
the high-speed rail programme (Chen and Haynes, 2016, Lin et al., 2015) 
or nuclear power (Zhou and Zhang, 2010). 
 
In the wind and photovoltaics sub-sectors, technology bargaining was 
devolved to the firm level. Consistent with experience in Japan (Gregory, 
1985, Lynn, 1982, Peck and Tamura, 1976), China’s Ministry of Finance 
found that in the wind sub-sector firms’ technology costs were bid up 
significantly compared with centralised bargaining (Tan and Seligsohn, 
2010a). However, higher cost345 was offset by the diversity of 
technological paths pursued by Chinese firms, resulting in technological 
differentiation and new types of competitive advantage. 
 
																																																								
345 At least for some firms. As noted in the Envision case study, that firm secured manufacturing 
capabilities at very low cost. 
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At a theoretical level, the experience was consistent with the distinction 
between diffusion of mature technology (Eaton and Kortum, 1999, 
Surry, 1997, Vernon, 1966), in this instance bargained by the 
developmental state in order to minimise costs, and the innovation or 
recombination of technology in order to compete through differentiated 
products and services (Porter, 1998 (1980)). As discussed in the context 
of endogenous growth theory in chapter 1, in a developing country the 
latter form of competition requires both the development of requisite 
technical capabilities and an IP regime that allows for excludability of IP. 
As this paradigm is created, the empirics of the thesis indicated that a 
transition to firm-led technology bargaining was important to the 
growth of firms defined by their dynamic capabilities. The empirical 
regularity from the case studies can be summarised as:  
 
Monopsony technology bargaining minimised technology costs. 
Decentralised technology bargaining increased chances of positive 
technological differentiation. 
 
In the thermal sub-sector, central bargaining by the Chinese state 
secured a technology transfer deal which, by the admission of 
Westinghouse executives, cost the vendor money. US$13.8m did not 
even cover the expense of worker training and management 
consultancy. The technology itself, accompanied by critical source code, 
was in effect free, and no royalties were paid on domestic sales of 
turbine-generator sets. The experience highlighted the benefits to a 
monopsony FDC purchaser of targeting a commercially weak 
multinational seller that nonetheless held world-class technology.  
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However, the case studies also showed that a switch to firm-level 
bargaining produced benefits that central bargaining could not easily 
deliver. In the wind sub-sector, Goldwind’s acquisition of DDPM 
technology (Chapter 3:section 4.5) reflected entrepreneurial capabilities 
that state planners were unlikely to replicate. The firm not only 
identified a proven but little utilised technology, it also recognised that 
plummeting prices for rare earth materials meant that the time was ripe 
for scale DDPM production. Goldwind successively licensed DDPM 
technology, purchased control of the technology supplier Vensys, and 
integrated Vensys into its design and development capability-set.  
 
Envision’s technology acquisition path (Chapter 3:section 4.7) was still 
less likely to have been pursued by government planners. The firm’s 
entrepreneurial leaders identified Chinese and foreign production and 
logistics specialists at wind turbine joint ventures in China and in 
unrelated but complementary manufacturing sectors overseas, design 
specialists in Denmark, software specialists in the United States, and 
blade specialists in the United States; they built a manufacturing and 
value-added services team from the bottom-up, without any licensing. 
Central government would not likely have taken such an approach; nor 
would it have identified Envision’s founders, entrepreneurs with no 
previous experience in wind turbine manufacturing. 
 
In the photovoltaics sector, bargaining for critical silicon feedstock 
technology was centrally managed by MOST. However, the 
implementation process, via state firms, was slow, while soaring silicon 
	 314	
feedstock prices recommended speed. It was in this context that a 
private firm, GCL, appeared to illegally acquire MOST-funded IP as part 
of its assault on a business sector in which it had no previous experience. 
It was not only GCL’s capacity construction speed that the state planning 
apparatus could not replicate. The firm was entrepreneurial and flexible 
in identifying a mix of imported and domestic capital equipment, in 
taking a strategic risk with and mastering hydrochlorination technology 
before other Chinese firms, and in recruiting freelance international 
specialists to further increase its technological edge over domestic rivals.  
  
With respect to appropriate developmental state policy towards 
technology bargaining, this necessarily depends on the concentration, 
and hence pricing, of the technology sought. In the high-speed rail and 
nuclear industries, China negotiated for technology held by only a few 
multinational firms, making the case for monopsony bargaining 
stronger. In the wind sub-sector, technology was widely available from 
typically small design firms. In photovoltaics, mid-stream technology was 
embedded in manufacturing equipment that could gradually be reverse 
engineered in China, while silicon feedstock technology was mostly out 
of patent protection and could also be reverse engineered. Each 
business had its own technology bargaining characteristics. Nonetheless, 
as a general rule, the devolution of technology bargaining to the firm 
level supports the development of dynamic capabilities, an empirical 
observation from the case studies that can be summarised as: 
 
The most successful developmental state policies promoted the timely 
devolution of technology bargaining to the firm level to support the 
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development of dynamic capabilities and the transition to 
technologically differentiated competition. 
 
The devolution of technology bargaining in the case studies allowed the 
most capable firms to differentiate themselves. Goldwind’s DDPM 
technology choice, Envision’s disruptive combination of globally-
dispersed technology teams with a focus on product-complementary 
software, and GCL’s introduction of hydrochlorination all reflected, and 
required the growth of, their dynamic capabilities. Envision exploited the 
opportunity to manage technology acquisition to bring capabilities from 
a different industry, energy trading, to bear on the wind turbine 
business, consistent with Jacobides and Winter’s (2005) fourth 
proposition about maturing structures of production and the co-
evolution of capabilities and vertical scope. 
 
Devolution of technology bargaining was also linked to the ownership 
issue. It was private firms that exhibited a stronger record of sourcing 
technology outside joint ventures and licences. Privately-controlled 
Goldwind, Envision and GCL led in acquiring technology via foreign 
takeovers and in hiring foreign technical specialists as consultants or 
integrating them within their organisations. 
 
6.5. Infant industry policies and industrial overcapacity 
Consistent with experience in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan (Peck et 
al., 1987, Chang, 1994, Johnson, 1982), the empirics of this thesis 
showed that the signalling effect of infant industry policy, backed by an 
industry-focused, developmental state-controlled banking system, 
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encouraged production overcapacity. This was moderated in the thermal 
sub-sector by the non-admission of new firms, but not in the wind 
turbine and photovoltaic sub-sectors. In contrast to the common 
shorthand that industrial policy is about ‘picking winners’ (Pekkanen, 
2003, Little, 1996, Hindley, 1983), it was therefore necessary for the 
developmental state to identify mechanisms to weed out weaker firms, 
as noted by Chang (1994). This empirical regularity from the case studies 
can be summarised as: 
  
Infant industry policy tends inevitably to overcapacity. Successful 
developmental state policies involved the culling of weaker firms. 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, limited overcapacity in the thermal sub-
sector until recent years, the government did nothing to cull the 
weakest of the three entrants. By the 1990s, a pecking order of success 
was already apparent among the big three firms, while they remained 
much smaller in scale than multi-national peers (Nolan, 2001a). Harbin 
was the weakest of the big three but, despite many rumours to the 
contrary, the developmental state failed to merge it with one of the two 
more successful firms and thereby create a duopoly of larger companies 
able to command higher margins. This contributed, in the thermal sub-
sector, to the failure of any firm to challenge for leadership at a global 
level. 
 
In the wind sub-sector, the competitive landscape was transformed by 
the admission of hybrid and private firms. There was a large number of 
entrants, a development amplified by the tendency of local governments 
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to subsidise and protect local companies of all ownership types. In 2011, 
the NDRC therefore centralised the provision of all wind farm approvals 
and temporarily dampened aggregate demand. The result was the 
culling of large numbers of weaker wind turbine assemblers and 
component suppliers. This increased market shares and improved 
margins at the best companies, and paved the way for competition 
through differentiation and incremental innovation (Chapter 4:210pp). 
Goldwind, the most capable firm, increased its domestic market share 
from 18 percent in 2011 to 27 percent in 2016.  
 
In the photovoltaics sub-sector (Chapter 5), a similar pattern played out 
more fitfully. Local government support for local favourites, an even 
higher share of solar farm development being locally financed and 
approved versus the wind sub-sector, and lower mid-stream costs of 
entry, allowed hundreds of firms to start up. The NEA therefore adjusted 
the FIT structure to encourage more value-added DG development. This, 
however, faced a host of legal and financing problems that made the DG 
market slower to develop than planners desired. More efficaciously, 
from 2015 the NEA introduced the Top Runner programme that 
rewarded larger firms able to re-invest in new production machinery and 
raise solar conversion rates.  
 
A number of indicators suggested that in 2015-17, the NEA’s efforts to 
promote concentration and focus subsidy were yielding results. A group 
of six large photovoltaics firms – four mid-stream companies and two 
fully-integrated silicon feedstock producers – stabilised as the market’s 
leaders. Outsourcing of the lowest value-added manufacturing activity -- 
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module assembly -- increased rapidly. However, the infrastructural and 
institutional structure of the photovoltaics sector, particularly with 
respect to DG, was still, as of 2017, inimical to competition by 
differentiation in forward parts of the value chain. 
 
In general, the NEA’s successes in culling the weakest firms in the 
electricity-generating equipment industry showed this was easier with 
private-sector firms. In the thermal sub-sector, locally and nationally 
state-owned firms represented embedded vested interests that planners 
failed to face down. Harbin’s status as an historic national champion saw 
it retain its independence despite strong commercial logic for merger. 
 
 
In terms of the analytical framework of this thesis, the three transition 
issues that recurred in the case studies as a state-led development 
process moved towards one driven by entrepreneurial firms are set out 
in Figure 1. The findings suggest that the study of innovation systems in 
developing countries should give transitions a central place in whichever 
heuristic is employed, recognising that the firm-level progression from 
building manufacturing capabilities to subsequently developing tacit, 
organisational and strategic capabilties involves a fundamental 
qualitative shift. As this process occurs, developmental state policy must 
make substantial adjustments if it is to support the creation of world-
class firms. To date, literature on innovation systems in developing 
economies has tended to treat industrial policy as monolithic when the 
case studies in this thesis showed that the most effective industrial 
policy is as dynamic as the high-performing firms it seeks to nurture.  
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Figure 10. Developmental state and entrepreneurial firm: transition 
issues 
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This thesis attempted to contribute by highlighting ‘developmental state 
capitalism’ as a simplistic notion. Instead, the thesis showed that the 
developmental state is not a condition, but a problem solving institution 
that, if successful, works itself out of a job. The developmental state 
does so as part of the transition from a dirigiste economy in which it 
focuses firms on learning to a decentralised economy in which atomistic, 
entrepreneur-led firms, and arm’s-length markets, play the dominant 
role as profit margins and firm-level R&D investment become the keys to 
global competitiveness. The state, the entrepreneurial firm and the 
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arm’s length market are always present, but the balance between them 
changes greatly during the accelerated economic development process 
that characterises an FDC. 
 
This thesis is subject to a number of clear limitations. The empirical 
research concerns three sub-sectors of a single industry in China, 
supported by a survey of complementary secondary empirics in other 
industries in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan presented in Chapter 1. The 
findings that were set out in this chapter are not put forward as 
generalisable to all industries. Instead, it is hoped the findings will be 
tested in longitudinal studies of other industries in China, and in FDC 
economies more generally. 
 
The limitations of cross-sectional studies, which have predominated in 
the economic development literature, were discussed in Chapter 1. This 
thesis highlights the limitations of longitudinal research. Such research 
provides context and perspective, identifying change at the state and 
firm levels over a long period. However, in a single study this can only be 
done for one industry strand within the overall microeconomy. This 
shortcoming would be less egregious if more industry histories were 
written, and it is hoped that in future more longitudinal business 
research will be undertaken in China, and in FDCs generally. 
 
Broadly, this thesis highlights the need for further research on the role 
of public versus private ownership in building different industrial 
capabilities in emerging economies. The clearer that policymakers’ 
understanding is of the issues surrounding firm ownership, the more 
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likely it is that governments will harness the benefits of state ownership 
without succumbing to its drawbacks in promoting the development of 
globally competitive firms. Similarly, there is scope for more empirical 
studies of transitions in technology bargaining in emerging economies in 
order to better understand the trade-offs between centralised and 
decentralised bargaining.  
 
The case study of Envision in the thesis suggests that further research is 
merited into the phenomenon of ‘born global’ firms (Cavusgil and 
Knight, 2009, Knight and Cavusgil, 2004, Zhou et al., 2007) in the middle 
reaches of development in China. Contrary to the Linder (1961) ‘home 
market’ hypothesis that comparative advantage is first developed 
through domestic demand, Envision entered directly into software 
development for American clients, as well as the operation of overseas 
wind farms. Much of the reason for this was the pool of returnee human 
capital available to Envision. The role of specialist returnee labour was 
important in the mid-term development of Japan (Gregory, 1985, Morita 
et al., 1986, Lockwood et al., 1970), South Korea (Urata and Lall, 
2003:chapter 6) and Taiwan (Saxenian and Hsu, 2001). However, the 
tendency has been more pronounced in China, which integrated earlier 
and more fully into the global economy than Cold War Japan, South 
Korea and Taiwan. That this may give rise to a particular ‘cosmopolitan 
advantage’ for China’s development is suggested by recent industry 
studies of electronics, software and the Internet (Clark, 2016, Fuller, 
2016) and warrants further research.  
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Finally, it is hoped that strategic management scholars – whose work 
this thesis suggests has much to contribute in developing countries – will 
conduct more research focused directly on emerging economies. The 
firm-level focus of strategic management research holds out the 
potential to redress a traditional bias in studies of FDCs towards state 
industrial policy, rather than transitions between state policy and 
entrepreneurial, firm-led development.  	
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Appendix 1: interviewees 
 
Code Cumulative 
Total 
Description 
Th1 1 Senior manager, Westinghouse China operations 
Th2 2 Senior manager, Westinghouse China operations 
Th3 3 Technical director, Westinghouse China operations 
Th4 4 Technology licensing specialist, Westinghouse US 
Th5 5 Senior manager, strategy, Siemens China operations 
Th6 6 Senior manager, Siemens China operations 
Th7 7 Senior manager, Westinghouse China operations 
Th8 8 Senior technology licensing manager, Westinghouse US 
Th9 9 Senior manager, Shanghai 
Th11 10 Technical director, retired, Shanghai 
Th12 11 Senior manager, wind turbines, Shanghai 
Th13 12 Senior manager, retired, Shanghai 
Th14 13 Senior manager, retired, Shanghai 
Th15 14 Wind turbine consultant to Shanghai, Europe-based 
Th16 15 Wind turbine consultant to Shanghai, Europe-based 
W1 16 Chairman, President or CEO, Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturer 
W2 17 Wind and solar industry consultant and technology supplier, 
China-based 
W3 18 Senior manager, Sinovel 
W4 19 Senior technical specialist, Goldwind 
W5  20 Senior manager, strategy, Goldwind 
W6  21 Senior manager, strategy, Goldwind 
W7 22 Senior manager, finance, Goldwind 
W8 23 Senior manager, strategy, Mingyang 
W9 24 Senior manager, sales, Mingyang 
W10 25 Technical specialist, Mingyang 
W11 26 Technical director, Envision 
W12 27 Senior manager, strategy, Envision 
W13 28 Chairman, President or CEO, Chinese wind turbine 
manufacturer 
W14 29 Technical director, software, Envision 
W15 30 Senior manager, strategy and technology, Envision 
W16 31 Sales (formerly service) manager, Envision 
W17 32 Senior manager, strategy and investment, Envision 
W18 33 Wind technology specialist, ‘Invest in Denmark’ investment 
promotion agency 
W19 34 China sales specialist, Romax Tech (Drivetrain), UK-based 
W20 35 Senior manager, Romax Tech (Drivetrain), UK-based 
W21 36 China focused technical specialist, Garrad Hassan, UK-based 
W22 37 Technical specialist, Aerodyn, Germany-based 
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W23 38 Technical specialist, Mita-Teknik, Denmark-based 
W24 39 Technical specialist, Mita-Teknik, Denmark-based 
S1 40 Chairman, President or CEO, Chinese photovoltaics 
manufacturer 
S2 41 Senior manager, marketing, Canadian Solar 
S3 42 Manager, investor relations, Suntech 
S4 43 Manager, sales, Yingli 
S6 44 Senior manager and technical specialist, LDK 
S7 45 Manager, strategy, Yingli 
S8 46 Manager, strategy, Suntech 
S9 47 Senior manager and technical specialist, GCL 
S10 48 Manager, strategy, Suntech 
S11 49 Manager, investor relations, Suntech 
S12 50 Journalist, Beijing-based 
S13 51 Manager, business development and strategy, GCL 
S14 52 Manager, GCL 
S15 53 Technical specialist, GCL 
S16 54 Technical specialist, GCL 
S17 55 Technical specialist, GCL 
S18 56 Senior manager, GCL 
S19 57 Technical specialist, GCL 
S20 58 Technical specialist, GCL 
S21 59 Photovoltaics sector financial analyst, Hong Kong-based 
S23 60 Technical consultant to case study firms, Holland-based 
S24 61 Technical consultant to case study firms, Holland-based 
S25 62 Technical consultant to case study firm, UK-based 
S26 63 Technical consultant to case study firms, US-based 
   
G1 64 Department director, NDRC 
G2 65 Manager, Energy Research Institute (ERI)  
G3 66 Professor and NDRC consultant, Tsinghua University 
G4 67 Senior manager, ERI 
G5 68 Senior manager, China Renewable Energy Industry Association 
(CREIA) 
G6 69 Professor and government consultant, Jiaotong University, 
Shanghai 
G7 70 Senior researcher responsible for China, International Energy 
Association (IEA) 
G8 71 Senior researcher on renewables, World Bank China mission 
G9 72 Researcher, Institute of Energy, Environment and Economy, 
Tsinghua University 
G10 73 Researcher, ERI 
G11 74 Researcher, CREIA 
   
Other:  
S5  Private equity financier to photoltaics sector, Singapore-based 
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S27  Private equity financier to photoltaics sector, Hong Kong-based 
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Appendix 2: standardised, semi-structured interview questions  
 
My research: I am looking at the relationship between firms and the 
state in conditions of effective industrial policy (such as has been used in 
Asia in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China). 
cr=µ$¤nxo`r°´#9/@nX$
²Ls{´JF´7@F³ 
Here are five important introductory questions that I ask the leaders the 
companies I look at: 
Atc.h:#9±K95 5"`ILµ 
I.                   How do you think about the nature of competition in your 
industry? Specifically: 
_	\eG¤*`´&~µ 
What has been the nature of competition in your industry so far? If you 
have to name the 3 most important dimensions of competition until 
today, what would you list? 
,´eG¤*`t_% ¶6=), 3
w¬¥*¶²Pt=*r°´d¡´N G
a#9@%#9
<	C"a#9´L=GC´´
g$³a3]tB¶ 
If you have to name what you think will be the 3 most important 
dimensions of competition in the next few years, is there any 
difference? 
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L¯¥ 0z~(V 3w¬¥*´@,°x
e0¶ 
[I do not offer suggested answers to these questions. I want answers 
that are not influenced by me to begin with. However, I will make 
suggestions during the meeting.] 
²cZaE´vb>*a{b´t´c
l)cY8³ 
II.                 How do you think about the nature of your firm’s 
relationship with the state (in all its different forms, at the national level, 
the local level, with politicians, with planners like the NDRC, with state 
financial institutions). Specifically: 
a6?#9@nX$xB¶²:;r°$´
LmM´­£|³&~µ 
In which relationships can you hope to influence government decisions? 
GB$KI´a3]xUy[A*nX'¶ 
In which relationships do you feel you are only reacting to policy and 
trying to understand it? 
GB$KI´a3]5¢nW;¦¶ 
 
III.              How do you think about your firm’s strategic choices in the 
value chain / about strategic choices in terms of vertical integration? 
Specifically: 
a_	?#9G	FC"/d¡=G+=/r
°C"´&~=µ 
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What decided your choices in the past and, with the benefit of hindsight, 
which decisions were right and which were wrong? What have you 
learned about the nature of the value chain for your firm? 
@1atj	~'´L<~´B't´
BtH<´ja¦´a6?#9	F`t	¶ 
In terms of the future, how do you think about which parts of the value 
chain you need to control now and how confident are you that you have 
understood the strategic challenge clearly? Please give a brief 
description of your firm’s value chain. 
Pz~~´a3],	FB'/t¯¥k+´a3]a
§uH¦A`i¶ 
IV.              How do you think about and strategise innovation? And how 
does the Chinese government and different levels think about and 
strategise innovation? Specifically: 
aL\
qWO
q>´&~´  
How does the way the government thinks about 
and strategises innovation differ from the way you actually see 
innovation happening in practice in your industry? 
a3]nX,
q3¨
q¦@´@#9
G¤¨S,B¤
qxB;¶ 
  V.                What determines the emphasis you place on growing export 
sales? Specifically: 
t	7a3]¯¥¬2)4TGC²JT³´&~´ 
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In the past. G@1# ´t	¶ 
In the future. Gz~´2t	¶ 
[ends] ²-}³ 
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